Situationism

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Situationism

處境主義

該思拉著（Norman L. Geisler），孔祥烱譯

Contrary to what the word situationism might seem to imply, it is not a completely normless ethic. According to one of its most vigorous proponents, Joseph Fletcher, author of Situation Ethics, situationism is located between the extremes of legalism and antinomianism. The antinomians have no laws, the legalists have laws for everything, and Fletcher’s situationism has only one law.	「處境主義」這個詞的含意似乎是一個完全沒有規範的倫理，但實際上卻不是。根據這主義的一位最有力的提倡者《處境倫理》的作者弗萊查（Joseph Fletcher），處境主義位於律法主義與無規範主義的兩個極端之間。無規範主義者沒有法律，律法主義者在一切事上都有法律，而弗萊查的處境主義只有一個法律。
There are a number of situationists whose works might have been examined here, among them Emil Brunner (The Divine Imperative), Reinhold Niebuhr (Moral Man and Immoral Society), and John A. T. Robinson (Honest to God). But Fletcher’s position has been more influential than these.	處境主義的代表作者包括布倫納（Emil Brunner著《神聖的命令》）、尼布爾（Reinhold Niebuhr著《道德的人與不道德的社會》）和羅賓遜（John A. T. Robinson著《向神誠實》），但弗萊查比這些人更有影響力。
Situationism Explained	（A）解釋處境主義
Since Fletcher’s situationism claims allegiance to one unbreakable norm, it will be treated here as a one-norm absolutism. According to Fletcher, his position is neither a lawless relativism, which says there is no law for anything, nor a legalistic absolutism, which has laws for everything. Rather, he contends that there is one law for everything, the law of love.	由於弗萊查的處境主義強調只有一個牢不可破的規範，這裏就將它作為一個獨一規範的絕對主義。根據弗萊查，他的立場並不是無法律的相對主義（就是認為在任何事上都沒有法律），也不是律法絕對主義（就是認為在所有事上都有法律）；他爭辯說，只有一個適合所有事的規範，就是愛的法律。
Avoiding the Extremes of Legalism and Antinomianism	（一）避免無規範主義和律法主義的極端
Fletcher fears both the radical right and the radical left in ethics. However, his position yields more readily to the criticism that it, too, is not distinguishable from antinomianism. Between these two poles, he tries to firmly establish one absolute norm that can be applied to every ethical situation.	弗萊查畏懼倫理學中的激進左派和激進右派；然而，他的主張更容易被批評為與無規範主義沒有區別。在兩個極端之間，他試圖要確立一個絕對的規範，可應用於每個道德處境。
The legalist is one who enters every decision-making situation encumbered with a bundle of predetermined rules and regulations. For such, the letter and not the spirit of the law prevails. The post-Maccabean Pharisees can be singled out as classic examples of legalists. With their 613 (or 621) laws, they were prearmed for any moral predicament. They had a preset and prescribed manual for morality. Fletcher considers Judaism, along with both classical Catholicism and Protestantism, to be legalistic, though Judaism is less so than the latter two. The Jews stoned homosexuals and the church burned them, says Fletcher. Both put law over love. The legalist believes in the love of duty; the situationist holds to the duty of love.	當律法主義者進入決策過程中，他被一大堆預先釐定的規則和條例所拖累；律法的字句而不是律法的精神獲得勝利。麥喀比王朝後的法利賽人正是律法主義者的典型例子，他們以613條（或621條）律法為他們面對任何道德困難預先作了防護；他們有一本預設和規定的道德手冊。弗萊查認為，猶太教、古典天主教和基督教都是律法主義，他認為後兩者比猶太教更嚴重；弗萊查說，猶太人以擲石殺死同性戀者，教會則燒死同性戀者，雙方都將律法蓋過愛。律法主義者愛上責任，處境主義者則堅持愛的責任。
At the other end of the ethical spectrum, Fletcher locates the antinomians, who are complete libertines, with no norms whatsoever. Each of their moral decisions is spontaneous and unprincipled, based only on the situation of the moment. Some antinomians claim to have a clairvoyant conscience, a kind of direct moral insight into right and wrong. As examples of the antinomian view, Fletcher cites the New Testament libertines, with their lawlessness; the early gnostics, with their “special knowledge”; the modern Moral Rearmament movement, with its “spiritual power”; and Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialism (discussed here in chap. 2). Common to all these views, says Fletcher, is the rejection of all moral rules, even any generally valid ones. No norm is accepted, not even a norm of love. From Fletcher’s point of view, the antinomians throw out the ethical baby (love) with the legalistic bathwater.	弗萊查將無規範主義放在倫理系統排列的另一極端，他們是絕對放蕩者；沒有任何規範可言；每一個道德決定都是自發性的和無原則的，只是根據當時的處境而作。有些無規範主義者說自己有洞察力的良知心，以一種直接道德洞察力來分辨是非。弗萊查引用新約時代的放蕩者為例子，說明無規範主義如何不接受任何法律，包括初期靈智派（諾斯底主義）說自己擁有「特別的知識」；現代道德重新裝備運動說自己擁有「屬靈力量」；沙特（Jean-Paul Sartre）之存在主義。弗萊查說，這些觀點的共同特點就是拒絕一切道德規則，包括任何一般有效的規則；他們不接受任何規範，包括愛的規範。從弗萊查的觀點來看，無規範主義者將倫理的嬰兒（愛）和律法主義者的洗澡水同時扔掉。
Between the polar opposites of legalism, with laws for everything, and antinomianism, with its lack of laws for anything, Fletcher posits his situational absolutism, with its one law for everything. The situationist comes into every ethical battle armed with but one moral weapon—love: “Only the command to love is categorically good.” Every other decision is hypothetical: do this if it is loving. “We are ‘obliged’ to tell the truth, for example, only if the situation calls for it; if a would-be murderer asks his victim’s whereabouts, our duty might be to lie.” As far as other moral rules are concerned, they are helpful but not unbreakable. The only ethical imperative one has is “Act responsibly in love,” literally “everything else without exception, all laws and rules and principles and ideals and norms, are only contingent, only valid if they happen to serve love in any situation” (emphasis original).	在律法主義（一切有法律）和無規範主義（任何事上都缺乏法律）兩個極端之間，弗萊查安置了他的處境絕對主義（所有事上只有一個法律）。處境絕對主義者面臨每一個倫理戰鬥時只有一個道德武器，就是愛：「只有愛是絕對的善。」任何其他決定都基於一個假設：如果出於愛就去做。「例如，我們『必須』說實話，如果處境需要的話；如果潛在的兇手問及受害者的下落，我們的責任可能是說謊。」至於其他道德規則，他們會有幫助，但不是不可違反的。只有一個道德命令，就是「以負責任的愛去行」，意思是「任何其他都沒有例外，所有法律、規則、原則、理想和規範都是因情況而異的，在任何處境中，只有剛巧為愛服務，它們才有效。」
The situationist has the one law of love (agape); many general rules of wisdom (sophia), which are more or less reliable; and the particular moment of decision (kairos), “in which the responsible self in the situation decides whether the sophia can serve love there or not.” The “legalists make an idol of the sophia, antinomians repudiate it, situationists use it,” writes Fletcher. The solidification of these generally valid rules into absolute norms is legalism, and the rejection of all value in them is antinomianism.	處境主義者只有一個愛的法律（無私的愛，希臘文agape）；有許多一般『智慧性規則』（希臘文sophia）大置上是可靠的；也有抉擇的特定時刻（希臘文kairos）。「在這時刻中，負責任的自我面臨處境時，它要決定『智慧性規則』能否為愛服務。」弗萊查說：「律法主義者以『智慧性規則』為偶像，無規範主義者拒絕它，處境主義者使用它。」律法主義將這些一般有效的規則凝固成絕對規範，無規範主義卻拒絕它們全部價值。
There are at least two basic reasons for accepting only one universal norm. First, universals cannot be derived by deduction from other universals like “middle axioms”—one cannot derive an underived norm. Second, each situation is so different from every other situation that it is questionable whether a rule that applies to one situation can be applied to all situations like it, since the others may not really be like it. Only the single axiom or norm of love is broad enough to be applied to all circumstances and contexts.	只接受一個普遍的規範至少有兩個基本原因。[a] 「普遍的絕對」不能像「過度通則」一樣，用演繹法從其他「普遍的絕對」推論出來，也就是不能推論出「非推論性規範」（underived norm）。[b] 每一個處境與其他處境都截然不同，將一個適用於一種處境下的規則，應用於所有處境是有問題的，因為其他處境可能不一樣；只有一個愛的通則或規範具有廣泛性，足以適用於所有情況和處境。
Setting Forth the Presuppositions	（二）前提的列出
According to Fletcher, there are four working principles of situationism: pragmatism, relativism, positivism, and personalism. He does not, however, intend that we should conclude that situationism is totally relativistic and nonnormative. He means, rather, that within the framework of this absolute norm of love, everything else is pragmatic, relativistic, positivistic, and personalistic.	根據弗萊查，處境主義有四個應用原則：實用主義、相對主義、實證主義和個人主義。不過，他不想我們認為處境主義完全是相對性的和無規範性的；他希望在這種絕對的愛的規範架構內，其他一切都是實用的、相對的、實證的和個人的。
Pragmatism. By a pragmatic approach Fletcher means that “the right is only the expedient in our way of our behaving.” It is what “works” or “satisfies” for love’s sake. He wants to put love to work in order to make it successful and to realize its “cash value.” The pragmatic approach disdains abstract, verbal solutions to ethical problems; it seeks, rather, concrete and practical answers.	[1] 實用主義。弗萊查認為一個實用的做法，就是「我們權宜的行為方式就是對的。」為愛的緣故而「可行的」或「滿意的」就是對的。他希望把愛實行而達到成功，並實現其「現金價值」。這實用的做法藐視以抽象和口頭的解決方法來處理倫理問題；相反地，它找尋具體和實際的答案。
Relativism. There is only one absolute; everything else is relative to it. “As the strategy is pragmatic, the tactics are relativistic.” The divine command of love is changeless in its why, but contingent in its specific what and how. “The situationist,” writes Fletcher, “avoids words like ‘never’ and ‘perfect’ and ‘always’ and ‘complete’ as he avoids the plague, as he avoids ‘absolutely.’” Yet it is impossible to be “absolutely relative.” “There must be an absolute or norm of some kind if there is to be any true relativity.” “In Christian situationism the ultimate criterion is ... ‘agapic love.’” But Christians should constantly remind themselves that everything else is relative to this one norm.	[2] 相對主義。只有一個絕對，其他一切都是相對的。「因為策略是實用的，戰術就是相對的。」對愛的神聖命令在「為何」的問題是不變的，在「什麼」和「如何」的問題上是因情況而異的。弗萊查說：「處境主義者避免『永不』、『完美』、『常常』、『完全』等字眼，像避免瘟疫和避免『絕對』一樣。」但是，『絕對地相對』是不可能的。「要達到真實的相對性，就一定有某種形式的絕對或規範。」「基督徒的處境主義最終的標準是…無私的愛。」但基督徒要不斷提醒自己，一切都相對於這一個規範。
Positivism. A positivistic position, as opposed to a naturalistic view, holds that values are derived voluntaristically, not rationally. A person decides on their values, one does not deduce them from nature. This is also called “emotivism” because moral values are thought to be expressions of one’s feelings rather than prescriptions for one’s life. A positivistic or emotive ethic places art and morals in the same camp: both call for a decision or leap of faith. Ethical statements do not seek verification, they look for justification. And only in the one norm of Christian love do all other moral expressions find their ultimate justification.	[3] 實證主義。一個實證主義者的立場，和自然主義的觀點不同，認為價值乃起源於自願而非理性；一個人決定自己的價值觀，而不是從本性演繹出來。這也被稱為「情感主義」，因為道德價值觀被認為是表現一個人的感情，而不是人生的規定。一個實證或情感主義的道德觀將藝術和倫理放在同一個陣營：兩個都要求人做決定或作信心的跳躍。倫理聲明並不求驗證，它們尋找合理性；只有在一個基督徒的愛的規範內，其他道德的表達才能找到最終的合理性。
Personalism. Moral values are not only what persons express; persons are the ultimate moral values. There are no inherently good things, only persons are inherently valuable. Value only “happens” to things. Things are of value only to persons. “Things are to be used, people are to be loved.” The reverse of this—loving things and using people—is the perversion of morality. According to Fletcher, considering only persons to have intrinsic value is what Kant meant by treating persons always as ends and never as means. So this is the meaning of love: relating everything to the good of persons, who alone are good as such.	[4] 個人主義（Personalism）。道德價值觀不僅由個人表達；個人也是最終的道德價值觀；沒有固有性的善，只有個人是固有性的價值。價值只不過「發生」在事物上；事物單單對個人有價值。「事物是要使用的，人卻是要被愛的。」相反來說，愛事物而使用人就是道德的誤用。根據弗萊查，康德說對待人要常常當作是目的，而不是手段，意思是單單人才有內在的價值。這就是愛的含義：一切事都為人們的好處，因為單單人是好的。
In brief, situationism is an ethic with a pragmatic strategy, a relativistic tactic, a positivistic attitude, and a personalistic value center. It is an ethic with one absolute, to which everything else is relative and which is directed toward the pragmatic end of doing good to persons.	總括說，處境主義是一個有實用主義策略的倫理，相對主義的戰術，實證主義的態度，和個人主義的價值中心。它是只有一個規範的倫理觀，其他一切都是相對的，都是為了達到一個實用的結果，就是為了人們的好處。
Explaining the Propositions	（三）命題的解釋
The situational position in ethics can be explained by six basic propositions.	處境主義的理論可以用六個基本命題來解釋。
Each proposition is an elaboration of what it means to live situationally with only the one absolute norm of love. Let us examine them in the order in which they are presented by Fletcher.	每一個命題闡述怎樣基於處境主義，以一個愛的絕對規範去生活；讓我們根據弗萊查所用的排列順序去逐一研究。
“Only one thing is intrinsically good, namely, love; nothing else at all.” The realist argues that God wills something because it is good. Fletcher follows the voluntarists like Duns Scotus and Ockham, who say that something is good because God wills it so. Nothing is good in and for itself. It is good only if it helps persons and bad if it hurts persons. The person “finding” the value may be divine or human, but only persons—God, self, neighbor—determine something to be valuable. No act has intrinsic value. It gains its value only as it relates to persons. Apart from helping or hurting persons, all ethical acts are meaningless. All value, worth, goodness, and rightness are predicates, not properties. They may be predicated about persons, but they are not real things in themselves. God is goodness and love; all other persons merely have or do good.	[1] 「只有一件事在本質上是好的，就是愛；沒有別的。」現實主義者認為，神願望一些東西，因為它是好的。弗萊查跟隨意識論者史高都斯（Duns Scotus）和岳金（Ockham），說一些事是好的，因為神願望它。幫助人的就是好的，傷害人的就是壞的。「發現」價值的可能是神或人，但只有當事人（神、自我、鄰舍）才能決定事物有沒有價值；沒有任何行為具有內在價值；它獲得其價值正因為與人有關。在幫助人或傷害人之外，所有道德行為都沒有意義；所有的價值、好處、正確性都是述詞，不是特性；它們可能用來描述一些人，但它們本身不是真實的事。神是仁慈和愛；所有其他人僅僅擁有或實行仁慈。
Love is an attitude, not an attribute. Love is something that persons give and something that persons should receive, because only persons have intrinsic value. According to Fletcher, the image of God in the human being is not reason but love. Love and personhood constitute humankind’s characteristic similarity to God. This is why the only human thing with intrinsic value is love—it makes the human like God.	愛是一種態度，不是一種屬性。愛是一些人給予的東西，也是人應該獲得的，因為只有人有內在價值。根據弗萊查，神的形像在人類中是愛，不是理性；愛和位格是人類和神相似的特徵，這就是為何人類的內在價值就是愛，它使人類與神相似。
The other side of the proposition that only benevolence (love) is inherently good is that only malevolence is intrinsically evil. However, for Fletcher the opposite of love is not hate, which is really a perverted form of love, but rather indifference. Hate at least treats the other as a thou, or person. Indifference treats others as inanimate objects. To totally ignore others and their needs is to depersonalize them. It is worse than attacking them, for an attack presupposes at least that the attacker considers the other person worth attacking.	這命題的另一面是：只有良善（愛）是本質上的善，只有惡毒是本質上的惡。然而，弗萊查認為愛的反面不是恨而是冷漠，因為恨實際上是愛被歪曲了；恨至少以人為一個「你」，冷漠以其他人為無生命的物體。完全漠視別人和他們的需要，是埋沒他們的人性；這比攻擊他們更壞，因為最低限度，攻擊的前提是攻擊者認為其他人值得攻擊。
Fletcher is opposed to calling some acts lesser and, therefore, excusable evils. A spy’s lie, for example, is not wrong at all. “If it [a lie] is told in love it is good, right.” “It is not an excusable evil; it is a positive good.” “If love vetoes the truth, so be it.” Whatever one must do for love’s sake is good, for only love is intrinsically good; nothing else whatsoever is good. Whatever is the loving thing to do in a given situation is the right thing to do, even if it involves sacrificial suicide while suffering torture, to avoid betraying one’s comrades to the enemy.	弗萊查反對形容一些行為是較輕的罪惡，故此就可以被原諒。例如，一個間諜的謊言是絕無錯誤的；「如果它 [謊言] 是以愛來講，它就是好的和對的。」「它並非是可被原諒的罪惡，它是一個積極的好事。」「如果愛否決了真理，就否決了吧。」一個人以愛去做必須做的任何事都是好的，因為只有愛是內在的善；任何其他事都不是善。在特定情況下，任何愛的行動就正確的行動，包括在遭受酷刑中作犧牲性自殺，為了避免向敵人出賣自己的同志。
“The ruling norm or Christian decision is love; nothing else.” Love replaces the law. The spirit replaces the letter. “We follow law, if at all, for love’s sake.” One does not follow love for the law’s sake; one follows the law only for love’s sake. Traditionally, people believed that they kept love by obeying the law because the two were identical. But love and law sometimes conflict, and when they do, it is the Christian’s obligation to put love over the law. It is not the love of the law but the law of love that one ought to follow.	[2] 「最重要的規範或基督徒的抉擇就是愛；沒有別的。」愛代替律法；精神代替字句。〔譯者註：參考林後3:6〕「我們服從律法（若真正服從）是為了愛的緣故。」一個人不因為律法的緣故服從愛，一個人服從律法只因為愛的緣故。傳統上，人們認為他們服從律法來保持愛，因為兩者是相同的。但愛和律法有時會發生衝突，如果真的話，基督徒的義務是將愛放在律法之上；一個人應該遵循愛的法律，不是遵循對法律的愛。
According to Fletcher, Jesus summed up the Mosaic law and the Ten Commandments in one word: love. Indeed, there is no one of the commandments that may not be broken in some situation for love’s sake. “There are no ‘universal laws’ held by all men everywhere at all times, no consensus of all men.” For “any precepts all men can agree to are platitudes such as ‘do the good and avoid the evil’ or ‘to each according to his due.’” There are no universal laws except love. Every other law is breakable by love. As Augustine put it, “Love with care and then what you will, do.” He did not say, adds Fletcher, “Love with desire and do what you please.”	根據弗萊查，耶穌以一個字總結了摩西律法和十誡：愛；在某些處境下人可以因愛的緣故違反任何一條誡命。「沒有『普遍法律』是所有人在所有地方和所有時間都持守的，所有人並沒有共識。」因為「所有人同意的戒律都是籠統的言詞，如『做好事和避免惡事』或『每人要獲得所應得的』。」除了愛，沒有普遍法律；除了愛以外，其餘每一條法律都可以違反。正如奧古斯丁所說：「小心地愛，然後做你想做的。」弗萊查加上一句，他沒有說：「用慾望去愛，然後做你想做的。」
Christian love is a giving love. Christian love is neither romantic (erotic) love nor friendship (philic) love. Christian love is a sacrificial (agapic) love. And it is also a responsible love, which is no more subject to exploitation than to the evasive motives of legalism. A legalistic refuge in the safety of universal laws can even be a retreat from individual responsibility. One may wish for the security of absolutes rather than the responsibility of relatives. The classical pacifist is, for Fletcher, escaping the responsibility of deciding which wars are just. It is an easier ethic if someone else decides what is right or wrong and simply tells us what to do.	基督徒的愛是付出的愛；基督徒的愛不是浪漫（色情）的愛，也不友誼的愛。基督徒的愛是一種犧牲的愛；而且它也是負責任的愛，比動機不清楚的律法主義更不容易受利用。律法主義可以用普遍法律的安全港逃避個人責任；一個人可能希望倚賴安全的絕對法律，逃避相對法律的責任。弗萊查認為，一個古典和平主義者實際是逃避決定哪些戰爭是正義的；這實際是一個容易做的倫理：讓別人決定什麼是對還是錯，然後告訴我們應該怎麼做。
“Love and justice are the same, for justice is love distributed; nothing else.” Love and Justice are identical. Love does more than take justice into account; love becomes justice. Justice means to give others their due, and love is their due. Fletcher quotes the apostle Paul’s injunction, “Owe no man anything except to love” (Rom. 13:8). Even if love and justice differed (and they do not), the least love could do would be to give justice to every person. In loving, in being just, one must be multidirectional, not just one-directional. The command is to love one’s neighbors.	[3] 「愛與公義是相同的，因公義就是愛的分配；沒有別的。」愛與公義是相同的；愛不單需要考慮公義，也要變成公義。公義是給別人應有的，而愛就是別人應有的。弗萊查引用使徒保羅的命令：「除了愛以外，不欠任何人任何東西。」（羅13:8）［譯者註：和合本譯為「凡事都不可虧欠人，惟有彼此相愛。」］就算愛和公義不同（實際他們沒有不同），愛至少可以將公義給與每個人。在愛人中，也就是行公義中，一個人必須要多方向的而非單方向的；命令就是要愛自己的鄰舍。
Love is not merely a present activity toward one’s immediate neighbor. Love must have foresight. It must borrow the utilitarian principle and try to bring the greatest good (love) to the greatest number of people, for if love does not calculate the remote consequences, it becomes selfish. In short, justice is love using its head. Christian ethics welcomes law and order for love’s sake and even foresees the need at times for a loving use of force to protect the innocent. It makes “rights” practical. Sometimes one may have the moral (loving) responsibility to disobey unjust civil law. And on occasion love may demand a revolution against the state—if the state has gone beyond love’s pale.	愛不單是對自己的鄰舍現時的行動；愛必須有遠見；它必須利用功利主義的原則，盡量把最大的善（愛）帶給最多的人，因為如果愛不計算長遠後果，它就變得自私。總之，公義是愛用它的頭腦。基督教倫理是為愛的緣故歡迎法律和秩序，甚至預見到有時需要使用愛的武力去保護無辜者；它使「權利」實用化。有時一個人可能有道德（愛）的責任拒絕遵守不義的公民法；如果政府超越了愛的範圍，有時愛會要求一個反對政府的革命。
“Love wills the neighbor’s good whether we like him or not.” Fletcher’s fourth proposition stresses that love is an attitude and not a feeling, and in so doing it stresses the distinctive characteristics of Christian love. In eros desire is the cause of love, while in agape love is the cause of desire. Agapic love is not reciprocal. A comparison of the three kinds of love reveals what Fletcher has in mind here. Erotic love is egoistic. It says, “My first and last consideration is myself.” Philic love is mutual. It says, “I will give as long as I receive.” Agapic love, on the other hand, is altruistic, saying, “I will give, requiring nothing in return.” This kind of love is the ruling norm in situational ethics. Agapic love holds that one ought to love one’s neighbor as oneself.	[4] 「愛是願望鄰舍得好處，不論我們喜歡他與否。」弗萊查的第四個命題強調，愛是一種態度，而不是一種感覺；這就是基督徒的愛獨特的特徵。在肉欲的愛中，慾望是愛的起因；在無私的愛中，愛是慾望的起因；無私的愛不是回報性的。比較三種愛就顯露了弗萊查的想法。肉欲愛是利己的；它說：「我首要和最後要關心的是我自己。」友愛是相互的；它說：「當我受的時候，我就會施。」無私的愛則是利他的；它說：「我會付出，而不要求回報。」這樣的愛就是情境倫理的最高規範；無私的愛就是：一個人應該愛人如己。
Fletcher sketches four interpretations of the command to love one’s neighbor as oneself. First, some say it means to love your neighbor just as much as you love yourself. Second, it may mean to love others in addition to loving yourself. Third, thinkers such as Søren Kierkegaard hold that it means to love your neighbor in the way you ought to love yourself—rightly and honestly. Fourth, it is said that the command is to love your neighbor instead of loving yourself (as you have been doing but must now stop doing). Which is the true meaning of self-love?	弗萊查形容愛人如己的命令有四個意思：[a] 有人說這是愛你的鄰舍像愛你自己一樣多。[b] 這可能指愛自己外加上愛別人。[c] 思想家如祈克果（Søren Kierkegaard）認為可能指愛你的鄰舍應該和愛自己的方法一樣，就是正確地和誠實地去愛。[d] 有人說愛你的鄰舍的命令是愛他代替愛自己（因為你一直在愛自己，現在必須停止）。究竟自愛的真正意義是什麼？
Following the ladder of self-love suggested by Bernard of Clairvaux—which ascends from love of self for self’s sake, to love of God for self’s sake, to love of God for God’s sake, to love of self for God’s sake—Fletcher outlines his own understanding of loving one’s neighbor as oneself. We move, he says, from love of ourselves for our own sake, to love of our neighbor for our own sake, to love of our neighbor for the neighbors sake, to love of ourselves for the neighbor’s sake. The last is the highest and the best. It is the right kind of self-love: the love of oneself for the sake of loving others.	克萊浮的伯納德（Bernard of Clairvaux）［譯者註：中世紀著名修士〕建議一個自愛的階梯，最低層是因自我的緣故而自愛，上面的各層是：因自我的緣故而愛神，進至因神的緣故而愛神，進至因神的緣故而自愛。弗萊查概述了他對愛鄰舍如愛自己的理解；他說，我們的進步從因自我的緣故而自愛，進至因自我的緣故而愛鄰舍，進至因鄰舍的緣故而愛鄰舍，進至因鄰舍的緣故而自愛。最後一種是最高和最好的；這是一種正確的自愛，就是為愛他人而自愛。
When self-love and neighbor-love conflict, “the logic of love is that self-concern is obligated to cancel neighbor-good whenever more neighbor-good will be served through serving the self.” Ship captains and airplane pilots, for example, are to keep themselves alive, even at the expense of some passengers, if need be, for the sake of the safety of the rest of the passengers. In actuality, there is no real conflict between self-love and neighbor-love. One is to love oneself only to the degree that it maximizes neighbor-love.	當自愛和對鄰舍的愛發生衝突，「愛的邏輯是，如果對自我的好處會引致更多鄰舍的好處時，自我關注有義務取消鄰舍的好處。」例如，船長和飛機師要保持自己活著，若有需要的話，甚至要犧牲一些乘客，目的是為著其餘乘客的安全。實際上，自愛和對鄰舍的愛並沒有真正的衝突；一個人需要愛自己，直至達到對鄰舍的愛有最高的程度為止。
All love is self-love, but it is the self loved for the sake of loving the most people possible. Love is one, but there are three objects: God, neighbor, and self. Self-love may be either right or wrong. “If we love ourselves for our own sakes, that is wrong. If we love ourselves for God’s sake and the neighbor’s, then it is right. For to love God and the neighbor is to love one’s self in the right way ... ; to love one’s self in the right way is to love God and one’s neighbors.” And in no case does loving one’s neighbors imply that we must like them.	所有愛都是自愛，但它是自己去愛人，為要愛可能內最多人。愛只是一種，但有三個對象：神、鄰舍、自己。自愛可能是對或錯；「如果我們為自己的緣故愛自己，這是錯的；如果我們為神和鄰舍的緣故愛自己，就是對的。因為愛神和愛鄰舍就是一種正確的自愛…；愛自己正確的方式就是愛神和愛鄰舍。」在任何情況下，愛鄰舍並非表示我們喜歡他們。
Love does not even necessarily involve pleasing our neighbor. Love demands that we will our neighbor’s good, whether or not the neighbor pleases us, and whether or not our love pleases the neighbor. Calculating the neighbor’s good, even if it displeases them, is not cruel. A military nurse, for example, may lovingly treat patients roughly so as to hasten their recovery and return them to battle.	愛甚至不涉及使鄰舍喜悅；愛要求我們希望鄰舍獲得好處，不論鄰舍有否使我們喜悅，也不論我們的愛有否使鄰舍喜悅。就算使鄰舍不喜悅，計算他們的好處也不算是忍心。例如，一個隨軍護士可能用愛心粗暴地對待傷者，目的是使他們盡快恢復健康而再回到戰場。
“Only the end justifies the means; nothing else.” If this were not true, no act would be justified. There are no intrinsically good acts except the act of love. Hence, the only thing that can justify an act is if it is done for loving ends or purposes. This is not to say that any end justifies any means, but only that a loving end justifies any means. For example, it might be the loving thing to steal a murderer’s gun or to lie to a schizophrenic patient to keep him calm for treatment. What, asks Fletcher, justifies slicing into a human body with a knife? Surely not hatred of him as one’s enemy. But would not the act of mutilating his body be justified if the end in view is to save his life from a disease or a cancerous organ? Does not the end justify the means in this situation?	[5] 「只有目的使手段合理；沒有別的。」如果這命題是不對的話，就沒有行動會合理；除了愛的行動，沒有內在良好的行動。因此，唯一可以使行動合理的，就是為愛的目的或用途而做的；這並不是說任何目的都可以使任何手段合理，單是愛的目的可以使任何手段合理。例如，偷竊兇手的槍，或對精神分裂症病人說謊，使他可以平靜地接受治療。弗萊查問，將刀插入一個人的身體怎可能合理呢？當然不是仇恨他是敵人。但割切他的身體為要從疾病或癌症中挽救他的生命，不就合理嗎？這種情況不就是目的使手段合理嗎？
In fact, what other than the end could possibly justify the means, asks Fletcher? The means cannot justify themselves. Only ends justify means. Indeed, “no act apart from its foreseeable consequences has any ethical meaning whatsoever.” The meaning of the act comes from its purpose or end. And the only justifiable purpose for performing ethical acts is agapic love. Any means that is sought for its own sake is wrong. All ends are actually only means to higher ends, until one arrives at last at the ultimate end of love itself.	弗萊查問：除了以目的來証明手段合理之外，怎能有任何其他証明呢？手段本身不能使手段合理；只有目的才可以使手段合理。事實上，「除了可預見的後果有道德意義外，沒有任何事有道德意義。」行動的意義從其宗旨或目的而來；執行道德行動的唯一合理宗旨是無私的愛；任何手段為了自己的好處都是錯誤的。所有目的實際上是達到更高的目的的手段，直到一個人達到最終的目的，就是愛。
In response to those who challenge, on the basis of the “wedge” principle (i.e., that it is dangerous to have exceptions to moral norms like telling the truth and saving lives), Fletcher argues that “abuse does not bar use.” The fact that some people will abuse the situationist position of responsible love by irresponsible actions does not disprove the value of the love norm itself. And the so-called generalization argument—“What if everyone did it?” —is no more than obscurantism, a delaying tactic of static morality.	對基於「楔子」原則的挑戰（就是，道德衝突有例外是危險的，就如說真話和拯救生命），弗萊查辯說：「有濫用並不就要禁止使用。」雖然有些人會濫用處境主義負責任的愛的觀點，而作出不負責任的行動，但這並沒有否定愛的規範的價值。至於所謂一般化的論點，就是「若每個人都這樣做又如何？」這不過是蒙昧主義，是靜態道德的拖延戰術。
“Loves decisions are made situationally, not prescriptively.” The final expository postulate of situation ethics strongly marks the difference between the basic ethical principle of the love norm and the application of that principle in a given circumstance. The love principle is a universal but formal norm. It does not prescribe in advance what specific courses of action will be loving, For the precise prescription of love, a person will have to wait until they are in the situation. Love is free from specific predefinition. One cannot know in advance the “existential particularity” that love will take in a given situation. Love operates apart from a system of pretailored, prefabricated moral rules. Love functions circumstantially and neocasuistically. Love does not make up its mind before it has seen the facts, and the facts come from the situation.	[6] 「基於愛的決定是根據處境作出，而不是根據規定。」處境主義最後的解釋性假設，明顯地將以愛為規範的基本道德原則，及在特定情況下對這原則的應用分別出來。愛的原則是普遍的和形式的規範；它不預先指示哪些行動是愛的行動。愛在事前無特定的定義；一個人無法預先知道「存在的特殊性」，就是愛在特定情況下如何實現。愛的運作不在預先量度和製造的道德準則；愛的運作隨著情況和面對的問題；在看見事實之前，愛不作決定，而事實來自處境。
What the situationist does have in advance is a general (though not specific) knowledge of what one should do (love), why one should do it (for God’s sake), and to whom it should be done (one’s neighbors). The situationist surely knows that love is altruistic and not egoistic. And one knows that love should be exercised toward as many neighbors as possible. The situationist knows in advance how this love will probably operate in a general way by means of sophia, or wisdom. But one cannot say for sure what the loving thing to do will be in a particular case until all the particulars are known. For example, if Fletcher is asked, “Is adultery wrong?” he answers, “I don’t know. Maybe. Give me a case.” (In fact, Fletcher himself provides a case where adultery can be right if it is done in love; see below.)	處境主義者在事實出現前只有一般性的（不是特定性的）知識，知道人應該做的事（以愛），為何要做（為神的緣故），向誰做（向鄰舍）。處境主義者肯定知道，愛是無私的，不是自私的；而且知道愛應該向盡量多的鄰舍實行。處境主義者在事前藉智慧知道，愛在一般的情形下會如何運作。但卻不能肯定地說，在特定情況的下愛的行動是什麼，直到知道所有細節為止。例如，若有人問弗萊查：「通姦是錯的嗎？」他會回答：「我不知道。也許是錯。把事實告訴我。」（其實，弗萊查自己提供了一個情況，就是如果以愛行動，通姦也可以是正確的，見下文。）
In brief, the situationist holds that the general what and why are absolute, but the how is relative. There is an absolute prescription, but it is only worked out in the relative situation. Love is ultimate, but just how one is to love is dependent on the immediate circumstances. By a closer examination of some difficult moral situations, we will be able to understand even better just how Fletcher’s one-norm absolutism functions in different contexts.	簡言之，處境主義者認為，做什麼事和為何做在一般上是絕對的，但如何做卻是相對的。絕對的指示是有的，但它只在相對的情況中行使。愛是最終的，但如何愛卻依賴現實環境。當我們仔細觀察一些艱難的道德處境，就能夠更了解弗萊查的獨一規範絕對主義在不同情況下如何應用。
Applying the Love Norm	（四）愛的規範的應用
By the use of provocative illustrations throughout his book, Fletcher is able to explain more fully just why he holds to only one absolute norm and how it would probably be applied under differing conditions. Some of these marginal moral cases merit further examination.	弗萊查在他的書內藉著一些挑釁性的例子，去更充分地解釋為什麼他認為只有一個絕對的規範，以及如何應用這規範於不同的情況中。這些邊緣性的道德實例值得進一步研究。
Altruistic adultery. A German mother of two was captured by the Russians near the end of World War II. The rules of her Ukrainian prison camp allowed her release to Germany only in the event of pregnancy, in which case she would be returned as a liability. So the woman asked a friendly camp guard to impregnate her. She was sent back to Germany, was welcomed by her family, gave birth to the baby, and made him a part of their reunited family. Was her adultery justified? Fletcher does not say explicitly that it was, but he implies the same by calling it “sacrificial adultery.” Elsewhere, however, Fletcher speaks approvingly of mate-swapping for consenting adults, of a woman seducing a man pathologically attracted to a little girl, and of a young couple forcing parental approval of their marriage by engaging in intercourse. The direct implication is that all of these things can be done lovingly and can, therefore, be morally right.	[1] 利他的通姦。在第二次世界大戰接近結束時，一個有兩個兒女的德國母親被俄國人俘虜。按照烏克蘭戰俘營的規則，她若懷孕就會成為戰俘營的負荷，便可以獲釋回德國。於是這婦人要求一個友好的營地衛兵使她受孕；結果她被遣送回德國，受家人的歡迎，生下的孩子成為重聚家庭的一部分。她的通姦是否合理？弗萊查沒有清楚判斷是否合理，但他同時暗示地稱這行動為「犧牲的通姦」。弗萊查在書內另一處以讚許的語氣，說及成年人自願性的交換配偶，說及一個婦人引誘一個病態性對小女孩有興趣的男人，也說及一對年輕戀人發生性交為要迫使父母同意他們的婚姻。這裏直接的含意是，這些事情都藉愛而行動，因此，在道德上是正確的。
Patriotic prostitution. A young woman working for a United States intelligence agency was asked to lure an enemy spy into blackmail by using her sexuality. In the guise of a secretary, she was to become involved with a married man working for a rival power. When she protested that she could not put her personal integrity on the block by offering sex for hire, she was told, “It’s like your brother risking his life or limb in Korea. We are sure this job can’t be done any other way.” She was patriotic and wanted to serve her country. What was the loving thing to do? Here again Fletcher does not give his answer, but in view of the fact that he elsewhere approves of spies lying and men dying for their country out of love, for him there seems to be no reason why one might not be able to justify committing fornication for the fatherland, too.	[2] 愛國的賣淫。一個年輕女子在美國情報局工作，情報局要求她利用性行為引誘敵方間諜，藉此勒索他；計劃是由她偽裝為一名秘書，和一個替敵方工作的已婚男人通姦。當她抗議說，她不能犧牲自己的誠信去賣淫，情報局告訴她：「你的行動就像你的兄弟冒著生命或受傷在韓國戰鬥一樣，我們相信這項工作不能用其他方式完成。」她是愛國的，希望服務她的國家。在這情形下，愛的行動是什麼呢？弗萊查在這裡亦沒有提出答案，但鑑於他在其他地方贊同間諜說謊和贊同人出於愛為國家死亡，似乎他沒有理由不贊同一個人為祖國行淫。
Sacrificial suicide. Is taking one’s own life always morally wrong? According to situation ethics, it is not; suicide can be done in love. For example, if a man has only the two choices of taking an expensive medicine—a course of action that will deplete his family’s finances and cause his insurance to lapse—in order to live three more years, or else refusing the medicine and dying in six months, thereby leaving ample financial provisions for his family, which is the loving thing to do? It is not difficult to see how a situationist could approve of this rather indirect kind of sacrificial suicide. In fact, Fletcher speaks with approval both of Mother Maria’s substitutionary death in the Nazi gas chambers for a young Jewess, and of a captured soldier’s taking his own life to avoid betraying his comrades to the enemy. Suicide can be done for love’s sake, in which case it is morally right according to a situationist ethic.	[3] 犧牲性自殺。自殺是否一定是道德錯誤？根據處境倫理，自殺不一定是錯誤而可以是愛的行動。例如，一個病人只有兩種選擇，一是服用昂貴的藥，可再活三年，但他的家庭就用盡儲蓄，他的保險亦停保；二是拒絕藥物，在六個月後死亡，但卻為他的家庭遺留充裕的儲蓄。愛的行動是什麼呢？在這情形下，不難看到處境主義者贊同這種間接犧牲性自殺。實際上，弗萊查以讚許的語氣，說及瑪麗亞修女代替一個年輕猶太女人在納粹毒氣室死亡，也說及一名被俘的士兵以自殺來避免出賣自己的同志。自殺可以為愛而做，處境倫理就以這樣是道德上正確。
Acceptable abortion. Even though Fletcher favors birth control over abortion as a means of controlling the population, nonetheless there are circumstances when he comes out clearly in favor of abortion. He gives the example of an unmarried schizophrenic patient who became pregnant after being raped. Her father requested abortion but was refused by the hospital staff on the grounds that it was not a therapeutic abortion and was, therefore, illegal. Fletcher castigates this refusal as legalistic. “The situationist ... would almost certainly, in this case, favor abortion and support the girl’s father’s request.”	[4] 可接受的墮胎。雖然弗萊查贊成以節育來控制人口，多於利用墮胎；但在有些情況下，他明確地贊成墮胎。他舉的例子是一個未婚而有精神分裂症的女子，被強姦後懷孕。她的父親要求墮胎，但被醫院的工作人員拒絕，理由是它不是治療性墮胎，所以不合法。弗萊查嚴厲批評這拒絕為律法主義。「在這種情況下，處境倫理者幾乎可以肯定會贊成墮胎，支持女孩的父親的要求。」
In another case, Fletcher gives tacit approval to a Romanian Jewish doctor who aborted three thousand babies of Jewish mothers in concentration camps because, if pregnant, the mothers were to be incinerated. That means that the doctor saved three thousand lives. And from the standpoint that the embryos were human lives (which Fletcher rejects), the doctor, by “killing” three thousand, saved three thousand and prevented the murder of six thousand. Surely this was the loving thing to do, according to situationism.	在另一個例子中，弗萊查默默贊同一個在羅馬尼亞的猶太醫生，為三千個猶太母親在集中營中墮胎，因為如果懷孕，母親就要被燒死。意思就是這醫生救了三千人的生命。就算從胚胎是人類的角度看（但弗萊查拒絕這看法），這醫生「殺了」三千人，卻救了三千人，就是防止了謀殺六千人。根據處境主義者，這當然是愛的行動。
Merciful murder. Should we actually turn our back on someone who is hopelessly caught in a burning airplane and begs to be shot? Would it not have been right to assassinate Hitler? Fletcher offers both illustrations and seems to indicate that either one could be a merciful, and therefore justifiable, murder. He seems to favor the act of a mother smothering her crying baby in order to save her group from being detected and killed by hostile Indians. The direct implication is that such an act might be performed in sacrificial love for the good of the whole group. Fletcher clearly approves of throwing some men out of an overloaded rescue boat to save them all from sinking. In 1841, the first mate of the ship William Brown of Liverpool was in charge of an overcrowded lifeboat and ordered most of the males thrown into the sea to save the rest. Later, the seaman who threw them into the sea was convicted of murder, with mercy recommended. “Situation ethics says it was bravely sinful, it was a good thing.” According to Fletcher, the first mate actually acted in love for the greater number of lives.	[5] 仁慈的謀殺。若有在燃燒的飛機中已絕望的人要求我們用槍殺死他們，我們會不理會嗎？刺殺希特拉是正確的嗎？弗萊查提供這兩個例子說明，這些謀殺都可以是仁慈的和合理的。他似乎贊同一個母親扼殺她哭叫的嬰兒，為要防止敵對的印第安人發現與她一同躲藏的一群人；這裏直接的含意是，這種行動為著整體的好處是以犧牲的愛而做的。弗萊查顯然贊同將一些人從過重的救生艇中丟進海中，為要拯救其他人不被溺。在1841年，利物浦的遊船威廉布朗號的大副負責一艘過重的救生艇，他下令將大部分男性丟進海中，為要拯救其他人；後來，那個將人丟進海的海員被判謀殺，不過法官建議對他施憐憫。「處境倫理形容它為勇敢的犯罪，是一件好事。」弗萊查認為大副的行動是為了更多的生命的愛。
There are many other marginal cases that Fletcher offers, including refusing to respirate a monstrously deformed child and carrying the inventor of a cancer cure out of a burning building rather than one’s own father. He also recommends sterilizing someone marrying a syphilitic and providing motherhood for single women by artificial insemination. I will not take space here to discuss more cases. One point, however, arises from all of these situations and needs emphasis here: in each situation there is a conflict of moral norms that the situationist feels can best be resolved by appeal to a single higher norm.	弗萊查還列舉了許多其他邊緣性的例子，包括拒絕讓一個極畸形的兒童呼吸，和贊同一個人在燃燒的大樓中揹出一個治療癌症的發明者，而不救出自己的父親；他還建議使一個嫁給梅毒患者的人絕育，也為一個單身婦女提供人工受精。我不會在這裡討論更多例子；但是，從這些處境看得到而且要強調的：在每一種情況中，當處境主義者感覺有道德規範的衝突時，最好的解決方法是選擇獨一和更高的規範。
Often the norms that conflict are held by some people to be unbreakable and universal. But how can two or more norms be universal and unbreakable if they conflict? One cannot follow two opposing paths; one must choose. Surely persons cannot be held responsible for obeying two conflicting norms when they can obey only one, can they? At this point the situationist’s solution shines. There is really only one universal and unbreakable norm: love. All the other norms are at best general and can be broken for love’s sake. The simplicity and logic of the solution has strong appeal, but there are also some grave difficulties. Let us turn our attention now to an evaluation of the one-norm absolutism of situation ethics.	一些人通常認為在衝突中的規範是不可違反的，也是普遍的。但兩個或以上在衝突中的規範又怎可以是普遍的和不可違反的呢？一個人不能同時跟從兩條相反的路；他必須選擇。當人們只能服從一個規範時，他們當然不能被追究責任，說他們違反兩個有衝突的規範，是嗎？在這情形下，處境主義者的解決方法就成為卓越的；因為只有一個普遍的和不可違反的規範：愛；所有其他規範是一般性的可以因愛而違反。這簡單而合邏輯的解決方法便有很強的吸引力，但同時亦有一些嚴重的困難。現在，讓我們把注意力移至對這獨一規範的絕對主義的評價。
Situationism Evaluated	（B）對處境主義的評價
The goal in what follows is not to evaluate the whole of situational ethics comprehensively, but only insofar as it bears on the question of moral laws. In this respect the evaluation will be both positive and negative. First, there are some clear merits to holding only one absolute norm such as love.	這一段的目標不是要全面評估整個處境倫理，只集中它對道德律的觀點；這評價將分為積極和消極兩方面的。首先，只持守一個絕對規範（愛）有它的優點。
Some Advantages of the Situational Position	（一）處境主義的一些優點
Critics from more traditional and absolutistic viewpoints tend to overreact to Fletcher’s relativism, pragmatism, emotivism, and radical examples. But what is sometimes forgotten is that all of this is in the context of a clear claim that his ethic is an absolutism, a one-norm absolutism. In this latter regard, many of the merits of the situational position emerge.	從較傳統觀點和絕對主義觀點出發的批評者，往往對弗萊查的相對主義、實用主義、情感主義與激進的例子有過度的反應。但是，我們或許會忘記這些特徵出於一個明確的聲稱：他的獨一規範倫理是一種絕對主義。在這一方面，處境主義有很多優點。
It is a normative position. First to be commended is Fletcher’s attempt to lay down a normative approach to ethics. His second proposition states, “The ruling norm of Christian decision is love; nothing else.” In view of the fact that he spends a whole chapter elaborating this, as well as repeatedly referring to this one absolute throughout the book, it seems quite unfair to summarily dismiss Fletcher as totally normless and antinomian. Indeed, Fletcher spends much of his first chapter explaining that his view is not antinomian but rather a one-norm absolutism. (In “What Is a Rule?” Fletcher later denies that his approach has any universal norms.)	[1] 這是一個規範性的觀點。首先要讚揚的是弗萊查奠定了規範倫理的取向；他的第二個命題說：「最重要的規範或基督徒的抉擇就是愛；沒有別的。」鑑於他花了整整一章去闡述這命題，也重複地在書中提及這一個絕對，拒絕弗萊查而說他完全沒有規範（是無規範主義）似乎不公正。事實上，弗萊查用他第一章的大部份去解釋說，他的觀點不是無規範主義，而是獨一規範絕對主義。（但弗萊查後來在「什麼是規則？」否認他的理論有任何普遍的規範。）
Fletcher distinguishes between formal principles, such as “Act as lovingly as possible”; substantial principles, such as “The good which should be sought or done is utility”; and normative principles, such as “Loving concern for our neighbors calls for telling them the truth.” Only formal principles, he says, are universal. Possibly Fletcher means that there are no universals with substantive content, and that the love principle, which he calls “the ruling norm of Christian ethics,” is only formally universal.	弗萊查區別形式的原則（如「盡可能以愛來行動」）、實質的原則（如「要尋求或行的善就是功利」）和規範性原則（如「對鄰舍的關愛就是對他們說實話」）。弗萊查說，只有形式的原則是普遍的；弗萊查可能想說有實質的事物都沒有普遍性，而唯有愛的原則（他稱之為「基督教倫理觀最重要的規範」）有形式上的普遍性。
The reasons for commending a normative approach to ethics have already been given and need not be repeated here. It is sufficient to note in passing that norms are both inescapable and essential to a meaningful ethic. Without them, one has no objective basis or guide for ethical decisions.	讚揚規範倫理取向的理由已在前面講及，無需再重複。簡單地說，有意義的倫理必須有規範；沒有規範，倫理抉擇就沒有客觀的依據或指引。
It is an absolutism. Fletcher’s view is not only normative; it is also absolute. There is one unbreakable law, the law of love. And even though Fletcher deliberately avoids such words as “never” and “always” with regard to every other norm, he does not hesitate to emphasize that there are no exceptions to the love norm. Only love and nothing else justifies what one does, he argues. Furthermore, there is no such thing as total relativity. Relative norms must be relative to a norm that is not relative. What, why, and who are the Christian’s three universals, Fletcher says. That is, the Christian knows that the neighbor should be loved for God’s sake. These three are absolute; only the circumstances are relative. He clearly holds that one ought always to love and should never hate or be indifferent to one’s neighbors. “Christian situation ethics has only one norm ... that is binding and unexceptional, always good and right regardless of the circumstances”: agapic love.	[2] 這是一種絕對主義。弗萊查的觀點不僅是規範性的，更是絕對的。有一個不可違反的法律，就是愛的法律；即使弗萊查刻意迴避用「永不」和「常常」等字眼形容其他規範，他卻不猶豫地強調，愛的規範沒有例外。他說，只有愛可以使一個人的行動合理，任何其他都不能。此外，完全相對性是不存在的；相對性的規範必須要相對於一個非相對的規範。弗萊查說，基督徒的三個共有性是「什麼」、「為什麼」和「誰人」；也就是說，基督徒知道要為神的緣故愛鄰舍。這三個共有（universals）是絕對的，只有情況是相對的。他清楚地認為，一個人對鄰舍應該常常愛而永不恨或冷漠；「基督徒處境倫理只有一個規範...這是有約束力和無例外的，無論在何種情況下總是好的和正確的」：就是無私的愛。
It resolves the issue of conflicting norms. Whatever one may think of the situationist’s solution to the marginal cases where conflicting norms are involved, at least it presents a logical possibility. All other ethical norms are subordinate to the one absolute norm, in view of which it is ethically right to break any of them for the sake of this love norm. This solution is both logical and simple. It is simple because it does not involve a complicated series of exceptions to norms, nor does it present a pyramid of moral values. It posits a single norm that takes precedence over all others. It is logical in the sense that it is not internally contradictory. It never leaves any ethical dilemmas in conflict or tension; they are always resolvable (at least in theory) by appeal to the single law of love. In other words, situationism is never faced with the dilemma of having two absolute or universal norms in conflict, since it does not have two absolute norms. There is one absolute norm, no more and no less.	[3] 它解決了規範衝突的問題。不管人們如何看處境倫理者解決有規範衝突的邊緣例子，它至少提出了一個合乎邏輯的可能性。所有其他倫理規範都在一個絕對規範之下，因著這愛的規範，違反任何規範都是倫理正確的。這解決方法是合邏輯又簡單。它是簡單的，因為它不涉及很多規範的例外，也沒有提出道德價值的金字塔。它假定一個規範，而這規範優先於所有其他規範。它是合邏輯的，因為它沒有內部矛盾。它從來沒有遺留有衝突和有張力的倫理困境，它們總可以被獨一愛的法律去解決（至少在理論上）。換言之，處境倫理永遠不會面對困境，不會有兩個絕對或普遍的規範的衝突，因為它沒有兩個絕對規範；只有一個絕對的規範，不多也不少。
It gives due value to differing circumstances. Another merit of situationism not to be undervalued is its emphasis on the fact that the circumstances or context of an ethical decision have a bearing on the rightness or wrongness of the act. However morally wrong falsifying may or may not be, surely it differs from context to context. Falsifying in fun to a friend is probably amoral, whereas serious falsifying before a judge and a jury is not. The circumstances do make a difference in the moral rightness or wrongness of the act. Likewise, taking another life accidentally, or in self-defense, or letting one die as an act of mercy are all markedly different situations from an intentional and malicious murder of another human being. The situation does condition the way one’s norm (or norms) should be applied. Without due stress on the conditioning influence of the moral situation, one’s ethics become legalistic and even inhuman.	[4] 它以應有的價值給與不同的情況。處境主義另一個不能低估的優點，就是它強調倫理抉擇的情況或背景影響行動的正誤。無論瞞騙是否為道德錯誤，它一定在不同的背景中有不同；對朋友玩笑性的瞞騙可能是道德中性的，對法官和陪審團的瞞騙卻不同。情況當然影響行動的正誤。同樣，意外地殺人、自衛的殺人、憐憫的容讓人死亡、惡意和故意謀殺等等都有不一樣的處境；處境當然影響如何應用一個人的規範。若不注重道德處境的重要性，則一個人的倫理觀會成為律法主義，甚至是非人道的。
Indeed, as will be seen later, it is very difficult (if not impossible) to contend for a many-norm absolutism of any kind, unless contextual qualifications become part of the definition of the norm. Truthfulness and the duty to avoid or prevent taking life (or at least letting someone die) invariably come into conflict unless one has the prerogative to say that lying and taking life in certain contexts are wrong. This will be discussed more fully later. For now it is sufficient to note that giving attention to the circumstances or context of ethical decisions is both unavoidable and desirable in elaborating a good ethical position.	正如在下面看到，應用任何多個規範的絕對主義的確是非常困難的（如果不是不可能的話），除非背景成為規範的定義的一部份。誠實和避免或防止殺人的義務（或容讓人死亡）很多時出現衝突，除非一個人有特權說，說謊和殺人在某些情況下是錯誤的；這問題在下面詳細討論。在這裏，要注意的是，考慮倫理抉擇要同時考慮情況或背景，這是擬訂一個良好的倫理立場所不可避免的，也是可取的。
It stresses love and the value of persons. From a Christian point of view (and even from many non-Christian perspectives), the stress on agapic love as the ruling norm is certainly commendable. Bertrand Russell wrote Why I Am Not a Christian, but he also said elsewhere, “What the world needs is Christian love or compassion.” Seldom do strong voices arise in defense of selfish love, that is, self-love, or self-centered love. And from the Christian point of view, love is the absolute moral character of God. “God is love” and “love is of God,” the New Testament says (1 John 4:7-8). And when all else fades, love will abide forever. Jesus summarized the whole of the Old Testament in the one word love. Indeed, according to Jesus, love was to be the earmark of his disciples. “By this all men will know that you are my disciples, if you love one another” (John 13:35).	[5] 它強調愛與人的價值。從基督教的角度看（甚至許多非基督教的觀點也一樣），強調無私的愛為最高的規範是值得讚揚的。羅素（Bertrand Russell）雖然著作了《為什麼我不是基督徒》，但他也在其他著作說：「世界需要的是基督徒的愛和憐憫。」維護自私的愛（自愛或自我中心的愛）的言論是不多的。從基督教的角度來看，愛是神絕對的道德特徵。新約聖經說：「神是愛」和「愛是從神來的」（約壹4:7-8）。一切都要消失，但愛會永遠存在。耶穌用一個字「愛」總結了整個舊約；事實上，根據耶穌，愛是成為他的門徒的標記；「你們若有彼此相愛的心，眾人因此就認出你們是我的門徒了。」（約13:35）
In view of this and from a Christian point of view, it is quite difficult to criticize the preeminence Fletcher gives to Christian agapic love. Implied in this stress on loving others is the fact that they are to be treated as persons in the image of God and not as mere things. The neighbor is a thou, not an it. The other is a person to be loved, not a thing to be used. Others are ends in themselves and not merely means for our own ends. Fletcher’s emphasis that humans are persons (like God) who have God-given value is commendable from a Christian perspective.	鑑於這一點，從基督教的角度來看，要批評弗萊查標榜基督徒無私的愛是相當困難的。強調愛其他人的含意包括將人視為神的形像，而不僅僅是事物。鄰舍是一個「你」而不是一個「它」；是一個被愛的人，而不是一個被利用的事物；是目的，而不是達致自我目的的手段。弗萊查著重人（像神一樣）是一個位格，擁有神所賜的價值，這基督教的觀點是值得讚許的。
Some Inadequacies of One-Norm Situationism	（二）獨一規範的處境主義的一些弱點
From both a moralistic viewpoint in general and a Christian perspective in particular, not everything in Fletcher’s situationism is praiseworthy. We will not take time here to elaborate on his critical and inconsistent view of the Gospel records of the New Testament, nor the implications of holding that God can be loved only through one’s neighbor. We will rather center our attention on the inadequacy of having only one norm for an ethic.	無論從一般道德的觀點，或特別從基督教的觀點看，弗萊查的處境主義並非全部都值得稱讚。我們不會花時間詳細闡述他對新約福音書的批判性和前後矛盾的看法，也不批評他認為愛神必須透過愛鄰舍的觀點；我們將集中注意獨一規範倫理的弱點。
One norm is too general. A one-norm ethic, especially when the norm is as broad and general as Fletchers love norm, is in most (though not all) cases little better than having no norm at all. By its very nature, a single universal norm must be broad and adaptable, or else it could not apply to all circumstances. But its versatility is also a liability, for it necessitates an ambiguity about what the norm means as far as concrete relationships are concerned. And if the absolute love norm is without concrete content apart from the relative situation, then the specific meaning of love is relative and not absolute.	[1] 一個規範是過於籠統。獨一規範的倫理，特別是一個廣泛的和籠統的規範，像弗萊查的愛的規範，在大多數（雖然不是全部）情況下只比沒有規範較為良好。就其性質而言，獨一的普遍規範必須是廣泛的和有適應性的，否則不能適用於所有情況。但它的多功能性也是一個弱點，因為規範的意義必須是含糊的，不能只適用於具體的關係。如果絕對的愛的規範缺乏具體的內容，只適用於相對的情況，那麼愛的特定意義就是相對的，不是絕對的。
Indeed, Fletcher admits that the content of love varies from situation to situation. Therefore, the command “Love in all cases” means little more than “Do X in all cases.” For unless there is advanced cognitive content to the term love, then one does not really know what one is being commanded to do. Fletcher clearly confesses that the love principle is empty of factual content: “This is why I say it is a ‘formal’ principle, which rules us and yet does so without content.”	事實上，弗萊查承認，愛的內容隨著不同的情況而改變；因此，「在所有情況下都愛」這命令和「在所有情況下都作X」沒有太大分別。除非「愛」這詞語在事前已有認知內容，否則一個人不會知道應如何行動。弗萊查清楚承認，愛的原則是無事實內容的：「這就是為什麼我說，這是一個『形式性』的原則，它控制我們，但沒有內容。」
In actual practice, Fletcher does seem to imply that there is some understanding of what love means in advance of the situation. But the question is How much understanding? Is there enough content in the universal love norm to raise it above a mere platitude? “Do the loving thing” is scarcely more specific than “Do the good thing.” In both instances the question is What kinds of acts are good or loving? So his one moral law is too general to be helpful.	在實際情況中，弗萊查似乎暗示，在事前可以對愛的意義有一些了解；但問題是「有多少了解呢？」普遍規範是否有足夠的內容使它比陳詞濫調有意義呢？「做有愛的事」只比「做好事」略為具體；在這兩種情況下，問題是「什麼行動是好的或有愛的？」可見弗萊查的獨一道德律過於籠統，沒有太大用處。
Fletcher’s one-norm ethic of love is not more helpful than a view that says “Follow nature” or “Live according to reason.” Instead of “What does ‘love’ mean?” the question becomes “What does ‘nature’ mean?” The result is the same, and one is left without any specific ethical direction. An appeal to the situation to provide content or meaning for love will not suffice. Fletcher admits that situations are relative and even radically different. If the meaning of love is dependent on the circumstances, then the significance of love is really relative to the situation and therefore not absolute. This leads to a second criticism.	弗萊查的愛的獨一規範倫理，不比「順乎自然」或「以理智生活」的觀點更有用；「『愛』的意思是什麼？」變成了「『自然』的意思是什麼？」結果卻是一樣，沒有帶來具體的道德指示；訴諸處境來提供愛的內容或意義是不足夠的。弗萊查承認處境是相對的，有時是極不相同的；如果愛的意義取決於具體情況，那麼愛的重要性實際上相對於處境，而不是絕對的。這導致了下面第二種弱點。
The situation does not determine the meaning of love. The meaning of the love norm is not completely determined by the particulars of the situation but is merely conditioned by them. Circumstances do not effect (determine) norms; they only affect (influence) them. The context in which a norm is applicable does not dictate how the norm will be applied but only influences its application. If the complete determination of meaning came from the situation, then the alleged ethical norm would not really be normative at all. The situation would be determining the norm rather than the norm being determinative for the situation. Actually, the situation does not determine what is right; God does. The situation simply helps us discover which of God’s laws is the one applicable there.	[2] 處境並不能決定愛的意義。愛的規範的意義不完全取決於具體處境，只僅僅被它們制約。情況沒有帶來（決定）規範；它們只影響規範。應用規範時的具體背景沒有規定規範如何被應用，它們只影響如何被應用。如果處境完全決定規範的意義，則這倫理規範就不是規範性的了；處境就決定了規範，而不是規範在處境中作決定。其實，處境不能決定什麼是正確的，是由神決定；處境只是幫助我們發現神的哪一條法律在那裏適用。
Fletcher does not claim that the situation completely determines what the norm means. He says only that what love will mean in advance of the situation cannot be known with any “existential particularity”; it can be known only in general. However, what is known in advance, “in general,” may turn out to be the wrong meaning of love in a particular circumstance. No general wisdom (sophia) or norms are universal and unbreakable. There is no rule apart from the general (and ambiguous) rule of love, which ought never be broken. But this is precisely the problem. The meaningful norms are breakable, and the only unbreakable norm is not meaningful in any specific or practical sense of the word. Perhaps Fletcher should not have so summarily dismissed the possibility that there are many universal and unbreakable norms.	弗萊查沒有說處境完全決定了規範的意義；他只說，在處境出現之前，愛的意義（其「存在特殊性」）是不可確知的，只能大約知道。但是，在事前可以「大約」知道的，可能在特定的情況下是錯誤地歸因於愛。沒有一般的智慧或規範是普遍的和不可違反的；只有一般的（也是含糊的）卻是永不能違反的愛的定律，沒有其他定律。但這正是問題；有意義的規範是可被違反的，而不可違反的規範卻在具體或實際上無意義。也許弗萊查不應太容易拒絕有許多普遍的和不可違反的規範的可能性。
The possibility of many universal norms. There seem to be several reasons why situationism dismisses the possibility of having many universal norms, though none of these reasons is definitive. First, Fletcher argues that the many-norm position would be legalistic. This does not follow. A many-norm ethic may be legalistic, but there is no reason why it must be legalistic. Whether or not the view is legalistic all depends on what the norms are, how they are related to each other, and how they are applied to life. One could actually be legalistic with one absolute norm such as “Keep the Sabbath.”	[3] 許多普遍規範的可能性。處境主義似乎有幾個原因拒絕有許多的普遍規範的可能性，雖然這些原因都不太明確。[a] 弗萊查認為，許多規範的理論是律法主義。但這是錯的。許多規範的倫理可能是律法主義，但沒有理由說它一定是律法主義。一個觀點是否為律法主義完全取決於規範是什麼，它們如何相互關聯，以及它們如何被應用在生活中；只有一個絕對規範亦可以是律法主義，例如「守安息日」。
Second, it is implied that there is no other way to resolve the conflict of norms unless there is one absolute norm to which all other norms are only relative. But this is not so. There are at least three others ways to relate many universal norms: show how they really do not conflict, show why it is wrong to break either when they do conflict, or show how one of the norms is of a higher order and takes priority over those of a lower order.	[b] 處境主義的隱意是，除非只有一個絕對規範，而其他所有規範只是相對的，否則不能解決規範的衝突。但這是錯的。至少有三種方式維特許多普遍規範的相互關係：闡明他們實際上不衝突；闡明當衝突時，違反其中一個是錯的；闡明其中一個規範比較低的規範重要和有優先。
Third, Fletcher sees no way to derive universal norms from a universal norm. He thinks that the concept of “middle axioms” is a contradiction in terms; they are “derived underiveds.” But there is no reason why a deduction cannot be as universal as its premises. Apart from whether there really are many universal norms, Fletcher certainly does not eliminate the possibility that there are such. He does not disprove that they can be arrived at by deduction the way postulates are derived from axioms in geometry. He does not disprove that they could come from revelation such as many Christians find inscripturated in the Bible. Nor does Fletcher definitely dismiss the possibility that many universal norms could be known intuitively to have a separate status of their own.	[c] 弗萊查認為沒有辦法從一個普遍規範，推論出多個普遍規範。他認為「過度通則」這概念是矛盾的；它們是「推論出來之不可被推論」（derived underiveds）。但沒有理由說演繹出來的觀念不能像它的前提而擁有普遍性。讓我們暫不理會是否真的有許多普遍規範，最少弗萊查並沒有排除這個可能性；他沒有反駁規範可以從演繹得出，正如在幾何學中，假設可以從公理推論出來；他沒有反駁規範可以從啟示而來，就如許多基督徒在聖經中找到；弗萊查也沒有絕對排除許多普遍規範可以直覺地被知道的可能性，而它們自己有獨立的地位，不需被推論。
In brief, the possibility of there being many universal norms should not be given up until either it is shown to be logically impossible, or no universal norm other than love is ever found. In view of the fact that candidates for universal norms will be introduced and evaluated in subsequent chapters, we will withhold judgment until then whether or not there really are many universal norms. At this point, it is enough to observe that Fletcher does not prove that “there is only one universal norm;” since he does not prove that it is impossible that there may be many universal norms.	簡言之，有許多普遍規範的可能性不應被放棄，除非在邏輯證明上它是不可能的，或者在愛以外找不到普遍的規範。在以後的幾章中，將介紹和評價很多可能有普遍性質的規範，現在我們將保留判斷，下面再研究是否真的有許多的普遍規範。在這裏，我們要知道，弗萊查並不能証明「只有一個普遍的規範」，因為他沒有証明有許多普遍規範的不可能性。
A different universal norm is possible. Not only is it possible that there are many universal norms in contrast to Fletcher’s single norm, but it is also possible to opt for a different single norm than the love norm Fletcher uses. Why not a one-norm ethic built on hate instead of love? Why not Buddhist compassion instead of Christian love? Why not a Confucian “negative Golden Rule” that mandates, “Do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you;” rather than the positive one? Or a New Age principle of harmony with nature? Surely Fletcher has not demonstrated that all ethical principles mean exactly the same thing (at any rate, not those as different as love and hate). Then on what basis is one to choose the single norm on which to build a whole ethic? There must be some way to justify one’s basic ethical presupposition if it is not to be entirely arbitrary.	[4] 另一個普遍規範是可能的。比對弗萊查的獨一規範，一個可能性是有許多普遍的規範，另一個可能性是獨一規範不一定是弗萊查所用的愛。為何不能以恨代替愛作為獨一規範呢？為何不能以佛教的慈悲代替基督徒的愛呢？為何不能用儒家的「反面通用規則」，就是「己所不欲，勿施於人」，而需要積極性的呢？為何不能用新紀元宗教「與自然和諧」的原則呢？當然弗萊查沒有証明所有倫理原則都是完全一樣的（最少，愛與恨不會一樣）；再者，在什麼基礎能以獨一規範來建立整個倫理呢？如果它不是完全任意的話，就必須有辦法解釋這理論的倫理前提是合理的。
In brief, the problem of a one-norm ethic arises: Which norm? Prima facie, there are many ethical norms that claim obedience. Which one should be given the special position of being absolute and unbreakable? Could not a case be made for using truthfulness at any cost as the single absolute? Could not such a position be worked out with internal consistency in the same way as Fletcher’s love norm can be developed? And if one absolute norm can be just as internally consistent as another, then on what basis is one norm to be preferred over another? By evaluating the consequences of each? If the one absolute norm is chosen on the ground that it brings the best consequences for most people in the long run, then there are several problems.	簡言之，獨一規範的倫理出現一個問題：哪一個規範？表面上看，很多倫理規範都要求人服從；哪一個應該有特殊的地位，成為絕對的和不可違反的呢？能不能盡力爭取以誠實為獨一的絕對呢？能不能建立另一種擁有內在一致性的理論，就像弗萊查的愛的規範呢？如果另一個絕對規範亦能有內在一致性，那麼有什麼依據可以將一個規範放於另一個之上呢？是否逐個評估其後果作為依據呢？如果一個絕對規範被揀選，是否因為它為最多人在長期帶來最好的後果呢？若然是就有幾個問題。
First, we do not know the long run, and some things that are not really best in the long run work well for many people in the short run (e.g., dishonesty and dictatorships). Many things distinctly wrong on almost any ethical basis obviously work too well for too many people for too long a time (e.g., cheating, lying, and stealing).	[a] 我們不知道遠境，而有些在短期內好的事，在長期後就不是真的最好（例如，不誠實和獨裁）。許多明顯是道德錯誤的事，為太多人在太長時間內帶來太多好處（例如，欺騙，說謊，偷竊）。
Second, to choose the norm on the basis of its consequences (if this were possible) would be to depart from a normative basis for ethics in favor of a utilitarian basis, with all the problems that view entails. Yet utilitarianism actually depends on norms for its own operation, which brings the argument full circle. This would thus be saying that ends are needed to justify norms, and these ends in turn depend on norms to establish them. But this really demonstrates that norms are the basis of ethics in either event. Norms are necessary. The questions remain: Which norms? How many are there? Next we turn to an examination of the many-norm view to seek an answer to these questions.	[b] 要以後果選擇規範（如果這是可能的話），就等於離開以規範為基礎的倫理，而選擇功利主義，就引來該理論的所有問題。然而，功利主義實際上倚賴規範才能運作，所以是循環性推論。這就等於說規範需要視其目的才能合理，而目的卻倚賴規範來建立。但是，這確實表明，在這兩種情形下，規範總是道德的基礎。問題仍然是：哪一個規範？有多少規範？下面我們看看多個規範的觀點如何回答這些問題。
A many-norm ethic is defensible. A number of contemporary writers have shown how one may defend the validity of many ethical norms. On a popular level this has been done by C. S. Lewis in Mere Christianity and in a philosophical way by William K. Frankena in Ethics. In this latter category one may also place the works of Paul Ramsey (see Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics). Indeed, there do seem to be many universally binding moral laws. Rape, cruelty, hatred, and genocide are universally frowned upon. And even if all do not practice them toward others, nevertheless all do seem to believe that others should treat them in accordance with these norms. (For an answer to this problem from a Christian point of view, see chap. 7.) And in view of the fact that Fletcher frankly but reluctantly admits that his view is utilitarian, perhaps this criticism should be stressed more.	[5] 有多個規範的倫理觀是可維護的。很多當代作家指出，多個倫理規範是可行的；包括魯益師（C. S. Lewis著《如此基督教》）以大眾化的方法分析，法蘭堅納（William K. Frankena著《倫理學》）和蘭西（Paul Ramsey著《基督教倫理學中之行為及規則》）以哲學的方法分析。的確，似乎真的有很多具有普遍約束力的道德律。強姦、殘酷、仇恨和種族滅絕是所有人都反對的；即使並非每一個人以善待人，但每一個人都相信別人應該按照這些規範去對待他們。由於這個現實，弗萊查勉強但坦白承認，他的觀點是功利主義的，下面再強調這一點。
Fletcher is really a utilitarian. Fletcher admits that his view is utilitarian. As such, then, it is not really a one-norm absolutism but a form of generalism. This being the case, it is subject to the criticisms of utilitarianism (see chap. 4). As he says, the end justifies the means. He believes in the greatest love (good) for the greatest number of people in the long run. Not only do we not know the long run, but what is good for many may rob the minority of rights. Furthermore, just because an end is good does not make an act good. There are evil acts, such as rape, cruelty, child abuse, and murder. No amount of good intentions can make an evil act good.	[6] 弗萊查實際是一個功利主義者。弗萊查承認，他的觀點是功利主義的。那麼，這不是真正的一個規範的絕對主義，而是廣泛主義。若是如此，它應承受對功利主義的批評。正如他說，結果使手段合理。他相信長遠目標應該是為最多人有最大的愛（善）。但問題是，我們不僅不知道長遠的事，再者，為很多人的善可能奪取了少數人的權利。此外，僅僅是良好的目的並不等於行為是好的，有些邪惡的行為，如強姦、殘酷、虐待兒童和謀殺。任何好的目的也不能使罪惡的行為變成好的。
Summary and Conclusion	（C）總結和結論
Situationism claims to be a one-norm absolutism. It believes that everything should be judged by one absolute moral law: love. However, it turns out that this one moral principle is really only formal and empty. It has no content that can be known in advance of or apart from the situation. Different situations really determine what it means. So in the final analysis the one moral law turns out to be no moral law. Situationism reduces to antinomianism, for in practice one empty absolute moral law is no better than no absolute moral law. And the denial of all value is self-defeating. It values the right to say that there are no values.	處境主義聲稱自己是獨一規範的絕對主義；它認為一切都應該受一個絕對的道德律所判斷：就是愛。然而，事實證明，這一個道德原則只是形式的和無內容的；它缺乏內容，因為沒有任何在處境內或在處境以外可以事先知道的；不同的處境決定原則的意義。所以，在最終的分析中，一個道德律變成沒有道德律；處境主義被貶降為無規範主義，因為在實踐上，一個無內容的絕對道德律沒有比無絕對道德律更好。而拒絕所有價值是弄巧成拙；「沒有任何價值觀」就成為它的價值觀。