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An Ethics of Divine Commands:
a Catalogue of Arguments

神聖命令倫理：論証的目錄

以茜阿著（Janine Marie Idziak），孔祥烱譯

During the last several decades there has been renewed interest on the part of philosophers and theologians in an ethics of divine commands. Most basically, a divine command moralist holds that the standard of right and wrong is the commands and prohibitions of God. According to the divine command theory, “an action or kind of action is right or wrong if and only if and because it is commanded or forbidden by God.” In other words, the theory stipulates that “what ultimately makes an action right or wrong is its being commanded or forbidden by God and nothing else.” According to a divine command moralist, it is not the case that God commands a particular action because it is right, or prohibits it because it is wrong; rather, an action is right (or wrong) because God commands (or prohibits) it.	在過去數十年，哲學家和神學家對神聖的命令倫理出現了重新的興趣。一個神聖命令道德主義者認為正確和錯誤的標準是神的命令和禁令。根據神聖命令的理論，「一個行動或一種行動的對錯，單單因為它是神所命令的或禁止的。」換句話說，這個理論規定，「一個行動成為對或錯最終基於它是神的命令或禁止，沒有別的理由。」根據一個神聖命令道德主義者，神命令一個行動並非因為它是正確的，亦非因為行動是錯誤的所以禁止它；實在是因為神命令（或禁止）就使行動成為正確（或錯誤）。
The defense of any ethical theory operates on two levels: the refutation of objections which may be brought against the theory, and the presentation of reasons in support of the position and for preferring it to other ethical systems. Recent proponents of divine command ethics have, for the most part, chosen the former strategy of defense.... The historical literature in general is richer in this regard, offering a variety of putatively “good positive reasons” for adopting an ethics of divine commands.	倫理理論的辯護可分為兩個層次：[1] 否定對該理論的反對，和 [2] 提出支持該理論的原因，並該理論比其他倫理體系更好的原因。最近對神聖命令道德的支持者大多數選擇前者的辯護戰略。但歷史上的文獻很多都屬於後者，提供多種公認「良好積極的理由」去採取神聖命令倫理。
Our aim ... is to present and call attention to these historical arguments, drawn from discussions of the divine command theory in late medieval philosophy and theology, in Reformation and in Puritan theology, and in British modern philosophy. Some of the sources on which we will draw have hitherto gone unnoticed in the recent published literature on the divine command theory. Although we will not here undertake a critical evaluation of the arguments in question but simply set them out, our catalogue is meant to be suggestive to philosophers and theologians interested in the divine command theory and hence a prolegomenon to further attempts to defend it.	我們的目標是介紹這些歷史性論據，是從不同時代對神聖命令理論的討論，包括中世紀晚期的哲學和神學、改革時代和清教徒神學、和英國現代哲學。我們選擇的文件有些是最近出版的神聖命令理論的資料仍然忽視了的。雖然我們不會在這裏對論點作批判性的評價，只簡單地列出來；這目錄的目的是為有興趣於神聖命令理論的哲學家和神學家提出建議，作為一個緒論，嘗試進一步來辯護這理論。
As well as considering particular arguments, we will attempt to discern some basic strategies for the positive defense of the theory.... [W]e consider arguments which connect an ethics of divine commands with various properties of the divine nature.... [W]e look at a line of argument centering on the unique status occupied by God. Arguments which are analogical in nature are examined.... Finally, ... we consider some wider implications of these arguments. Specifically, we describe a particular form of divine command theory to which some of these arguments point, and suggest that the body of historical arguments we have delineated serves to counteract one of the standard criticisms leveled against an ethics of divine commands.	在考慮特殊的論據中，我們將嘗試辨別一些基本策略去積極辯護這理論。[1] 我們將考慮那些將神聖命令倫理學連繫於各種神聖屬性的論據。[2] 我們將注意那些集中神如何佔據獨特地位的論據。[3] 我們也審查那些類比性質的論據。最後，我們考慮這些論據更廣泛的含意。具體來說，我們描述一個由這些論據帶出來特定形式的神聖命令理論，並結論說：我們所排列的歷史性論據可以用來抵擋一個對神聖命令倫理學常用的批判。
Arguments from the Divine Nature	（A）從神本性的論証
The citation of authorities is a familiar element of the medieval style of argumentation, and discussions of the divine command theory from this period are no exception. Authoritative statements apparently favoring an ethics of divine commands were brought forward from the writings of.	中世紀論証風格的一種熟悉的元素是引用權威，神聖命令理論的討論也不例外。贊成神聖命令理論的權威性聲明，包括奧古斯丁、安波羅斯、大格哥利、西比安偽書、塞維之伊西多、聖維多之曉夫及安瑟倫等著作（Augustine, Ambrose, Gregory the Great, the Pseudo-Cyprian, Isidore of Seville, Hugh of St. Victor and Anselm）。
Such authoritative statements not infrequently represent mere assertions of a viewpoint or stance, rather than the presentation of reasons or evidence, properly speaking, for a position. From the point of view of the task at hand, that is, of searching for “positive reasons” for an ethics of divine commands, the most interesting of the authoritative statements comes from Hugh of St. Victor’s On the Sacraments. We quote in its entirety the section of the text from which various quotations were taken:	這些權威性聲明很多時只是對一個觀點或立場所作的主張，而不是為那個立場提出理由或証據。我們現在的工作就是找尋神聖命令倫理學的「正面理由」；權威聲明中最相關的言論來自聖維多之曉夫所著的《關於聖禮》，我們將有關的一節全部引述如下：
The first cause of all things is the will of the Creator which no antecedent cause moved because it is eternal, nor any subsequent cause confirms because it is of itself just. For He did not will justly, because what He willed was to be just, but what He willed was just, because He Himself willed it. For it is peculiar to Himself and to His will that that which is His is just; from Him comes the justice that is in His will by the very fact that justice comes from His will. That which is just is just according to His will and certainly would not be just, if it were not according to His will. When, therefore, it is asked how that is just which is just, the most fitting answer will be: because it is according to the will of God, which is just. When, however, it is asked how the will of God itself is also just, this quite reasonable answer will be given: because there is no cause of the first cause, whose prerogative it is to be what it is of itself. But this alone is the cause whence whatever is has originated, and it itself did not originate, but is eternal.	萬物的第一個起因（或第一因）是創造者的意志，沒有任何前置起因啟動它，因它是永恆的，也沒有任何後續起因確定它，因它本身已是正義的。神不需要正義地決志，因為祂所決志的就是正義的；但祂決志的事是正義的，單單因為祂自己作決志。祂自己和祂的意志的特點就是：祂所擁有的都是正義的；從祂而來的是正義，正義在祂的意志中，正因為正義從祂的意志而來。正義的事跟隨祂的意志成為正義；若不跟隨祂的意志，就不是正義。因此，當有人問正義的事怎樣成為正義，最恰當的回答是：因為它是根據神的意志，神的意志就是正義的。但是，當有人問神的意志本身怎樣成為正義時，合理的答案就是：因為第一因本身沒有起因，因此第一因的特權就是祂自己決志本身是什麼。這就是起因，就是存有的開始，而它本身沒有起源，而是永恆的。
This text suggests a connection between the dependency of what is just on the divine will and God’s recognized status as first and uncaused cause. Although the text is somewhat obscure, it bears the following interpretation. When trying to determine what is just, we look to what accords with the will of God, for the divine will is considered to be paradigmatically just. Now in seeking the foundation of justice, it does not make sense to seek something else beyond the divine will. For the divine will is the first cause of all things, and as such, it is uncaused and has no cause prior to it. Thus, there is no cause of the justness of the divine will; rather, the divine will itself generates justness.	這文章表明了決定什麼是正義依賴神的意志和神被認可的地位，就是祂是無起因的第一因。雖然文章有些模糊，但它帶來如下解釋：當試圖確定什麼是正義時，我們看看那些事符合神的意志，因為神的意志是範例性（paradigm）的正義。要尋找正義的基礎，離開神的意志去尋找是無任何意義的。因為神的意志是所有事物的第一因，故它是無起因的，沒有任何起因先於它。因此，神意志的正義性是無起因的；相反地，神的意志產生正義。
The text from On the Sacraments takes on additional significance from the point of view of subsequent discussions of divine command ethics. The connection suggested by Hugh of St. Victor between an ethics of divine commands and God’s status as first cause and uncaused cause is a connection which recurs in the historical literature, in somewhat varying forms....	這段源於曉夫所著《關於聖禮》的文章的顯著性，隨着後代對神聖命令倫理的討論而增加。曉夫將神聖命令倫理與神為無起因的第一因的地位相連，這說法多次以不同形式出現在歷史文獻中。
The connection in question is also found in Reformation and early Protestant theology. Whatever may be the best interpretation of the ethics of Luther and Calvin overall, there are passages to be found in their writings which are indicative of an ethics of divine commands. Such statements of a divine command theory are at times contextually intertwined with statements about the uncaused nature of God’s will. This juxtaposition is unmistakable in a passage from Martin Luther’s The Bondage of the Will, in which assertions of the uncaused status of the divine will immediately precede and immediately follow a statement of the divine command ethical principle:	這種連繫亦出現在改革時期和更正教早期神學中。無論如何詮釋路德和加爾文倫理學的整體，他們的著作中出現了一些與神聖命令倫理相關的話。這些神聖命令倫理的聲明，和神意志本性是無起因的聲明互相交織。這種交織明顯出現在路德所著《意志的束縛》中，其中一段堅持神聖意志是無起因的，它出現在神聖命令倫理的聲明之前，然後再出現在這聲明之後：
The same reply should be given to those who ask: Why did God let Adam fall, and why did He create us all tainted with the same sin, when He might have kept Adam safe, and might have created us of other material, or of seed that had first been cleansed? God is He for Whose will no cause or ground may be laid down as its rule and standard; for nothing is on a level with it or above it, but it is itself the rule for all things. If any rule or standard, or cause or ground, existed for it, it could no longer be the will of God. What God wills is not right because He ought, or was bound, so to will; on the contrary, what takes place must be right, because He so wills it. Causes and grounds are laid down for the will of the creature, but not for the will of the Creator...	下列兩個問題應該獲得同樣的答覆：[1] 為何祂容讓亞當墮落？[2] 如果神可以保護亞當安全，祂也可以用其它的物質或者用已經潔淨的種子創造我們，那麼為何祂創造我們有同樣的罪污？沒有任何起因或基礎可以成為神意志的規則和標準；因為沒有任何事物和神的意志平等或在其上，但它卻是所有事物的規則。如果它在任何規則或標準、起因或基礎之下，它就不是神的意志。神的決志是正確的，並不是因為祂必須這樣做；相反，神所決志的事物就一定是正確的。起因或基礎為受造物而，但並非為造物主的意志而成立。
This text of Luther was subsequently quoted by Jerome Zanchius in The Doctrine of Absolute Predestination in his assertion of the position that “the will of God is so the cause of all things, as to be itself without cause.” The juxtaposition of an assertion of the divine command thesis with a description of the divine will as uncaused is again in evidence in John Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian Religion. At one point in the text, it is after warning “how sinful it is to insist on knowing the causes of the divine will, since it is itself ... the cause of all that exists” that Calvin goes on to affirm that “the will of God is the supreme rule of righteousness, so that everything which he wills must be held to be righteous by the mere fact of his willing it.” ...	路德的文章後來為山其奧（Jerome Zanchius）所著《絕對預定論的教義》所引述，他堅持「神的意志既然是所有事物的起因，故它是沒有起因的。」加爾文的《基督教教義》再堅持神聖命令和神無起因的意志並列。在文中，他警告說「堅持要知道神的意志的起因是多麼有罪，因為它本身就是…所有存在的起因。」加爾文接着申明：「神的意志是正義的、至高無上的法則，所有祂所決志的事物一定是正義的，單單因為這是祂所決志的。…」
While the appeal to God’s causal powers represents one strain in the defense of the divine command theory, it is by no means the only aspect of the divine nature to which this ethical position has been related. One can find yet other historical arguments which have the form of showing that an ethics of divine commands is compatible or consistent with some established attribute of God whereas rejection of this theory is not.	雖然以神為宇宙起因的權力來辯護神聖命令理論是一個方法，但它決不是用來將這倫理立場和神的本性連繫的唯一方法。其他歷史論據亦表明神聖命令和一些公認的神的屬性是協調的或一致的，反之，以神的屬性去拒絕這理論卻沒有。
This strategy is employed by John Preston in Life Eternal, in contending that an ethics of divine commands is required to preserve God’s impeccability. His argument is straightforward and succinct:	普雷斯頓（John Preston）在《永恆的生命》中利用這戰略去支持神聖命令倫理，認為要保存神的無錯誤就需要這理論。他的論據是直接的和簡潔的：
…we should finde out what the will of God is; for that is the rule of justice and equity; for otherwise it was possible that the Lord could erre; though he did never erre: that which goes by a rule, though it doth not swarve, yet it may; but if it be the rule itselfe, it is impossible to erre.	…我們應該找出什麼是神的意志；因為這是正義和公平的定律；否則神就可能有錯誤；雖然祂從未有錯誤：如果神跟隨一條規則，雖然不一定偏差，但有可能偏差；但如果神自己就是規則，就不可能有錯誤。
Of the same ilk is a line of argument recorded by Ralph Cudworth which involves the divine omnipotence. In describing the divine command position in a Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, Cudworth claims that “this doctrine hath been since chiefly promoted and advanced by such as think nothing so essential to the Deity, as uncontrollable power and arbitrary will, and therefore that God could not be God if there should be any thing evil in its own nature which he could not do....”	與此相同的是加德夫（Ralph Cudworth）有關神聖全能的論証。他在《有關道德的永恆和不變的論証》中，他描述神聖命令為：「這教義已經被提倡和推廣為神性的基本特徵，就是祂有不可限制的權力和自主的意志；因此，如果在神的本性中有任何邪惡，是祂不能做的，祂就不是神…。」
The argument which Cudworth reports might be unpacked in the following way. Omnipotence is one of the essential or defining properties of God; or, in other words, “Necessarily, God is omnipotent.” Now let us suppose that an ethics of divine commands is a false theory and that there is something, x, which is evil in its own nature entirely apart from a divine prohibition. If this is so, then God, being good, cannot do x. But then, if God cannot do x, God is not omnipotent—which is impossible. In other words, the rejection of the divine command position seems to lead us into the unacceptable position of denying the divine omnipotence. An ethics of divine commands, on the other hand, respects God’s omnipotence, for if God can make anything right which he wants to, then there is nothing which he is morally prevented from doing.	加德夫的論証可用以下方式解釋。無所不能是神主要或定義性的屬性之一；換句話說，「神必須是全能的。」讓我們假設神聖命令倫理是一個錯誤的理論，而有一些事物（以x代表）在本性上是邪惡的，完全在神聖的禁令之外。若是如此，如果神不能做x，神就不是全能的，但這是不可能的。換句話說，拒絕神聖命令倫理似乎引至不可接受的立場，就是否定神的全能。另一方面，神聖命令倫理尊重神的全能，因為如果神可以使任何祂想做的事成為正確，那麼就沒有什麼事是祂在道德上不能做的。
Cudworth himself is not a proponent, but a vociferous critic of the divine command position. Thus one can ask the question of how accurately he reports the actual thinking of divine command moralists.	加德夫本身不是一個神聖命令理論的倡議者，反而是一個響亮的批評者。因此，我們的疑問是，他對神聖命令道德者的報導真的準確嗎？
A number of medievalists have suggested a connection between adherence to an ethics of divine commands and exaltation of the divine omnipotence in the case of William Ockham. This explanation for Ockham’s favorable disposition toward the divine command theory has been offered in papers by David Clark, Francis Oakley, and Oakley and Elliot Urdang. It has also been suggested by Frederick Copleston in his history of philosophy. This explanation for the espousal of an ethics of divine commands may seem intuitively plausible, for God’s postulated institution of morality surely represents an aspect of what God has the power to do. In the case of Ockham, however, this explanation turns out to be purely speculative from a strict textual point of view.	一些研究中世紀的學者建議，岳金（William Ockham）堅持神聖命令倫理和高舉神聖全能是有連繫的。解釋岳金贊同神聖命令理論的論文有克拉克、奧克利、奧克利和奧特（David Clark, Francis Oakley, and Oakley and Elliot Urdang）。哥普斯頓（Frederick Copleston）在他的哲學歷史中也這樣建議。表面上，這樣解釋擁護神聖命令倫理好像是可信的，因為神要求成立道德架構無疑代表這是神有能力做的事。不過，這樣解釋岳金卻是純粹從著作觀點的猜測。
In reviewing the texts which serve as evidence for Ockham’s adherence to a divine command theory, one can see that they do not contain any deduction of divine command ethics from the concept of divine omnipotence, nor any explicit argument for an ethics of divine commands which involves the notion of divine omnipotence. Further, the connection in question is not suggested by the larger context of discussion. Ockham’s statements of the divine command position do not occur within questions dealing with the divine power.... [Later] we will consider further the implications of this connection for the acceptability of a divine command ethical system.	在審查岳金用來解釋他堅持神聖命令理論的著作中，我們可以看到，他並沒有從神聖全能的概念演繹至神聖命令倫理，也沒有用神聖全能的論點去明確地辯護神聖命令倫理。此外，這有疑問的連繫也沒有在廣泛的討論中提及。岳金對神聖命令理論的說明沒有和處理神聖權力的討論一同出現。下面我們會進一步分析這種連繫如何影響神聖命令倫理體系的可接受性。
Arguments from God’s Unique Status	（B）從神獨特地位的論証
... [In this category of arguments] is the contention that there cannot be anything which is independent to God. For in A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, Richard Price also makes mention of the issue whether “we must give up the unalterable natures of right and wrong, and make them dependent on the Divine will” in order to avoid “setting up something distinct from God, which is independent of him, and equally eternal and necessary.”	［這論証目錄］的論點是沒有任何東西是獨立於神的。正如皮來斯（Richard Price）在《評論道德觀的主要問題》中提到這一點：是否「我們必須放棄是和非那不可改變的性質，使他們依賴神的意志」，以避免「在神以外設立一些事物，是獨立於神的、與神同是永恆的和必要的。」
The suggested contention that a divine command theory must be adopted in the realm of ethics because there cannot be anything independent of God may be seen, we believe, as an attempt to capture the religious insight of the absolute centrality which God is to enjoy. As such, it bears some analogy to a point made in favor of the divine command position by Robert Merrihew Adams, namely, that such a system satisfies the religious requirement that God be the supreme focus of one’s loyalties.	有人建議神聖命令理論必須收容在倫理學的領域中，因為不能有任何獨立於神的事物，我們認為這論點是嘗試表達宗教的見解，就是讓神享受絕對的中心。因此，它類似亞當斯（Robert Merrihew Adams）贊成神聖命令理論的理由，就是這樣的系統滿足了宗教的要求，讓神成為一個人效忠的最高焦點。
Analogical Arguments	（C）類比的論証
An ethics of divine commands was a major topic of discussion in late medieval philosophy and theology, and E. Pluzanski has hypothesized two reasons for the attractiveness of this theory to the medieval mentality. On the one hand, he connects the espousal of an ethics of divine commands with the unwillingness of medieval theologians to take liberties in interpreting Scripture, which contains accounts of actions which clearly seem to contradict moral laws and which yet are presented as accomplished under the direct order of God.	神的命令倫理是中世紀晚期的哲學和神學一個重大的討論課題，普辛斯基（E. Pluzanski）指出兩個原因來推測這理論對中世紀心態的吸引力。[1] 一方面，他認為擁護神聖命令倫理與中世紀神學家不願意自由解釋聖經有關；因為聖經記載一些似乎明顯違反道德律的行動，而這些行動也被記載為神直接指令的。
This postulated connection is verified by the use made, within the medieval divine command tradition, of such Scriptural cases as Abraham sacrificing Isaac, the prophet Hosea committing adultery, the Israelites despoiling (and hence stealing from) the Egyptians on their way out of Egypt, Samson killing himself, Jacob lying to his father, and the patriarchs practicing polygamy. Secondly, Pluzanski suggests that the structure of civil society in the Middle Ages, in particular, the large number of special regulations admitted by customary and canon law, prepared the way for acceptance of the idea of an arbitrary moral law.	這個假設的關係被中世紀神聖命令的傳統所証實，他們提出了聖經的事例，如亞伯拉罕將以撒獻祭、何西阿先知犯姦淫、以色列人在出埃及前掠奪（就是盜竊）埃及人、參孫殺死自己、雅各欺騙他的父親、始祖實行一夫多妻制。[2] 其次，普辛斯基認為，中世紀民間社會的結構（尤其是習慣法和教會法典中大量的特殊規條）為接受任意道德律的思想開路。
At first blush, Pluzanski’s second suggestion appears to be a sociological and psychological thesis of a highly speculative character. On closer examination, one can see in Pluzanski’s comment the suggestion that an analogical mode of reasoning with respect to legislative activity may underlie the position of the divine command moralist.	驟眼看來，普辛斯基的第二項建議似乎是一個極度猜測性的社會學和心理學論點。但仔細觀察後，我們可以看到普辛斯基的論點中包含一個建議，就是神聖命令道德的後面是對立法活動作一個類比推理模式。
From this point of view, it is worth taking note of an argument reported by Thomas Bradwardine in The Cause of God on the side of the divine command theory:	從這個角度來看，一個值得注意的論點是伯維但（Thomas Bradwardine）在他所著《神的起因》支持神聖命令理論：
This could be confirmed by human ecclesiastical laws, and even by secular ones. For frequently in ecclesiastical laws the Pope says, “It pleased us thus, or so,” which, from that very fact, is established for a law and is obligatory. Imperial laws too very often have a similar foundation, wherefore they also say, “What has pleased the sovereign has the force of law.” But so is God free in establishing laws for governing his whole state, just as these are for his state. Therefore the will of God is sufficient for law, and the highest law.	這一點可以用人類教會的法律確定，甚至可用世俗的法律。經常在教會的法律中，教宗說：「所以這使我們感到高興，」就因為這個事實而建立一個強制性的法律。帝國的法律也往往有類似的基礎，所以他們也說：「使國王高興的就有法律的效力。」但同樣，神有自由制定統治祂的國家的法律，而這是為了祂的國家。因此，神的旨意足夠成為法律，也是最高的法律。
This argument works with a comparison between civil and ecclesiastical law and divine legislative activity. From the realm of civil law, it makes use of a statement in the code of Justinian, “What has pleased the sovereign has the force of law.” When reporting arguments in favor of the view that justice as found among created things depends simply upon the divine will, Thomas Aquinas mentions precisely the same text from the Justinian code as supposed evidence that law is “nothing but the expression of the will of a sovereign.” Thus the argument reported by Bradwardine can be interpreted as claiming that civil law can be, and indeed frequently is constituted by the mere will of the ruler.	這論點可以用來比較民事法並教會法和神聖的立法活動。民事法應用游斯丁尼（Justinian）的法典中的聲明：「國王高興的事就有法律的效力。」當阿奎那著述他的論點，說在被造之物中的正義僅僅依賴神的意志，他正是提出游斯丁尼的聲明，用來作証據說明法律「不過是表達了一個主權的意志。」因此，伯維但的論証可以解釋為：民事法可以僅僅是、也經常是統治者的意志。
Further, according to this argument, the same thing holds true in the realm of ecclesiastical law, since papal legislation is often formulated in the terminology of “It pleased us thusly.” Having established a connection between law and will, the argument proceeds by way of analogy. Just as the pope is governor of the spiritual realm and just as a civil ruler governs a political state, so God governs all of creation as his “state.” And hence, just as an ecclesiastical or civil ruler has the power to make law by sheer choice of will, so it must be the case that the will of God is enough to create law in those matters appropriate to divine legislative activity....	此外，根據這個說法，教會法也是一樣，因為教宗的立法往往用這個公式：「我們為此感到高興。」當建立了法律和意志的連繫之後，下面的論證就用類比方法。正如教宗是屬靈領域的統治者，而公民的統治者管轄一個國家，所以神也統治整個宇宙為祂的「國家」。因此，正如一個教會或民間統治者擁有權力單單以自己的意志而制定法律，神在行使神聖的立法活動時也可以適當地用祂的意志創造法律。
The ... strategy of establishing an analogy between what obtains in metaphysics and what obtains in ethics is employed and indeed ingeniously exploited by Peter of Ailly in taking the familiar medieval cosmological argument for the existence of God and constructing an analogue of it supporting an ethics of divine commands. Ailly’s version of the cosmological proof is divided into three stages: firstly, an argument that it is necessary to reach one first efficient cause; secondly, establishment of the contention that no created thing can serve this function; and thirdly, an argument that the first efficient cause is to be identified with the divine will.	艾伊（Peter of Ailly）運用（也是機靈地利用）他的策略，在形而上學的結論和倫理學的結論建立了類比，他利用中世紀熟悉的宇宙論對神存在的論証，建立一個類比去支持神聖命令倫理。艾伊的宇宙論証據分為三個階段：[1] 辯說必須達到一個第一有效起因；[2] 建立論點証明被造之物不能有這功能；[3] 辯說第一有效起因和神聖意志是相同的。
The analogous proof of divine command ethics likewise involves three steps. Through rejection of the possibility of an infinite regress in obligatory laws, Ailly argues for the necessity of one first obligatory law; he then contends that no created law enjoys this status for the reason that no created law has from itself the power of binding; finally, using the divine attribute of perfection and Augustine’s definition of eternal law, he establishes that the first obligatory law is the divine will. Given the enduring popularity of the cosmological argument, Ailly’s extrapolation of it into the realm of ethics is sufficiently intriguing to merit quoting the text of the argument in its entirety:	神聖命令倫理的類比式証明亦包括三個步驟。[1] 通過拒絕強制性法律有無窮倒退的可能性，艾伊辯說有第一個強制性法律的需要；[2] 然後他辯說被造的法律不能享有這地位，因為沒有一個被造的法律有約束的權力；[3] 最後，他利用神聖完美的屬性和奧古斯丁對永恆法律的定義，建立結論說第一個強制性法律就是神的意志。鑑於宇宙論論証持久的普及性，加上艾伊如何將論證帶入倫理學的領域是極有趣的推論，我們將論證的全文節錄如下：
Thus the first conclusion is this: Just as the divine will is the first efficient cause in the class of efficient cause, so, in the class of obligatory law, it is the first law or rule. Now the first part of this conclusion is commonly granted by all philosophers; therefore it is assumed as something evident. But in order to prove the second part, I must first advance some preliminary propositions.	因此，第一個結論是：正如神的意志是有效起因類的第一有效起因，所以，在強制性法律類內，它是第一條法律或規則。這結論的第一部是所有哲學家普遍接受的；因此可以假定它是正確的。但為了証明第二部分，我首先要提出一些基本的命題。
The first proposition is that, among obligatory laws, one is a law absolutely first.	第一個命題是：在強制性的法律中，有一個法律是絕對第一。
Proof: Just as there is not an infinite regress in efficient causes, as the Philosopher proves in Metaphysics II, 3; so there is not an infinite regress in obligatory laws. Therefore, just as it is necessary to reach one first efficient cause, so it is necessary to arrive at one first obligatory law, because the principle is entirely the same in both cases. Therefore, etc.	証明：正如哲學家已經在《形而上學》第二部第三節証明了，一個有效的起因不能無限地倒退，所以強制性法律不能無限地倒退。因此，正如必須達到第一有效起因，所以必須達到第一個強制性的法律，因為兩種情況的原則是完全一樣的。因此，…
The second proposition is that no created law is absolutely first.	第二個命題是：沒有被創造的法律是絕對第一。
Proof: Just as no created thing has of itself the power of creating, so no created law has of itself the power of binding; for as the Apostle states in Romans 13, “There is no power except from God,” etc. Therefore, just as no created thing is the first efficient cause, so no created law is the first obligatory law; for just as “first cause” is a sign that it is God who is involved in the causal activity, so “first law” is an indication that it is God who is imposing the obligation. Therefore, etc.	証明：正如沒有被創造的事物本身有力量去創造，所以沒有被創造的法律本身具有約束的權力；正如使徒在羅馬書13章說：「沒有權柄不是出於神的。」等等。因此，正如沒有被創造的事物是第一個有效起因，所以沒有被創造的法律是第一個強制性的法律；正如「第一因」是神參與起因活動的記號，所以「第一個法律」是神強加義務的表明。因此，…
The third proposition is that the divine will is the law which is absolutely first.	第三個命題是：神的意志就是法律，是絕對第一。
Proof: Evidently by the two preceding propositions.	証明：因為前面兩個命題正確，這就很明顯。
Just as it is ascribed to the divine will to be the first efficient cause, so it must be ascribed to the same thing to be the first obligatory law; for just as the former belongs to perfection, so does the latter. Therefore, etc.	正如第一個有效起因可以歸因於神的意志，所以同樣地，第一個強制性的法律必須歸因於神的意志；因為前者是完美的，後者也是如此。因此，…
Furthermore, this proposition is demonstrated by Augustine in Against Faustus 22, where he states that the eternal law is the divine intellect or will commanding that the natural order be maintained and forbidding that it be disturbed. Now the eternal law is a law absolutely first; similarly, nothing is prior to the divine will. Therefore, etc.	此外，奧古斯丁在《對抗浮士德》22章表明這個命題；他指出，永恆的法律是神聖的智力或意志，命令要維持自然秩序，並禁止將它擾亂。永恆的法律是絕對第一；同樣，沒有任何事先於神的意志。因此，…
And thus the second part of the conclusion is evident.	就這樣，結論的第二部份是顯而易見的。
This line of argument is presented by Peter of Ailly in his introductory commentary on the first book of the Sentences.	這個論點是艾伊在他所著《句子》第一冊的序言中介紹的。
Ailly’s contemporaries did not let this argument pass without criticism, and Ailly defended it against a variety of objections: (1) that there is a first obligatory law only in the sense of priority of time of institution, and concomitantly, that a created law could be first in this sense; (2) that it is in effect a category mistake to connect the fact of being an obligatory law with the concept of perfection; (3) that the divine will is not, strictly speaking, the eternal law, but rather, is the eternal maker of law; (4) that the divine will is not absolutely the first law or rule because negative laws (such as “Do not steal”) are not derived from it; and (5) that the status of a law or rule is inappropriately assigned to the divine faculty of will. It is Ailly’s response to this last objection which is the most interesting philosophically, in articulating a version of the divine command theory based on the concept of the divine simplicity, and hence on the identity of will and intellect in God.	艾伊的同時代者沒有讓這種說法容易地通過，他們的批評使艾伊要抵抗各種反對意見：（1）第一個強制性的法律的意思是制定的時間上有優先，同樣，第一個被創造的法律也有這個意義；（2）將強制性的法律和完美的概念聯繫一起是一個分類的錯誤；（3）嚴格來說，神的意志不是永恆的法律，它只是永恆法律的製造者；（4）神的意志不是絕對的第一條法律或規則，因為負面法律（如「不可偷竊」）不是源於它；（5）將法律或規則的地位分配給神聖的意志機能是不適當的。阿伊對最後一個的回應在哲學上是最有興趣的，他闡明一種基於神聖簡樸的概念的神聖命令理論，分析神的意志和智慧的分別。
Peter of Ailly also makes mention of the analogy between the divine will as first efficient cause and as first obligatory law in his treatise Is the Church of Peter Regulated by Law? A possible precursor of Ailly’s argument is to be found in a line of argument recorded in Thomas Bradwardine’s The Cause of God. Although lacking an explicit analogy with a cosmological form of argument for God’s existence, the argument reported by Bradwardine is like Ailly’s argument in contending that there cannot be an infinite regress in the rules of justice, that the rule which is the highest of all and the origin of the other rules cannot be in some creature, and that this highest law is the divine will.	艾伊在他的論文《彼得的教會由法律管制嗎？》也提到神的意志為第一有效起因和它為強制性法律的類比。艾伊論證的一個可能的前驅者是伯維但在《神的起因》中的論證。伯維但的論証雖然缺乏一個明確的類比，沒有像宇宙論對神存在的論証；但他就像艾伊的爭辯，說正義的規則不能無限倒退；最高的規則也是其他規則的來源，這不能是任何被造物，而這種最高的法律就是神的意志。
Implications	（D）含意
Surely, one of the purposes of studying the history of philosophy is to gain insight into problems we are still grappling with today....	學習哲學歷史其中一個目的，是深入了解我們今天仍然在掙扎的問題。
An ethics of divine commands has not infrequently been perceived as a theory which reduces ethics to a matter of power. As we have already noted, the seventeenth-century British philosopher Ralph Cudworth asserts that “this doctrine hath been since chiefly promoted and advanced by such as think nothing so essential to the Deity, as uncontrollable power and arbitrary will, and therefore that God could not be God if there should be any thing evil in its own nature which he could not do....” Another historical critic of divine command ethics, Thomas Chubb, saw proponents of the theory as reduced to adopting the unpalatable position of Hobbes, that is, of grounding God’s authority in his absolute power. In the contemporary literature, D. Goldstick has claimed that a theist is in the position of affirming, with respect to any divinely willed code of behavior, that “its moral rightness follows necessarily from its being willed by somebody omnipotent.” Or again, Philip Quinn has described varieties of divine command theory which “have it that God’s commands are to be obeyed just because he is supremely powerful.”	神聖命令倫理經常被簡化而成為一項關乎權力的理論。正如上面所說，十七世紀英國哲學家加德夫認為：「這教義已經被提倡和推廣為神性的基本特徵，就是祂的不可限制的權力和自主的意志；因此，如果在神的本性中有任何邪惡，是祂不能做的，祂就不是神。」另一個在歷史中批評神聖命令倫理的是崔博（Thomas Chubb），他簡化神聖命令倫理的提倡者，說他們為採用霍布斯（Hobbes）可憎厭的說法，以神的權威基於祂絕對的權力。現代的高斯狄（D. Goldstick）認為：一個有神論者肯定神聖意志決定行為準則，就是主張「準則的道德正確性一定源於一個全能者的決志。」再者，奎恩（Philip Quinn）形容不同種類的神聖命令理論，說它們「主張服從神的命令只是因為祂有最高的權力。」
Tying the divine command theory to the divine omnipotence has occasioned severe criticism of it. As representative of this critique, we quote Antony Flew:	將神聖命令理論連結於神的全能帶來了很多嚴厲的批評。這種批評可以用弗盧（Antony Flew）的話代表：
But a price has to be paid for thus making God’s will your standard .... you simultaneously lay yourself wide open to the charge that your religion is a gigantic exercise in eternity-serving, a worship of Infinite power as such, a glorification of Omnipotent Will quite regardless of the content of that will. It takes a very clear head—and a very strong stomach—to maintain such a position openly, consistently, and without any attempt to burk[e] its harsh consequences.	這樣將神的意志成為你的標準是要付代價的…你就同時將自己暴露在一個指責下，就是你的宗教是一個服務永恆的巨大演習，是一個對無限權力的崇拜，一個對全能的意志的歌頌，而不理會意志的內容如何。要公開地和一致地保持這種立場，需要一個非常清醒的頭腦和很強的胃，也絕不能嘗試鎮壓其惡劣後果。
While it cannot be denied that the divine omnipotence has entered into the articulation and defense of an ethics of divine commands, study of the historical literature does serve to indicate that the notions of God’s omnipotence and of his power over us have not constituted the only considerations offered in support of the divine command theory, nor have they dominated the discussion. The theory has also been related to other divine attributes, such as God’s impeccability. It has been related to the religious insight of the absolute centrality of God, expressed as the view that there cannot be anything which is independent of God. There have been attempts to use human legislative activity as a model for the divine. And attempts have been made to defend divine command ethics through notions taken from the realm of metaphysics, specifically, by invoking God’s status as first and uncaused cause, by drawing an analogy between “being” and “goodness,” and by constructing an ethical analogue of the cosmological argument for God’s existence. Thus someone inclined to adopt an ethics of divine commands need not fear being automatically committed to a doctrine of “Might makes right.”	不能否認的，神的全能已被用來解釋和保衛神聖命令倫理，但是，研究歷史文獻的結果是：神的全能和祂管治我們的權力並非支持神聖命令理論的唯一理由，它也沒有支配對這理論的討論。神聖命令理論還涉及其他神聖的屬性，如神的無錯誤。它也涉及以神為絕對中心的宗教見解，其觀點就是沒有任何東西是獨立於神。有人嘗試用人類的立法活動去作為神的模式。也有人嘗試以形而上學來保衛神聖命令倫理，就是引用神是無起因的第一因的地位；也有引用「存在」與「善」的比喻；也有用神存在的宇宙論論証構建一個道德模擬。因此，如果有人想採用神聖命令倫理，他不必擔心被迫使用「強權即公理」作為理由。

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SOURCE: Janine Marie Idziak (1994): “In Search of Good Positive Reasons for an Ethics of Divine Commands: a Catalogue of Arguments,” in Readings in Christian ethics, volume 1: Theory and Method, ed. David K. Clark and Robert V. Rakestraw (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker), 50-61.

From Janine Marie Idziak, “In Search of ‘Good Positive Reasons’ for an Ethics of Divine Commands: A Catalogue of Arguments,” Faith and Philosophy 6, 1 (January 1989): 47-64.

Arguments from the Divine Nature. 3

（A）從神本性的論証... 3

Arguments from God’s Unique Status. 9

（B）從神獨特地位的論証... 9

Analogical Arguments. 10

（C）類比的論証... 10

Implications. 17

（D）含意... 17