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Natural Law Ethics

自然律倫理

 

貝德著（Craig A. Boyd），孔祥烱譯

 

 

Natural law morality boasts one of the longest genealogies in the history of ethics. From the ancient Greeks down through the Middle Ages to today, professional philosophers, Christian theologians, and many lay people subscribe to some version of natural law morality which maintains that there are some basic truths about human nature which require the prohibitions of some values and the practice of others. Natural law theorists believe that they can discern in human nature—and its various inclinations and desires—a basic orientation to the goods that all people pursue. These inclinations, when rightly understood and ordered, direct us to some activities and away from others. There is, on the natural law perspective, a basic desire to seek peaceful coexistence with others since peaceful communal life is a necessary condition for pursuing other goods. Prohibitions on murder, lying, and adultery are all seen as violations of the ideal for “human nature” since they thwart the peaceful coexistence of humans in community. Moreover, natural law theorists also contend that all human societies know these precepts to be true regardless of particular cultural contexts since they all require peace as a basic good for communal life. These specific principles which ground various prescriptions and prohibitions can be discovered by all people without regard to cultural or religious diversity.

自然律道德在倫理學歷史中擁有最長的家譜之一。從古希臘經過中世紀到今天，專業哲學家、基督教神學家和許多平信徒都支持某類型的自然律道德。這理論認為，有一些對人性的基本真理會要求禁止某些價值，亦實踐其他價值。自然律理論家相信他們可以看出人的本性和它各種傾向和願望，基本的趨向就是要所有人都追求的良善。這些傾向被正確地理解和調整時，就會指導我們行一些活動，而避免另一些活動。從自然律的角度看，人有一個基本的願望，就是尋求與其他人和平共處，因為和平的群體生活是追求其他善的必要條件。謀殺、說謊、通姦都被視為違反了理想的「人性」，因為它們阻礙人類在群體中和平共處。此外，自然律理論家還爭辯說，所有人類社會知道這些戒律都是真實的；不論任何文化背景，良好的群體生活都需要和平。各種命令和禁令都基於具體的原則，都可以在所有人類中發現，不論任何文化或宗教。

In an increasingly global society where religious and cultural differences are often accentuated and form the basis for conflict between peoples and among nations, it would seem that natural law morality, if it can be coherently defended, may provide a plausible common ground for people of diverse backgrounds. The issue of moral diversity has created problems for defenders of the natural law; if there is such diversity with regard to moral practices throughout the world, how can we say that there is some underlying notion of human nature that could serve as the basis for normative ethics?

在一個日益全球化的社會，宗教和文化差異往往加劇人民和國家之間的衝突，如果能夠一貫地辯護自然律道德，或者可以為不同背景的人提供一個合理的共同基礎。道德多樣性已經為自然律的辯護者創造了問題；如果世界各地有多樣性的道德實踐，我們怎能說有一些人性的基本概念，可作為規範性倫理的基礎呢？

The theory has frequently been attacked and its obituary has often been prematurely written by its critics. Yet, as Yves Simon observes, “The theory of natural law, attacked and rejected many times, always comes back with fresh energy.” The present work is an attempt to defend natural law despite the many challenges it currently faces.

自然律理論常常被攻擊，它的批評者多次過早地為它寫了訃告。然而，西蒙（Yves Simon）指出：「自然律理論被多次攻擊和拒絕，但它總帶着活力歸來。」這本書嘗試辯護自然律，儘管目前面對許多挑戰。

Although the arguments here appeal to the classic articulation of natural law morality formulated by St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), the book is not merely an apologetic for eight centuries of Thomism. Rather, I attempt to salvage what still has value in his work while simultaneously rejecting those aspects of the theory that are hopelessly beyond rehabilitation. For example, I find his appeal to nature as a necessary condition for morality an important corrective to much of analytic philosophy’s preoccupation with linguistic analysis. His emphasis on transcultural moral norms serves an important role in refuting various kinds of relativism; and his articulation of virtue as a necessary development of the precepts of natural law enables us to see the two elements in a complementary relationship.

雖然這裏的論點辯護阿奎那（Thomas Aquinas，1225-1274年）所表達的古典自然律道德，但這本書不僅是為八世紀的托馬斯主義（Thomism）衛道。我是試圖挽救他的工作中還有價值的地方，同時拒絕這理論中不值得改善的地方。舉例來說，我覺得他訴諸於自然作為道德的一個必要條件，這是非常重要的糾正，因為分析哲學過份注重語言分析。他強調跨文化的道德規範具有重要的角色，用來駁斥各種相對主義；他主張德行為自然律戒律必要的發展，這樣使我們看到兩個要素有互相補充的關係。

Although these valuable insights in Aquinas’s work offer the contemporary ethicist much to ponder, unfortunately there are those elements that simply need to be abandoned or stand in need of serious rehabilitation. Contemporary natural law moralists should resist the temptation to follow Aquinas down the path of Aristotelian ontology and archaic medieval patterns of human nature. A genuine theory of the natural law must move beyond the sexism of the medieval church as well as the confusion of identifying cultural norms with transcendent moral principles.

雖然阿奎那著作中寶貴的見解為當代倫理學家提供了需要思考的問題，不幸的是，自然律仍然有一些要素需要放棄的，否則會妨礙真正的恢復。當代自然律道德家應該拒絕跟隨阿奎那所走的小徑，就是亞里士多德的本體論和中世紀過時的人性模式。一個真正的自然律理論必須超越中世紀對性別的歧視，也要超越將文化規範與超越的道德原則作為相同的混亂。

The Religious Challenge: Divine Command Theory

（A）宗教的挑戰：神聖命令理論

Divine Command Theory contends that human nature, among other things, is entirely too corrupt to function in a normative role. Humans are thoroughly sinful and their attempts at constructing a moral theory based upon the quicksand of a corrupt and perverse human nature is an exercise in futility. Humans are noetically corrupted by sin and, as a result, morally incapable of knowing the good—to say nothing of doing the good. Only a divine command can play this important role; any other attempts are sheer hubris. Furthermore, natural law morality, by starting with human nature and its normativity, seems to be committed to a position that must preclude the importance of God in moral theory. Surely this cannot be an acceptable position for the serious Christian.

神聖命令理論認為人性（和其他事物）是太敗壞而不能在規範角色中運作。人類是完全有罪的，他們試圖構建一個道德理論，基於一個敗壞和墮落的人性流沙，這是徒勞無功的。人類的理智被罪惡敗壞，結果是沒有能力認識善，當然更不能行善。只有神聖的命令可以發揮這一重要作用，任何其他嘗試是純粹傲慢。此外，自然律道德以人性和它的規範性入手，似乎是委身於一個可疑的立場，就是排除神在道德理論中的重要性。當然這是認真的基督徒所不能接受的立場。

In contrast to sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, divine command theory holds that the sole source of obligation can only be found in the will of God. Janine Marie Idziak writes, “Generally speaking, a ‘divine command moralist’ is one who maintains that the content of morality (i.e., what is right and wrong, good and evil, just and unjust, and the like) is directly and solely dependent upon the commands and prohibitions of God.”

對比社會生物學和進化心理學，神聖命令理論認為義務的唯一來源是神的意志。以茜阿（Janine Marie Idziak）寫道：「一般來說，一個『神聖命令道德者』認為道德的內容（即什麼是正確和錯誤、善與惡、正義與非正義等等）直接和完全依賴神的命令和禁令。」

Defenders of divine command theory have a variety of reasons for preferring their own moral theory to others. These reasons invariably appeal to specific religious and theological claims.

神聖命令理論的捍衛者有多種原因支持自己的道德理論過於其他理論。這些原因全部都基於宗教和神學的宣稱。

[NOTE: Idziak catalogues these nicely in the introduction to her Divine Command Morality, 9-10. She lists seven reasons why the religious believer would think the DCM is plausible:

·         Divine command morality is a correlate of the divine omnipotence.

·         Divine command ethics is involved in the divine liberty.

·         Divine command ethics recognizes the importance of the divine will.

·         Divine command morality must be espoused in the realm of ethics because there cannot be anything independent of God.

·         Divine command ethics is related to man’s dependency on God as creator.

·         Divine command ethics satisfies the religious requirement that God be the supreme focus of one’s loyalties.

·         Divine command ethics is grounded in God’s graciousness to man in Jesus Christ.]

〔註：以茜阿在她著作的《神聖命令道德》第9至10章列出了七個理由，說明為何信徒認為神聖命令道德是合理的：

·         神聖命令倫理和神聖全能相關聯。

·         神聖命令倫理涉及神聖的自由。

·         神聖命令倫理承認神的意志的重要性。

·         神聖命令倫理必須收容在倫理學中，因為不可能有任何獨立於神的事物。

·         神聖命令倫理有關人類依賴神作為創造者。

·         神聖命令倫理滿足宗教的要求，就是神成為一個人效忠的最高焦點。

·         神聖命令倫理是神在耶穌基督裏對人施恩的基礎。］

William Ockham argued for one version of divine command theory on the basis of divine freedom. If God was bound by some principle other than God’s own being, then omnipotence was threatened.

岳金（William Ockham）所主張的神聖命令理論的基礎是神聖的自由。如果神是受一些神自己以外的原則所限制，那麼神的全能受到威脅。

Others have maintained that it is hubris for the human mind to determine what God can and cannot command; while still others maintain that if we agree to any other theory (theological in tone or not), it represents a kind of sinful departure from our supreme loyalty to, and love for, God our Creator. Here human nature, especially human biology, is simply irrelevant to morality. Since morality is based upon the commands of God, nothing else has any relevance.

其他人認為確定神可以和不可以命令什麼是人思想的狂妄自大；還有一些人主張，如果我們同意任何其他理論（用神學的語氣與否），就代表我們邪惡地離開我們對創造的神最高的效忠和愛。在這理論內，人的本性（特別是人類生物學）與道德根本無關；既然道德是根據神的命令，沒有任何事有關聯。

Idziak has recently attacked natural law morality as suspect for two reasons. First, it asks the believer to adopt “methodological atheism,” wherein God apparently becomes irrelevant to the tasks of ethics. That is, one can do ethics without ever appealing to God as creator and supreme object of our loyalties.

以茜阿最近以兩個理由攻擊自然律道德。第一，自然律道德要求信徒採納「方法論無神論」，就是認為神似乎在倫理學的工作中變得無關重要；也就是說，一個人做倫理學而永遠不需要承認神是創造者和我們效忠的最高目標。

Her second criticism is one that appeals to a post-Darwinian construal of human nature that natural law simply cannot defend itself against. She asks,

她的第二個批評是：自然律根本無法抵抗達爾文之後對人性的解釋。她問：

Is it really so clear what constitutes “human nature” on which moral precepts are based? The post-Darwinian view of human beings is not the same as the traditional Judeo-Christian view .... The plausibility of a natural law approach to ethics can be challenged from a scientific point of view. Human beings no longer appear to be directly designed by God .... Since this is so, the question is seriously raised: “Why should ‘human nature’ be taken as morally normative?”

道德戒律的基礎是人性，但是否真的清楚什麼是「人性」呢？達爾文之後的觀點跟傳統的猶太教和基督教的觀點不同，…自然律方法的可信性受到科學角度挑戰。人類好像不是神直接設計的…既是這樣，就可提出嚴重的問題：「為什麼『人性』要被視為有道德規範性呢？」

The approach of natural law, she contends, is impossible to maintain in an evolutionary world. I will argue that this is not so.

她辯稱，自然律的方法在一個漸進的世界中是不可維持的。我會辯說並非如此。

Divine command theorists rightly point out that there is a problem with human nature serving as a normative basis for ethics. Indeed, any theory of ethics that didn’t see a problem here would certainly not have much value. However, this objection is hardly insurmountable since natural law morality recognizes that there is more than one sense in which we can understand the term “nature.” Divine command theorists also rightly insist that God must play an important role in any moral theory that aspires to being called “Christian,” as many natural law theories do. Once again, natural law theory not only accommodates God, but sees God as critical to the development of the theory.

神聖命令理論家正確地指出，以人性作為一個倫理學規範性的基礎確實有問題。事實上，若任何倫理學理論沒有看到這個問題就肯定不會有太大價值。但是，這種反論並非不可逾越的，因為自然律道德認識「本性」這個詞語有多過一個意義。神聖命令理論家亦正確地堅持，若然是一個基督教的道德理論，神必須在其中有重要的角色，而許多自然律理論都是如此。讓我再說，自然律理論不僅能容納神，而且認為神對這理論的發展極其重要。

The Ethics of Virtue

（B）德行倫理

Different versions of narrative or virtue ethics contend that attempts to start with universally applicable rules for human morality are subject to the postmodernist critique of Enlightenment ethics. However, unlike postmodernism one can provide an epistemological basis for morality through the development of the virtues. According to Stanley Hauerwas, the Enlightenment version of natural law morality is guilty of a number of transgressions. “It confuses the claim that Christian ethics is an ethic that we should and can commend to anyone with the claim that we can know the content of that ethic by looking at the human .... (and) It fails to appreciate that there is no actual universal morality.” Hauerwas seems to object to the idea that natural law morality can provide a universal ethic; or rather he seems to think that since it is a product of the Enlightenment it is doomed to postmodernism’s deconstruction of it.

不同類型的敘述倫理或德行倫理都主張：以普遍適用的道德規則為起點的嘗試，都受到啟蒙道德倫理學的後現代主義者的批判。然而，與後現代主義不同的，德行的發展可以為道德提供一個認識論的基礎。跟據侯瓦華斯（Stanley Hauerwas），啟蒙時代的自然律道德有幾個錯誤。「它混淆了基督教倫理的主張（就是我們可以也應該將倫理推薦給所有人）和透過觀察人就知道倫理內容的主張。它不明白這裏沒有實際的普遍的道德。」侯瓦華斯似乎反對自然律可以提供一個普遍的倫理；也可能他認為啟蒙時代的產物注定被後現代主義去推翻。

Instead of focusing on either the nature of moral language—as the analytic philosophers did in the 20th century—or considering the nature of the moral act itself—as Kant and the utilitarians did—virtue theorists have concentrated their efforts on specific character traits. Moral language is merely the reflection of morally mature persons, and moral acts originate from persons with relatively enduring character. Thus, the question of moral psychology and character formation lie at the heart of virtue ethics. And yet it may be the case that morally mature persons must be guided by the consideration that specific kinds of acts will never lead to the kind of happiness that all people desire. This is precisely the point that defenders of natural law morality make; it is not in competition with virtue ethics but rather provides a necessary basis for human character.

德行倫理理論家沒有把重點放在道德語言的性質（正如二十世紀分析哲學家所作的），也沒有考慮道德行動的本質（正如康德與功利主義者所作的），他們集中力量在特定的性格特徵。道德語言只是反映了道德成熟者，而道德行動源於性格相對當持久的人。因此，德行倫理的中心就是道德心理學和品格的形成。有可能的是，道德成熟者需要考慮：特定的行動永遠不會導致所有人想望的快樂。這一點正是自然律道德的辯護者指出的，它不是與德行倫理競爭，而是為人類的性格提供必要的基礎。

Natural Law Morality: A Provisional Definition

（C）自然律道德：一個臨時的定義

As an alternative to these competing theories of human nature and morality, I conclude this chapter with a preliminary account of natural law that will be fleshed out throughout the remainder of the book. That theory will include the following elements: (1) all human beings have a specific nature in common, (2) moral precepts are grounded in that human nature, (3) the basic moral precepts cannot change unless human nature changes, (4) these precepts are teleological in character—they direct human beings to their end, but this end also requires a theory of the virtues, and (5) all properly functioning human beings know what the basic moral precepts are.

我以初步解釋自然律來結束這一章，自然律理論包括下列要素：（1）所有人類有一個共同的具體本性，（2）道德戒律基於人類的本性，（3）除非人的本性改變，否則基本的道德戒律亦不能改變，（4）這些戒律有目的論的特徵，它們引導人類達到目的，但這目的也需要一個德行的理論，（5）所有功能正常的人都知道基本的道德戒律是什麼。

What do we mean by saying that humans share a “nature in common”? Initially, at least, it means that there is an identifiable essence or species—biologically speaking—that each member shares with every other member of that species. Furthermore, the human species has evolved in such a way that there are clearly activities that promote survival and propagation (e.g., cooperation in groups). It also means that this nature in common is transcultural. Regardless of the culture or geographic location, certain kinds of activities will always necessarily be required for human cooperation. Although the manifestations of these principles may vary from culture to culture, the principle remains the same. Finally, a common human nature applies to both members of the sexes equally. Even though men and women differ in important ways regarding their biological nature, they are both equally human and whatever moral obligations are owed to, and expected from, them apply with equanimity. This nature also serves as the basis for our moral obligations.

（1）我們說人類分享一個「共同的本性」的意思是什麼？（a）第一，它最少表示有一個可識別的本質或物種（生物學上來說），是每名成員和那物種所有其他成員分享的。（b）此外，人類已經進展到一個地步，有明確的活動去促進生存和繁殖（例如，群體合作）。（c）這也表示這共同的本性是超越文化的；無論在哪一個文化或地理位置，某些類型的活動都是人類的合作所需的；雖然不同的文化有不同的表現，原理都是一樣。（d）最後，人類共同的本性同等適用於男女成員；雖然男人和女人在生物本性上有重大的分別，但他們同是人，任何應獲得或應付出的道德義務，都同時應用於兩性。這本性也是道德義務的基礎。

The second element concerns what we might call philosophical anthropology. It serves as a necessary condition for ethics because in order to know the human good, one must first know what a human is. In this respect, biology is a necessary but insufficient condition for ethics. Rational evaluation and discernment among our various impulses are required. Moreover, it may be the case that reason provides goods of its own that transcend the merely biological.

（2）第二個要素關於哲學人類學。這是倫理學一個必要條件，因為若要知道什麼是人類的善，必須首先知道人類是什麼。在這方面，生物學是必要的，但對倫理學卻不是充分的條件。我們需要對人類各種衝動有合理性的評價和鑑別。此外，理性本身也是重要的，因它超越了生物性。

Our third element of natural law is that moral precepts don’t change unless human nature changes. Certainly, if human nature does change—and this is an issue we must allow for if we admit that evolutionary theory is true—then there is the possibility that, in some respect, the most basic precepts of natural law morality may change as well. However, it seems that it would always be the case that we are required to “practice justice” and “seek truth,” since these principles would act as necessary formal constraints on human behaviors given our social nature. Yet the idea that the precepts of natural law morality may be open to change seems to confer an advantage on the theory, because its perceived rigidity has been a constant source of criticism throughout the ages. In any case, the precepts are always directed toward the human good.

（3）第三個要素是：除非人的本性改變，否則道德戒律不改變。當然，如果人的本性有變化（當然，如果我們承認進化理論是正確的，就要考慮這假設），那麼自然律最基本的道德戒律也有可能改變。然而，似乎我們一直需要「實踐正義」和「尋求真理」，因為這些原則會對人類行為作為必要的約束，鑑於我們喜歡交際的本性。不過，自然律的道德戒律可能會被這思想改變，或許這會為自然律理論帶來好處，因為它一向被視為太僵硬，所以在過去時代一直被批評。無論如何，戒律的目的一直不變地為人類帶來好處。

Our fourth element of natural law morality concerns its teleological dimension. Since the Enlightenment, and even more so since Darwin, teleology has come into disrepute. When we say that moral precepts are teleological we need to ask what kind of statement we are making. It may be that biological organisms are not teleologically oriented toward pre-ordained goals, or ends; however, that does not mean that human activity is not teleological. I believe that the teleological orientation of the natural law is fulfilled by an account of the virtues.

（4）第四個自然律的要素有關目的論方面。自從啟蒙運動而來，特別是達爾文以後，目的論已經聲名狼藉。當我們說，道德戒律是屬於目的論的時候，我們甚至被懷疑為何這樣說。當然，生物可能不是隨目的論走向預定的目標；但這並不表示人類的活動不是隨目的論的。我相信自然律的目的論趨向可以因德行的理由獲得滿足。

The natural law does not delineate every detail of the moral life; rather, it lays down those commonly understood truths that provide the bare minimum for human coexistence. Traditionally understood, this means that natural law morality is not a complete moral system but requires the development and practice of the virtues as perfecting the agent. Thomas Aquinas, the “father of natural law morality,” says, “All the acts of the virtues are prescribed by natural law, since each person’s reason naturally dictates that he is to act according to virtue.” The key point here is that all the acts of the virtues fall under the sphere of the natural law since they are prescribed by reason.

自然律沒有劃定道德生活的每一個細節；相反，它規定了那些通常理解的真理，為人類提供了共存的最低需要。根據傳統理解，自然律道德不是一個完整的德體系，它需要德行的發展和實踐去完成。「自然律道德之父」阿奎那說：「所有德行的行為都是自然律所命令，因為每個人的理性自然決定了他要按照德行去行動。」關鍵的一點是，所有德行的行為都在自然律的領域之下，因為它們都被理性所命令。

However, the natural law does not dictate precisely how one is to act according to reason. For Aquinas, the natural law simply indicates what specific kinds of actions are per se good, and those that are evil. But he does not specify in his theory of the natural law just how one goes about determining what kind of behavior is required. Natural law morality does not simply provide prima facie obligations; it also requires the development of virtue, which enables a person to act consistently for the right reasons and in the right circumstances.

然而，自然律沒有準確地規定一個人如何按照理性行事。對於阿奎那，自然律只是指出哪些特定的行動本身是好的，哪些是邪惡的。但他的理論沒有規定一個人如何確定什麼樣的行為是必需的。自然律道德沒有簡單地提供顯見之義務；它也需要德行的發展，才能使一個人可以一貫地在適當的情況下以正確的理由行動。

My fifth and final point, concerning the nature of natural law, is that its basic precepts are available to all humans whose reason is functioning in a normal fashion. Although this claim has been challenged by sociobiologists, divine command theorists, and postmodernists, I will argue that there is enough of the divine spark in all humans that enables them to apprehend the basic precepts of natural law morality. Thinkers from St. John the Apostle to C. S. Lewis have affirmed the ability of humans to know what the natural law requires. For St. Paul it consisted in natural revelation; for Augustine it was “divine illumination”; and for Aquinas it was the “natural light of reason.” There is a normative capacity in all human cultures to understand these moral principles. Moreover, these principles have their ontological and teleological basis in a relatively stable human nature that is accessible to anyone who will but consult it.

（5）第五和最後一個要素有關自然律的本質，就是基本道德戒律是所有正常理性的人都可以獲得的。雖然這種說法被社會生物學家、神聖命令理論家和後現代主義者所挑戰，但我要辯說所有人類都有足夠的神聖的火花，使他們領悟自然律道德的基本戒律。思想家如使徒約翰至魯益師（C. S. Lewis）都認為人有能力知道自然律要求什麼。對於保羅，它是自然的啟示；對於奧古斯丁，它是「神聖光照」；對於阿奎那，它是「理性的自然光」。在所有人類文化中，都有規範性容量去明白這些道德原則。此外，這些原則擁有本體論和目的論的基礎，加上人類相當穩定的本性，任何意願的人若去尋找它必定找得到。

 

 

 

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SOURCE: Craig A. Boyd (2007): A shared morality: a narrative defense of natural law ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos), 11-32 (excerpts from Chapter 1).

 

 

 

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