Demography: Report
Fertility Differences: US vs.
Canada
Canadian
and U.S. fertility divergence
Marriage,
divorce, common-law unions
Other
factors influencing fertility
Implications
of diverging fertility
==============================
The Northern America
Fertility Divide
Policy Review, AUGUST & SEPTEMBER
2005, pp.39-55.
By BARBARA BOYLE
TORREY AND
NICHOLAS EBERSTADT
Barbara Boyle Torrey is visiting scholar at the Population Reference
Bureau. Nicholas Eberstadt holds the Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at
the American Enterprise Institute.
CANADA AND THE U.S. are more similar to each other than any two other
large countries on the planet today. We share a language, a continent, and a
colonial history. Our two affluent and resource-rich countries, moreover, have
forged the largest trading bond in the modern world.[1] Since the implementation of NAFTA in 1993, of
course, the volume of U.S.-Canadian trade has steadily increased; this economic
integration is drawing the two economies ever closer.
Yet for all their similarities — and the unfolding forces pressing for
still greater homogenization — Canada and the United States are remarkably
distinct from one another. In recent years, government policies in these two
similar countries have diverged recurrently, and conspicuously, on a number of
issues: Think of Iraq, missile defense, lumber, gay marriage, and marijuana.
And these highly visible differences may not be the biggest ones. A quiet and
as yet largely unrecognized divergence may be even more fundamental. Its
indicators are found in the relatively new but steadily increasing
differentiation of demographic trends in North America.
Twenty-five years ago the population profiles of Canada and the United
States were similar. Both were younger than their European allies, and their
societies were more heterogeneous. In 1980 their populations had almost the
same median age, fertility rates, and immigration rates. In the years since
then, small changes in demographic variables have accumulated, ultimately
creating two very different countries in North America by the end of the
twentieth century.
Canadians now have half a child fewer than Americans during their
lifetimes — their fertility level is roughly 25 percent lower than that of
their neighbors south of the border — and they are living two years longer.
Both populations are growing at about the same rate, but the components of
growth have diverged. Immigration is relatively more important in Canada’s
growth rate, and fertility is more important in the United States.
Canadians marry later and less often than Americans. They enter
common-law unions more often and their children are increasingly likely to be
born out of wedlock. Canadians and Americans have similar labor force
participation rates, but Americans work more hours per year. They have higher
incomes but less leisure. And even though Canada’s birth rate is now
substantially lower than America’s, the Canadian government provides more child
services and benefits than the U.S. government.
Changes in patterns of marriage and fertility are the accumulated
outcomes of millions of personal decisions by men and women. When couples, one
at a time, make decisions that differ in aggregate from the couples in a
neighboring country, it is a reflection of deliberate agency rather than mere
chance. That’s why the still-widening demographic gap that has opened up
between Canada and the U.S. says even more about the two societies and their
futures than public or policy differences on any single issue. It also
demonstrates that macroeconomic integration since NAFTA may not have had a
homogenizing effect at a household level. This exploration should make
Canadians who fear becoming too much like the U.S. a bit less fearful.
Why fertility may change
ONE OF THE most important and interesting debates in demography today
centers on the decline in fertility in developed countries. When the decline in
total fertility rates begins and when it stops is of importance not only to
demographers, but also to societies. Age structure changes that are caused by
declining fertility have far-reaching ripple effects: They touch on all
age-specific activities and programs throughout society.
Over the past generation, childbearing patterns in nearly all developed
countries have changed significantly, falling to levels that (if continued
indefinitely in the absence of immigration) would presage a steady shrinking of
successive generations. This shift to markedly sub-replacement fertility
patterns (and the accompanying changes in marital patterns) has been dubbed
“the second demographic transition” by demographers.[2] This “transition,”
however, constitutes a set of facts in search of a theory — the reasons for
this dramatic demographic shift remain to be explained.
There are competing explanations in the fertility debates. The “Family
Economics” hypothesis focuses on the changing value of women’s time due to
their labor force participation.[3] It suggests that the opportunity cost of
having children increases directly with women’s education and income. According
to this theory, fertility will be likely to fall as women become better
educated and more employable, at least up to the point at which women’s incomes
become larger than their partners’. Beyond that point, the theory predicts,
further increases in women’s economic opportunity would become positively
related to fertility.
The “Relative Income” hypothesis suggests that large birth cohorts will
have more trouble reaching their expected income goals than smaller cohorts.[4]
For relatively large birth cohorts, the theory conjectures that female labor
force participation rates would rise and fertility rates would fall as women
try to reach their income goals. A modification of this hypothesis suggests
that women’s participation in the labor force depends on how close males’ wages
are to their joint expectations: Females’ wages would have either a net
positive income effect on their future fertility or a net negative opportunity
cost effect depending on their role in fulfilling the couple’s income
expectations.[5]
The “Role Incomparability” hypothesis posits that the ability of women
to combine childbirth and work is a strong determinant of how many children
they will eventually have.[6] Government policies, such as child care provisions,
child-friendly labor practices and child benefits, are important in explaining
fertility trends in specific countries. In addition to the hypotheses above,
some researchers believe that a significant factor in fertility rates may be
cultural values, such as religion.
The various hypotheses about why total fertility rates change are not
necessarily incompatible. All of the factors they suggest may be important, and
their importance may vary over the life cycle of an individual or cohort.
Family formation is a complex social phenomenon that has no single determinant
or simple explanation. Comparing the fertility in two societies increases the
complexity of the analysis. But following the question of why fertility differs
between neighbors can be revealing of fundamental differences that may be
unacknowledged — and of erstwhile similarities that have been forgotten.
Canadian and U.S. fertility divergence
CANADIANS HAVE 25 percent fewer children than Americans today, though
historically they have had more children. In 1945 Canadian women had a half
child more than American women (a total fertility rate of 3.0 vs. 2.5). And the
fertility rate in Quebec was even higher than the Canadian average. Each
country had a major baby boom after World War II, but Canada’s boom was louder.
Both booms peaked in 1959 and then declined. By 1966 the total fertility rates
in both countries were equal (2.7), and they declined together to about 1.8
children in 1978. In the late 1970s the fertility rates began to diverge, with
the Canadian rate sinking slowly to the current level of 1.49 and the U.S.
fertility rate increasing back up toward the replacement rate; it has remained
slightly above 2.0 for almost a decade and a half (see Figure 1).
FIGURE 1
Total Fertility Rates (number of children per woman)
Source: Statistics Canada, Current Demographic Analysis: Fertility in
Canada 1984, 130; Report on the Demographic Situation 2002,130. U.S. National
Vital Statistics Report 51:2 (December 2002).
This slow but inexorable divergence over the past quarter-century can be
accounted for by a number of factors (which are not additive; some categories
overlap):
Americans have their babies earlier than Canadians. American teenagers
have 2.5 times as many births as Canadian teenagers (52 per 1,000 vs. 20). This
represents about one third of the difference in fertility between the U.S. and
Canada. Two-thirds of the difference is caused by earlier American births to
women in their 20s.
Minorities in the U.S. have higher fertility rates than the non-Hispanic
white population, especially in the younger age groups. If all American women
had the fertility rates of non-Hispanic white women, it would reduce the
fertility divergence with Canada by 0.2 children.[7]
Geography also matters in heterogeneous countries. If the non-Hispanic
white fertility rates in American border states and neighboring Canadian
provinces are compared, the divergence in the national fertility rates is
reduced from 0.5 children per woman to 0.4 (0.38) children. That can explain
about 20 percent of the difference in fertility, leaving 80 percent
unexplained.[8]
The important point to underscore in these disaggregations is not what
they can explain about current differences in Canadian-U.S. fertility
differences, but rather what they cannot. The closest “apples to apples”
comparison across the Canadian-U.S. borders would be for the ethnic majority
populations of the two nations. In the United States today, period total
fertility rates for the non-Hispanic white population are substantially higher
than for their counterparts in Canada. That gap has steadily increased over the
past generation, and by all indications it is continuing to increase.
Disaggregating trends can’t tell us why the differences among ages, ethnic groups,
and geography exist. But it can point to subsequent questions to ask. In this
case, the differences in the timing of births lead to follow-up questions about
patterns of marriage, divorce and other forms of unions.
Marriage, divorce, common-law unions
IN 1975 BOTH CANADIANS AND AMERICANS had relatively high rates of
marriage. The Canadian rate of 9 per 1,000 was 90 percent of the U.S. rate of
10 per 1,000. Crude marriage rates in Canada have declined 40 percent since
1975, while the U.S. rate has declined 15 percent. Consequently the Canadian
marriage rate today is only 60 percent of the U.S. rate.
Historically, Canadians have married at an older age than Americans, and
that difference has increased recently. The 3.9-year increase in age at first
marriage for Canadian women since 1980 is higher than the 3.1-year increase for
U.S. women. Not only do Canadian women get married later on average than
American women, but they also wait longer to have their first child. In 1999,
the age of a Canadian mother at her first birth was three years (2.9) older
than the American mother. The increases in Canadian ages at first marriage and
first births relative to U.S. are consistent with a relative decrease in
Canadian fertility. But the U.S. increases in ages at first marriage and first
birth seem at odds with the absolute increases in U.S. fertility since 1980.
Although Canadians enter marriage later than Americans, they have longer
marriages because they divorce less often. The Canadian Divorce Act of 1968 for
the first time provided “no-fault” divorce after a formal separation of three
years. Two decades later, in 1986, the Divorce Act was amended to reduce the
time of formal separation to a year. It also made divorce generally available
in Quebec for the first time. Despite these changes in the divorce laws,
Canadians still use this option only half as often as Americans. Of course,
Americans, who marry earlier and divorce more often, have more time to have
multiple marriages — and divorces. This marital optimism of Americans tends to
increase their rates of marriage and divorce.
One of the reasons that the marriage rate is declining and age of first
marriage increasing in both countries is because of the increase in common-law
unions, which grew from 6 percent of all couples in Canada in 1981 to 14
percent in zooi (see Figure 2). Increases in common-law unions, however, are
not compensating for the decreases in marriage among Canadians aged 20-29.
The equivalent estimates of cohabitation for the United States are 3
percent and 9 percent. The majority of first unions in Canada are now common-
law unions, as they are in the United States (in 1990-94, 57 percent and 54
percent respectively).
“Common-law union” is an imprecise term and an imperfea statistic. In
some surveys, it includes a union of either opposite-sex or same-sex partners;
in other areas it refers only to opposite-sex partners. In both Canadian and
American Censuses, common-law unions or cohabitation is self-defined.[9]
Because the definition of cohabitation or common-law marriages is still a term
of art and a state of mind, international comparisons should be made with
caution.
FIGURE 2
Common-Law Unions (percent of all couples)
Canada Quebec U.S.
Source: Statistics Canada “Common Law Unions in Canada End of 20th
Century; Profile of Source:
Jean Dumas and Alain Belanger, “Common-Law Unions in Canada at the End
of the 20th Century,”
Report on the Demographic Situation in Canada 1996, (Statistics Canada,
March 1997). Larry Bumpass
and Hsien-Hen Lu, “Trends in Cohabitation and Implications for
Children’s Family Contexts in the
United States,” Population Studies 54:1 (March 2000). Stephanie Ventura
and Christine Bachrach,
“Nonmaritat Childbearing in the United States, 1940-99,” National Vital
Statistics Reports 48:16
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, October 18, 2000) Jason
Fields and Lynne M. Casper,
“America’s Families and Living Arrangements: March 2000,” Current
Population Reports P-20-S37
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2001).
The General Social Survey in Canada also asked about common law status
defined as “a sexual relationship while sharing the same usual address.” This
survey was done by telephone where the interviewer could provide clarification.
It therefore presumably measured the number of such unions bener rhan rhe
Canadian Census, which was a self-report without clarification.
In the United States, indirect estimation techniques have been used on
Decennial Census and Current Population Survey results to estimate the number
of “cohabiting adults.” In the late 1970s, researchers at the Census Bureau
developed a new measure to help them estimate indirectly the number of
cohabiting adults. The measure is fondly referred to as POSSLQ, “Persons of the
Opposite Sex Sharing Living Quarters.” POSSLQ is a term only a statistician
could iove. The problem with the measure is that it wouldn’t necessarily
capture the cohabiting couple that was living with other adults in the same
living quarters. It would, however, mistakenly capture two adults living together
as roommates platonically. And it never Included a couple living with children,
which is not unusual with cohabiting couples. An attempt to correa this
undercount was made by researchers at the Census Bureau with an “Adjusted
POSSLQ” measure that did include households with unmarried couples and
children. This adjusted measure suggests that the original POSSLQ undercounted
the cohabiting couples by between 12 percent and 19 percent historically. In
1990 the U.S. Decennial Census for the first time provided the option of
“unmarried partner” with respect to the relationship to the householder. The
Current Population Survey did not provide this option until 1995. Four recent
U.S. surveys also provide direct measurement of cohabitation. The National
Survey of Family and Households, the National Survey of Family Growth, the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, and the Survey of Income and Program
Participation. The surveys focused on family growth, and families and
households give higher estimates of cohabitation than estimates based on the
decennial Census or Current Population Survey. For example, in 1995 the POSSLQ
estimate based on Current Population Survey is about 6 percent; the estimate
from the National Survey of Family Crowth is about i z percent. See Larry
Bumpass and Hsien-Hen Lu; “Trends in Cohabitation and Implications for
Children’s Family Contexts in the United States,” Population Studies 54:1
(March 2000). Unfortunately, estimates from the surveys cover a much shorter
period of time, truncating any historical trends. Therefore, this paper uses
the historical estimates of cohabitation from the CPS and Census but cautions
readers that it is almost certainly underestimating the true number.
The kinds of women entering common-law unions are quite different in
Canada and the U.S. In 1995, Canadian women whose first union was common-law
were more Hkely to have been to university than to have dropped out of high
school, although the differences were not statistically significant.[10] In the
United States in 1995 American women who had ever cohabited were more likely
not to have graduated from high school than to have had some college education.
And the American women were as likely to be white as black (45 percent); in
Canada they were most likely to be Francophone Quebecois.
FIGURE 3
Out of Wedlock Births (percent of all births to unmarried mothers)
Sources: jean Dumas and Alain Belanger, “Common-Law Unions in Canada at
the End of the 20th Century,” Report on the Demographic Situation in Canada
1996, (Statistics Canada, March 1997). Larry Bumpass and Hsien-Hen Lu, “Trends
in Cohabitation and Implications for Children’s Family Contexts in the United
States,” Popubtion Studies S4:l (March 2000). Stephanie Ventura and Christine
Bachrach, “Nonmarital Childbearing in the United States, 1940-99,” National
Vital Statistics Reports 48:16 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
October 18, 2000) Jason Fields and Lynne M. Casper, “America’s Families and
Living Arrangements: March 2000,” Current
Population Reports P-20- 537 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001). CANSm2
Statcan.ca/cgi-winTTablel02-4506
Among Canadians in the same age groups, common-law unions are almost
twice as likely to dissolve as marriages.[11] This may be one of the reasons
that the fertility rate of women in common-law unions is much lower than in
marriages. In the 1985-94 period, the total fertility rates of Canadian women
in common-law unions for their entire fertile years was 1.44, whereas it was
over two children for those who were married.
One reason common-law unions may be more prevalent in Canada than in the
U.S. is because they are legally recognized more explicitly there. The Income
Tax Act of Canada treats a common-law union as a marriage if the parties have a
child together or have lived together for at least one year.
Canadian Pension Plan benefits pass on to the partner at death, though
partners cannot share property unless it is jointly owned. In contrast, most
U.S. states have abolished common-law marriage by statute. Ten states continue
to have varying forms of recognition; five recognize such unions only if they
began prior to a certain date. New Hampshire recognizes common-law unions for
inheritance only.
Out-of-wedlock births, including those in common-law unions, have
increased in both countries — i.e., the drop in total marital fertility rates
has been offset to a degree by the total nonmarital fenility rates. In Canada
the percentage of children born out of wedlock has grown from 13 in 1980 to 28
in 2002. The equivalent numbers for the United States are 18 and 34 (see Figure
3). In both countries the increase since 1980 in out-of-wedlock births is
largely because of the increasing number of births of common-law unions. And
nearly all of that increase in the U.S was among non-Hispanic white women. In
Canada, however, the increase in out-of-wedlock births has not offset the
decrease in births in wedlock.
Other factors influencing fertility
RESEARCH SUGGESTS
SEVERAL Other possible influences that may help suggest why Canada and U.S. fertility
rates have diverged: income and labor force trends, government programs and
policies, and values and the role of religion.
Income and labor force influences. In both the New Family Economics and the Relative Income hypotheses,
fertility is affected by income and women’s labor-force participation rate. At
a macro level, gross national income in both countries has increased
substantially since 1975. But the national fertility rates went in opposite
directions. Canada’s national fertility rate declined as gross national income
(GNI) grew and the U.S.’s national fertility rate increased (see Figures 4 and
5). This suggests that growth in national income will not be a discriminating
factor in explaining the opposite fertility trends.
Women’s labor-force participation rates are also very similar in each
country. Since 1980 women’s civilian employment rates (16 years and older) in
Canada and the United States started at just below 50 percent and climbed to
56-57 percent in z o o i . Canadian women aged 15-24 were employed at slightly
higher ratios than in the U.S. in 1990, but the U.S. rate was higher in 2000.
The ratio of women’s employment to the population 25-54 years old has been
almost the same in both countries since 1983. The labor-force participation
rates for women with no children, one child, and two or more are also very
similar to each others differing by no more than three percentage points over
the period. And the number of women 16 and over who work part time has not
changed much in either country and remains within one percentage point of each
other.
FIGURES 4 AND 5
Canada and the United States: GNI per capita vs total fertility rate
1975-2001
Source: World Bank — World Development Indicators CD-ROM 2003, US Census
Intemational Data Base.
Although the part-time labor-force participation rates are similar
between Canada and the United States for all ages, they differ for women in
their childbearing and child-caring years. Part-time employment is much more
prevalent in Canada for women 25-54, and the percentage increases with the
number of children they have (as it does in the U.S.). The increased prevalence
of part-time work in Canada for women 25-54 might make it easier to juggle the
roles of parent and worker.
Although labor force participation rates between the two countries are
similar, since 1980 the economic uncertainties have not been. Canadian
unemployment rates have been 5 o percent to 7 5 percent higher than in the
United States as officially reported and as adjusted for comparability.[12]
Over the period 1973-90, the adjusted Canadian unemployment rates averaged 8.1
percent, while the rate was 6.9 percent in the U.S. Between 1990 and 2000, the
average rates increased to 8.6 percent and 5.6 percent respectively. On the
other hand, Canadian job stability (four-year retention rate) increased
slightly between 1987 and 1995, while U.S. stability declined slightly.[13]
American women work more hours than Canadian women, partly because
Canada has higher unemployment rates and higher part-time work rates. The
difference in hours worked has increased from two weeks in 1979 to three weeks
in 2000. In 2001, employed Americans, both men and women, worked 10 percent
more hours than employed Canadians, and they were 10 percent more productive. Part
of the reason Americans were more productive was because Canadians took twice
as much vacation leave as Americans. The result of these and other factors was
that Americans had 17 percent more real income per capita than Canadians in
2001.[14]
The lower incomes of Canadians may have a positive effect on female
labor-force participation rates; it may also make Canadian women feel that they
can’t afford to have children as early as American women with higher household
incomes. On the other hand, American women are working more hours than
Canadians, which would make bearing and raising children in the U.S. more
difficult according to the Role Incompatibility hypothesis. Another way that
unmet income expectations could affect fertility is if they resulted in a lack
of affordable housing for young people. The homeownership rates (including
cooperative housing) by age of household head are slightly higher before 50
years of age in Canada than in the U.S; American homeownership rates of older
household heads are higher than Canada’s.[15] The down payment ratio average
from 1970 to 1995 was higher in Canada (23.3 percent) than in the U.S. (17
percent), and the Canadians cannot deduct their mortgage interest from their
income tax as the U.S. homeowner can. (However, the U.S. tax deduction makes
the owning of a U.S. home cheaper, and therefore may tend to bid up the price
of U.S. homes, which at least partly offsets the tax benefit.) Homeownership
rates in Canada and the U.S. are not different enough to appear to be a cause
of the differences in their fertility.
And homeownership costs within Canada do not explain the variance in
total fertility rates within Canada. The Royal Bank of Canada’s Housing
Affordability Index is the percentage of pretax household income taken up by
homeownership costs. The index for the last quarter of 2003 ranges from 26.8
percent in the Atlantic Provinces to 42.9 percent in British Columbia. The
provinces had the same fertility rate in 2001 (1.4). Housing affordability and
fertility are uncorrelated both in 1990 and 2003, suggesting that homeownership
costs are unrelated to the patterns of fertility within Canada as well as
between Canada and the United States.
Government policies on children. The lower household incomes in Canada compared with the United States
could be partly offset by government policies. Public policies, such as cash
benefits, services, or tax policy may change income incentives for having
children if they reduce the cost of raising them. In terms of the percentage of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the U.S. spent about 0.23 percent on family cash
benefits in 1999. It had been twice that level in 1980 but had slowly declined
to the 0.2 percent range by 1986 and had stayed there. It also provided another
0.28 percent of GDP in family services in 1999. The two forms of U.S.
government programs combined were 0.51 percent of GDF. The equivalent numbers
for Canada were 0.74 percent of GDP, provided in family cash benefits. (The
last year of OECD data on Canadian family services was 1990, and it was then
only 0.08 percent). These data suggest that the Canadian government spends
about 50 percent more of their GDP for their family benefits than the U.S.
provides for benefits and services combined.
The Canadian government also provides a much more generous parental
leave policy. Maternity leave of 15 weeks began in 1971; in 1990, ten more
weeks were added for either parent to claim. In 2000, parent leave benefits
were increased again to 3 5 weeks of paid leave (up to 5 5 percent of prior
weekly insurable earnings up to a maximum of $413 a week.) The percentage of
mothers taking between nine and i z months of leave went from 8 percent
in 2000 to 47 percent in 2001. Ten percent of fathers participated in parental
leave in 2001, up from three percent the year before.[16]
The generosity of the Canadian parental leave system stands in contrast
to the American system. The U.S. 1993 Family Medical and Leave Act allows
employees to take up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave a year for family or
medical reasons. Canadian public policies are more generous in both cash
benefits and in parental leave benefits than the U.S. system — which should
make having children easier and encourage higher Canadian fertility. But larger
Canadian government programs are not enough incentive to offset the decrease in
total fertility rates, nor are the smaller U.S. government programs a
disincentive to offset U.S increases in fertility.
Values and religion. The role of values
in explaining social trends such as fertility is harder to quantify than
personal income or government services. But changing values may still hold
insights that the better-quantified variables cannot. A number of studies have
documented differences in some core values between Canada and the United States.
And other studies have shown how some values may be related to birthrates.[17]
One value that is correlated with fertility is the role of the man in
the family. A recent survey asked people in Canada and the U.S. whether they
agreed that “The father of the family must be master in his own house.” The
percentage of people agreeing with that statement was highly correlated with
total fertility rates across Canadian provinces and U.S. regions in 2000. The
lowest agreements were in the Canadian provinces, with the lowest being in
Quebec, at 15 percent, and the highest being in Alberta, which was only six
percentage points higher. All of the U.S. regions were higher than any of the
Canadian provinces.[18] And the variance among the U.S. regions was much higher
than in Canada. The percentage of households surveyed in the South agreed with
the statement more than twice as much as in New England.
Another value that is both measurable and germane to fertility is the
importance of religion. People who are actively religious tend to marry more
and stay together longer.[19] To the extent that time spent married during
reproductive years increases fertility, then religion would be a positive
factor in fertility rates. For example, in Canada women who had weekly religious
attendance were 46 percent more likely to have a third child than women who did
not.[20]
Over time, several different nationally representative surveys have
asked about church attendance in both Canada and the U.S. The World Value
Survey, taken periodically in both countries, found that in 1981, 62 percent of
Americans and 45 percent of Canadians attended church monthly. A decade later
American attendance had decreased by 6 percent, but Canadian attendance had
fallen by 16 percent. And the number of people who rated the “importance of God
in their lives” as ten out of ten was 48 percent of Americans and 28 percent of
Canadians. An index of religiosity based on the European Value Survey showed
that the U.S. was considerably more religious than Canada in 198 i , and by
1990, Canadian religiosity had decreased and U.S. had increased. This happened
at the same time that the number of people not attending church at all
increased in both countries. Despite the drop in church attendance, women of
childbearing age were much more likely to have attended church weekly in the
U.S. (34 percent) than in Canada (18 percent) in 1995. {And in Canada’s three
largest metropolitan areas the foreign-born were much more likely to have
attended religious services at least once a month than the Canadian-born.)
Religiosity, as defined by importance of God and church attendance, is
also significant for fertility because it is the most powerful predictor of
attitudes toward abortions. In 1980, the World Value Survey found 42 percent of
Americans and 3 8 percent of Canadians responding that abortion “can never be
justified.” Ten years later, that percentage had dropped to 33 and 21
respectively. This represented a 20 percent drop in the U.S., but a 46 percent
drop in Canada. The larger value change in the acceptance of abortion in Canada
has been correlated with a significant increase in Canadian abortions since
1980, at a time when the U.S. abortions were declining {see Figure 6).
FIGURE 6
Total abortion rate per woman
Source: Calculated from data on age specific abortion rates from
Statistics Canada and U.S. National Vital Health Statistics.
The change with respect to abortions arises partly from the change in
the legal climates of the U.S. and Canada. Abortions were outlawed in both
countries for most of the twentieth century. In 1969, Canada passed a law
making therapeutic abortions possible if approved by a committee of doctors;
similar conditions prevailed in the U.S. In 1973, abortions for any purpose
were legalized in the U.S. In 1988, the Canadian law that only allowed
abortions for therapeutic reasons was declared unconstitutional. Therefore,
Canadian and American women had the same legal protection for abortions by the
late 1980s, but they responded differently. The Canadian abortion rate began to
rise and the American rate, which had always been higher than Canada’s, and had
been at 0.8 abortions per woman for 20 years, began to fall.
The total abortion rate is an estimate of how many abortions a woman is
likely to have over her reproductive life. It is, in concept and in
calculation, consistent with the total fertility rate. In both cases, the event
(either a birth or an abortion) is calculated for each five-year age-group of
reproductiveage women, and aggregated for a particular year to estimate how
many “events” a woman would have over her reproductive live if she followed the
age-specific patterns of current cohorts. Because the concepts and the estimate
of the total fertility rate and the total abortion rate are consistent, it is
possible to estimate how much the total abortion rates per woman are affecting
the total fertility rate per woman.
Since 1975, abortions per Canadian woman have increased from 0.3 to 0.5.
This was at the same time that abortions per American woman decreased from 0.8
to 0.7. Therefore the trend in abortions is converging while the total
fertility rate trend is diverging. If the total abortion rates per woman in
both countries had not changed, the divergence in fertility would be 60 percent
lower than it was in zooo (see Figure 7). The rise in the Canadian total
abortion rate would explain 3 5 percent of the divergence by itself. The drop
in the U.S. total abortion rate per woman is not unambiguously related to the
increase in American fertility over that time, as the reduction may have been
because of fewer unwanted pregnancies. (U.S. pregnancy rates dropped 7 percent
over the same time). But the increase in the Canadian total abortion rate is
unambiguously related to the decline in total fertility rate.
FIGURE 7
Total fertility rates (TFR) and TFR if total abortion rate per woman had
not changed since 1975
Source: Calculated from data on age-specific fertility and abortion
rates from Statistics Canada and the Natiomt Vital Health Statistics.
These data cannot indicate whether the increase in Canadian abortions is
the result of changes in values or other conditions, such as the legal or
economic context. What it does suggest, however, is that the change in the
total abortion rate per woman and the change in values it may represent are
important in explaining between 3 5 and 60 percent of the divergence in the
total fertility rate between Canada and the United States.
Implications of diverging fertility
IN SUMMARY, THERE are clues to why there is such a divergence in
fertility between Canada and the U.S., but there are no definitive answers. The
levels of Canadian and American long-term trends in age of first marriage,
first births, and common-law unions are consistent with the divergence in total
fertility rates in the two countries. But the divergence in none of these
proximate variables is large enough to explain the much larger divergence in
fertility. Higher unemployment rates and lower incomes in Canada may also be
consistent with lower fertility rates in Canada than in the U.S. But the more
generous cash and maternity benefits in Canada would tend to offset some of the
U.S. economic advantage. And the longer working hours in the U.S for women are
inconsistent with their increase in fertility since 1980 according to the role
incompatibility hypothesis.
Finally, changing values in the U.S. and Canada may be contributing to
the fertility divergence. The stronger notional role of men in U.S. families
and the greater religiosity of Americans are positively associated with
fertility, and the latter is also a strong predictor of negative attitudes
toward abortion. Increased total abortion rates per woman in Canada may be the
result of changes in values, which are also reflected in the changes in the
Canadian legal context. An increase in Canadian abortions can explain 3 5
percent of the fertility divergence with the U.S. The decline in the U.S.
abortion rate combined with the Canadian increase would explain more.
The divergence in fertility may continue to increase in the near future.
But once the delay in age of fertility in both countries stops, as it
inevitably will, then there may be a slight increase in fertility, at least in
Canada, because of what is described as the tempo effect.[21] This is because
the calculation of the total fertility rate does not accurately reflect the
outcomes of delays in births, and therefore underestimates fertility while the
transition to births at later ages is in process.
What declining fertility does do in societies such as Canada’s is make
them age more rapidly. Canada is becoming an older country than the U.S.
because Canadians have fewer children and live two years longer. In 2000, the
median age in Canada was 3 6.% in the U.S. it was 35.2,. But in 2 5
years the difference will be larger (43.5 vs. 39.0).[22] That means that Canada
will have an older labor force and relatively more people 6 5 and over. In
zooo, 12 percent of the Canadian and American populations were 6 5 years old or
older (12.7 vs. 12.4). But in 25 years there will be an increasing divergence
(22.9 percent vs. 19.6 percent in 2030). The aged dependency burdens will be
higher, but the total dependency burdens wiil not. The aging population will
put more pressure on the Canadian health care system than on the U.S. system.
But the higher fenility rates in the U.S. will put continuing pressure on
school systems, especially since school-age children are becoming increasingly
diverse ethnically.
As countries age at different rates the financial flows between them may
be affected.[23] An aging society is likely to save more, both privately and
through pension funds, and therefore have more to invest. Younger countries
with lower savings rates may offer better rates of return. But there is no
evidence of this kind of movement yet in developed countries. And between
Canada and the U.S. there is already so much cross-investment that the aging
differential may have only a marginal effect.
Ultimately, the differences in fertility rates between Canada and the United
States may say less about the future than they say about the present. The
societies of these two countries are becoming different at the same time as
their economies integrate and become more interdependent. The basic rhythms of
private lives are diverging as women in Canada enter commonlaw unions more
often, wait longer than American women to marry, and have children later and
less often. Abortion is the one demographic trend that is converging, but this
accentuates the underlying difference in fertility rather than reducing it.
Many people worry that as the world becomes more economically integrated
it will produce a homogenized culture with similar values and social behavior.
This concern is even greater in North America, where the U.S. economy and
population are much larger than those of Canada. The divergence in fertility,
however, suggests an alternative. It raises the possibility that economic
integration in North America may not necessarily result in a homogenized
culture with similar values and behavior. Fertility is a leading indicator of
other changes taking place in society. If the North American fertility
divergence continues, it may become an example of how countries can converge at
the macroeconomic level while diverging at the micro level of individuals and
families.
Notes
[1] As of 2003, total trade turnover between the two nations amounted to
nearly $400 billion U.S. (Foreign Trade Data, U.S. Census Bureau, 1.004). Tbis
is an enormous sum under any circumstances, perhaps not least in relation to
Canada’s 2003 GNP of approximately S850 billion U.S. (WDi Database, World Bank,
July 2004).
[2] R. Lesthaeghe, “The Second Demographic Transition in Westem
Countries: An Interpretation. IPD Working Paper 1991-2, 31 (Vrije
Universiteit Brussel, Interuniversity Programme in Demography, 1991).
[3] William P. Butz and Michael P. Ward,”The Emergence of
Countercyclical U.S. Fertility,” American Economic Review 69 (1979).
[4] Richard A. Easterlin, “What will 1984 belike?” Demography 15
(1978).
[5] Diane Macunovich, Birth Quake: The Baby Boom and its Aftershocks (University
of Chicago Press, 1002,)
[6] Karin L. Brewster and Ronald R. Rindfuss, “Fertility and Women’s
Employment in Industrialized Nations,” Amual Review of Sociology (2000).
[7] In 2002, when the U.S. total fertility rate was 2.0, Hispanic
fertility was 2.7; Blacks, 1.0; and non- Hispanic Whites 1.8. (NVSR Vol. 52 No.
10). In Canada, total fenitity rates are collected by immigrant status rather
than race. Immigrants are i 8.4 percent of the Canadian population (in the
U.S., 11 percent). Immigrant women in Canada have a higher fertility rate (1.8)
than native-born women, but their daughters have i . 4 children, less than the
Canadian native-bom average of 1.5.
[8] This demographic difference between Canadian provinces and U.S.
border states is consistent with a recent economic study that also showed
sustained economic differences in income redistribution on either side of the
border despite NAFTA. This study did find that differences were smaller if
Canadian provinces were compared only to the adjacent U.S. state rather than
all border states. See Gerard Boychuk, “Redistribution, Social Protection and
North American Linkages,” Paper presented to HRDC/IC Workshop “Social and
Labour Market Aspects of North American Linkages,” (Montreal, November 20-22,
2003).
[9] The ambiguity of the term is unfortunate, given the importance of
the increasing trend toward “unmarried unions.” See Larry L. Bumpass, R. Kelly
Raley, “Redefining Single Parent Families: Cohabitation and Changing Family
Reality,” Demography 32:1 {February 1995). In 1981 and 1986, Canadian
censuses for the first time let respondents define their relation to the
“reference person” in the household. But if they said they were living unmarried
with the reference person, they were then asked to consider themselves married
for the subsequent questions. Subsequent censuses were more direa, asking
specifically about common-law status.
[10] Jean Dumas and
Alain Belanger, “Common-Law Unions in Canada at he end of the 20th Century,” Report
on the Demographic Situation in Canada 1996, (Statistics Canada, March
1997).
[11] Celine LeBourdais et al., “The Changing Face of Conjugal
Relationships,” Canadian Social Trends (Statistics Canada, Spring
2000).
[12] Constance Sorrentino, “Intemational Unemployment Rates: How
Comparable are they?” Monthly Labor Review (June 2000).
[13] Andrew Heisz, “The Evolution of Job Stability in Canada: Trends and
Comparisons to U.S. Results,” Research Paper (Statistics Canada, 2002).
[14] Pierre Fortin, “Differences
in Annual Work Hours per Capita between the United States and Canada,” Intemational
Productivity Monitor 6 (Spring 2003).
[15] Maria Concetta Chiuri and Tullio Jappelli, “Financial Markets,
Judicial Costs and Housing Tenure: An Intemational Comparison;” Luxembourg
Income Study Working Paper 130 (April 2000).
[16] Statistics Canada; “Benefiting from Extended Parental Leave,”
Perspectives on Labour and Income 4:3 (March 2003), Catalogue No, 75-001-XIE.
[17] Simons, “Fertility and Values in 15 Westem Countries during the
1980’s,” in Ruud De ed., Values in Westem Societies (Netherlands:
Tilburg University Press, 1995).
[18] Michael Adams, Fire and Ice, The United States, Canada and the
Myth of Converging Values (Penguin Canada, 2003), 87.
[19] Alain Belanger and Genevieve Ouellet, “A Comparative Study of
Recent Trends in Canadian and American Fenility, 1980-1999,” Report on the
Demographic Situation in Canada 2001 (Statistics Canada, 2002).
[20] Alain Belanger and Cathy Oikawa; “Who Has a Third Child?” Canadian
Social Trends 53 (Statistics Canada, Summer 1999).
[21] Bongaarts and Griffith Feeney, “On the Quantum and Tempo of
Fertility,” Population and Development Review 24:2 (1998).
[22] U.S. Census Bureau, Intemational Data Base projections (2005).
[23] Erik Canton, Casper von Ewijk, and Paul J.G. Tang; “Aging and
Intemational Capital Flows,” CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy
Analysis (Netherlands, Z004).
