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A Procedure for Ethical Decision Making

倫理抉擇的程序

芬博約翰及芬博保羅著（John S. Feinberg and Paul D. Feinberg），孔祥烱譯

In the preceding section we discussed matters of Christian liberty and suggested tests for deciding what to do in such situations. But suppose the decision confronting someone is a matter of morality. In such a case how should a person go about deciding what to do?	我們在前面討論基督徒的自由，並建議用一些方法，來決定在特定情況下該怎麼做。但是，假設一個人的決定是關乎道德問題，一個人又應該如何著手作抉擇呢？
Once it is clear that the decision is about morality, the first thing to do is identify one’s ethical theory. This is the first step, because judgments about what acts are right or wrong, obligatory and permissible in any situation stem from one’s ethical theory. But what aspect of ethical theory is in view? In this chapter we have examined the answers of various theories as to where ethical rules come from, what makes an agent moral in doing an act, how a set of moral norms can be justified as correct, etc. Which of these issues is in view, and which ethical theories are we talking about?	[1] 一旦清楚知道抉擇是關乎道德的，首先要做的就是確定一個人的道德理論。這是第一步，因為在任何情況下，判斷哪些行為是對的還是錯的，是義務性的及可允許的，都基於一個人的道德理論。但是，究竟要注意道德理論的哪方面呢？在前面，我們探討了各種理論的來源和它們的答案，要如何行動才算是合道德，道德規範如何成為正確等；我們要注意的是的哪一個問題呢？是哪一個倫理理論呢？
The discussion before us is not about where ethical norms come from, nor how one should justify a set of rules. Nor is it about the number and nature of ethical norms. The answers to those questions will not tell us our duty in a particular situation. In fact, the question about what makes an agent moral in doing an act is not really at stake. We are asking instead about the morality of the action, regardless of who does it and what his motivation is, for we want to determine which action we should do (i.e., which is the morally right act) in the situation confronting us.	我們要討論的並不是道德規範從哪裏來，也不是如何證明規則是否合理，也不關乎道德規範的數目和性質；這些問題的答案不會解決我們在特定情況下有何責任。事實上，問題並不是行動要怎樣做才合道德；相反地，問題是什麼行動是合道德，而不論誰去做，或有何動機，因為我們要確定的是在這處境中要選擇什麼行動（也就是，什麼行動符合道德）。
Since we are searching for the right thing to do, clearly our concern is about what makes any course of action moral or immoral. As we saw earlier in this chapter, there are two main answers to this question: consequentialism and non-consequentialism. Consequentialists determine which acts are moral on the basis of outcomes, consequences. Non-consequentialists point to something other than results (the act obeys a divine command, keeps a promise, etc.).	由於我們正尋索正確的行動，顯然是我們擔心的是什麼使行動成為道德或不道德。正如在本章前面看到，這個問題有兩個主要答案：後果主義和非後果主義。後果主義者以成果或後果決定哪些行動是合道德的。非後果主義者則基於其他事物而不是後果（例如服從神命令的行動，或保持承諾等）。
Once one’s ethical theory is identified, the next step for either consequentialists or non-consequentialists is to understand fully the situation and the options open to you as you decide what to do. This may seem obvious and it may also seem easy to determine. However, we list it as an important step in making a moral decision, because nowadays many times when one is asked to make a moral decision, the situation is very complicated. Think, for example, of an end-of-life decision. If the doctor says that your relative who has been in a coma for three weeks is really very close to death, and he tells you to think very seriously about removing all life-support systems currently in place, the decision will not be easy.	[2] 當一個人的道德理論確定後，下一步（不論是後果主義者或非後果主義者）就是充分了解當時的情況和可作的選擇。這似乎是顯而易見的，也是容易確定的。但是，我們列出它為一個作道德抉擇的重要步驟，因為今天要作道德抉擇時，情況往往異常複雜。例如，試想一個對死亡的抉擇，如果醫生說你的親戚已經昏迷了三個星期，很接近死亡，他告訴你要認真考慮停止現有的維生系統，該抉擇將不會是容易的。
You will want an assessment of whether there has been any brain damage and if so, whether it can be reversed or overcome. You will also want to know what sort of machines are keeping your relative alive—a respirator, a machine to pump blood, a kidney dialysis machine, or what? Depending on the answer, you will get a better picture of just how impaired your relative’s condition is. It would also probably be helpful to know how the medical community defines physical death, so that you can more clearly evaluate how close your relative is to death. And, it might also help to know how much it is costing to provide the medical care your relative is receiving and to know how much of the cost his medical insurance will pay.	你可能要評估是否有腦部損傷，如果有，是否可以逆轉或治療。你也可能要知道是什麼機器維持你的親戚，是呼吸器、輸送血液的器材、腎臟透析機、還是其他器材？根據不同的答案，你會更明白你親戚的受傷情況。也許能幫助你了解醫學界如何定義身體死亡，使你可以更清楚地評估你的親戚離死多遠。也許知道醫療護理的費用是多少對你有幫助，也許要知道醫療保險有多少津貼。
All of these items and their impact on end-of-life decision making will be discussed in the chapter on euthanasia. We raise them now to illustrate that just by identifying your ethical theory, you don’t automatically know what decision to make in the situation you face. What you should or shouldn’t do will depend in part on the particulars of the situation. Both consequentialists and non-consequentialists need this information before deciding which course of action will bring the best results (consequentialism) or whether there are any moral rules that cover the decision you must make.	所有這些項目如何影響生命終結的抉擇，將在安樂死的一章討論。我們現在提出來，是說明僅僅確定你的道德理論，不能自動知道在什麼情況下作什麼抉擇。你應該或不應該作的將取決於情況的細節。無論你是後果主義者或是非後果主義者，都需要這些資料才可以決定哪個行動將帶來最好的結果（跟隨後果論），或者有任何道德規則影響你必須做的抉擇。
Suppose that you have identified your ethical system, and have gathered available information about the situation. Suppose as well that you are a consequentialist. What should you do next? The next step is to identify the non-moral value you want to maximize. Typically, utilitarians have sought to minimize pain and maximize pleasure, but those are not the only possible non-moral values someone might want to increase.	[3] 假設你已經確定你的道德體系，也有關情況收集了現有的資料，再假設你是後果主義者。下一步你應該怎麼做？下一步是找出你要盡量增加的非道德價值。通常功利主義者力求最少的痛苦和最大的快樂，但這並不是一般人想要增加的唯一非道德價值。
Once the desired non-moral value is identified, the next step is to determine which actions will likely produce the most of the value desired. As the consequentialist assesses this matter, he may want to do a cost/benefit analysis of the options before him. That is, consequentialists, when deciding what to do in a given situation, often calculate the benefit to be gained by doing each of the possible choices and the cost or risk that comes with each choice as well. If, for example, it is deemed that the risks or costs associated with a given option outweigh the potential benefit of choosing that option, that will be a significant strike against the choice.	[4] 一旦確定了所想望的非道德價值，下一步就是確定哪些行為將會產生最多所想望的價值。當後果主義者評估這件事時，他可能計劃對面前的選擇做一個成本／效益分析。也就是說，當後果主義者在一個特定的情況下要決定怎樣做時，他們經常會計算每個可能的選擇所獲得的利益，也計算每個選擇的代價或風險。例如，如果一個選擇所要付出的代價或風險比潛在的好處更大的時候，這個選擇大概會落選。
After the consequentialist decision maker identifies the action that best maximizes the desired non-moral value, that action becomes the agent’s duty. It is also true that this choice will probably also be the most prudent one, for it will be the best way to achieve the ends envisioned. But, according to the consequentialist’s ethical theory, the best way to achieve the ends desired is also the morally right thing to do.	當後果主義者認定了一個可以盡量增加所想望的非道德價值的行動時，這個行動就成為一個責任。這種選擇很可能也是最慎重的選擇，因為它是達到預期目的最好的方法。當然，根據後果主義者的倫理理論，達到預期目的最好的方法，也是道德正確的行動。
Three other items are noteworthy in decision making as a consequentialist. First, suppose that the consequentialist is a utilitarian. As we saw earlier in this chapter, there are two broad brands of utilitarianism, rule utilitarianism and act utilitarianism. In a situation involving a moral decision, rule utilitarianism holds that a particular act is morally right if it would be better to have a code of rules that permitted that act rather than to have one that excluded it. Hence, a rule utilitarian will analyze the situation, but he will also consult the set of moral rules he has already decided should be included in a general code of moral rules. An act utilitarian confronts each situation without any set of rules like those of the rule utilitarian. Hence, moral decision making for the act utilitarian focuses on the details of the situation confronting the agent and on calculating the choice (from the possible choices) that will best achieve the ends desired.	另外三個項目也是後果主義者作抉擇時值得注意的：[5] 假設後果主義者是一個功利主義者。正如在前面看到，有兩大類功利主義，就是規則功利主義和行動功利主義。在道德抉擇的情況下，如果有一個規則允許某種行動，而沒有一個規則不允許該行動，規則功利主義就認為該行動是道德正確的。因此，規則功利主義者會分析情況，但他亦會諮詢一套道德規則，就是他已決定應包括的一些廣泛的道德準則。行動功利主義者則在面對每一種情況之前沒有一套道德規則。因此，他的抉擇着重於面臨情況的細節，從可能的選擇中，計算一個能獲得所想望的結果的選擇。
Second, the consequentialist must also decide whether her goal is to produce the greatest amount of the desired non-moral good for the greatest number of people possible, or the greatest good for herself alone. Here again, the details of the consequentialist’s ethical theory will tell her whether she aims at maximizing good for as many as possible or only for herself.	[6] 後果主義者必須決定他的目標是否會為最多人帶來最大量所想望的非道德價值，抑或單單帶給他自己。在這裏，後果主義者的倫理理論會告訴他是否將好處帶給最大群人抑或帶給他自己。
And, finally, suppose that the consequentialist does everything stated so far, but concludes that more than one possible option would produce the most good. And suppose that if the agent picks one of the various options, he cannot also choose the second, third, etc. Which should he choose, and how should he decide? It is tempting to say that he should let the consequences of each choice determine the best option, but for a consequentialist the dilemma we are imagining results from calculating the consequences of each option.	[7] 假設後果主義者完成上述決定，而結論有多過一個可行的選擇達到最高的利益。再假設他只能從幾個選擇中決定一個，而他也無法選擇第二或第三個。那麼他應該如可選擇呢？當然我們可以說讓每個選擇的後果確定最佳的抉擇，但是，對於一個後果主義者，這想像的困境源於計算每個選擇的結果。
So, how should he proceed? Non-consequentialists might encourage the consequentialist to consider whether there are any moral rules (commanded by God, enjoined by reason, etc.) that attach to the various options, and then choose the option that fulfills the most significant moral rules. The problem with this advice is that for the consequentialist the only moral rules available are the ones that result from calculating which action results in the best consequences. But, the consequentialist has already done the calculating, and it appears that more than one choice would maximize the most of the non-moral good the consequentialist wants to produce.	所以，他要如何進行呢？非後果主義者可能會鼓勵後果主義者考慮是否有任何道德律（為神所命令的，基於理智的）涉及各種選擇，然後選出能滿足最重要的道德律的選擇。這種方法的問題是，對於後果主義者，唯一可用的道德律就是如何計算最佳後果的行動。但是，後果主義者已經做了計算，似乎最大限度地增加非道德價值的選擇不止一個。
So what should the consequentialist choose in such a situation? If more than one possible choice seems to produce the greatest good, but the agent can’t do more than one of the options, he is free to choose whichever one he wants. As long as he chooses an option that maximizes the desired good, he will fulfill his moral duty, and there will be no moral demerits for failing to choose the other most serious contenders.	在這種情況下，後果主義者要怎樣選擇呢？如果有多個選擇都產生最大的善，而他也不能作多過一個選擇，那麼他可以自由選擇任何一個。只要他的選擇帶來想望的最大的善，他就已經滿足自己的道德責任，沒有選擇其他可能性也不是道德過失。
Suppose now that a non-consequentialist confronts the moral decision. He has gathered all the relevant information about the situation, and he has identified his own moral theory. How would the non-consequentialist go about deciding what to do? Since non-consequentialists determine the moral rightness or wrongness of an action on grounds other than results of the act, they likely would address the situation with the moral rules or principles their theory enjoins. The non-consequentialist will ask himself whether his theory contains a moral rule (or more than one) that covers either directly or indirectly the situation confronting him. If the situation he confronts requires him to give aid in dying to a relative, and if his ethical theory tells him that it is morally wrong to take innocent life, that rule will directly address this situation and urge him not to help the person die.	現在讓我們假設一個非後果主義者面臨道德抉擇。[1] 他已經確定了自己的道德理論，[2] 他也收集了對面對的情況所有有關資料。這非後果主義者要怎樣抉擇呢？[3] 由於非後果主義者確定行動的道德正誤的基礎不是行動的結果，他們很可能會以道德律或道德原則解決問題。非後果主義者會問自己，他的理論是否包含一個或多個道德律，可以直接或間接使用於他面對的情況。如果情況需要他幫助一個將死的親戚，又如果他的倫理理論告訴他，奪去無辜的生命是道德錯誤，這道德律將直接解決這情況，催促他不要幫助親戚尋死。
On the other hand, imagine someone who videotapes a popular show and then learns that his friends didn’t see the show. He invites them to his house to see the program, but as they enter his home, he requires them to pay two dollars apiece for the right to see the show. Now it is highly unlikely that there is an ethical theory that specifically forbids the videotaping and charging of admission to see a television program. However, the person in question does believe that there is a rule that forbids stealing for personal gain what doesn’t belong to him. As he thinks about charging his friends an admission fee to see the videotaped show, he realizes that what he is doing actually qualifies as stealing. That is, he sees that his ethical rule that forbids stealing indirectly prohibits his charging admission to see a videotaped program.	另一方面，試想像有人錄影了一個很受歡迎的節目，他知道他的朋友們還沒有看過那節目。他邀請他們到他家看那節目，但是當他們進入他的家時，他要求他們每人支付兩元才可看節目。當然，大概沒有一個道德理論清楚地禁止人錄影電視節目後，要別人付入場費去觀看。然而，這個人實在相信有一個規則禁止人偷竊不屬自己的物品用來獲利。當他考慮向他的朋友收入場費去看錄影帶的時候，他意識到自己想做的實際是偷竊。也就是說，他看到，禁止間接的偷竊的道德律，同樣禁止他收取看節目的入場費。
So, after the non-consequentialist identifies his ethical theory and gathers information about the situation confronting him, he looks for moral rules that are relevant to the case in point. Suppose he identifies several rules that seem to apply, or perhaps there is only one rule, but it applies to several different individuals involved in the situation before him. At first glance, it would seem that he would know what to do or not do. But imagine that there are two rules that apply but he cannot obey both, for the choosing of either makes choosing the other impossible.	[4] 因此，當非後果主義者確定了自己的倫理理論，也收集了他面對的情況的資料，他找尋與個案有關的道德規則。假如他找到幾個可應用的規則，或者是一個規則，但在這情況下適用於多個不同的人。乍然看，似乎他會知道什麼可以做或不能做。但如果有兩個適用的規則，而他不能同時遵守，也就是選擇了其中一個就不能選擇另一個。
Think, for example, of the situation recorded in Daniel 3, the choice Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego had to make. They were required to bow down and worship the image Nebuchadnezzar set up in the plain of Dura. On the one hand, Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego know that they are supposed to worship only the God of Israel. On the other hand, there is a moral rule that says they must obey those who have political or governmental authority over them. If they choose to obey the King, they will anger God, and if they refuse to worship anyone but Yahweh, they will infuriate the King. They can’t obey both rules, so which of the two should they obey?	例如，試想但以理書第三章的情況，就是沙得拉、米煞、亞伯尼歌要作的選擇。他們被命令俯伏敬拜尼布甲尼撒王在杜拉平原所造的金像。一方面，沙得拉、米煞、亞伯尼歌知道他們只應該敬拜以色列的神。另一方面，道德規則說他們必須服從在他們以上的政治或政府權威。如果他們選擇服從國王，他們會觸怒神。如果他們拒絕敬拜任何人而只敬拜神，他們會激怒國王。他們不可以同時遵守這兩個規則，那麼他們應該遵守哪一個？
Now Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego never read Geisler’s book on ethics; still let’s imagine that their preferred way of solving moral dilemmas is hierarchicalism. And, suppose that their form of hierarchichalism is more like Ross’s than Geisler’s version. We suspect that Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego held some form of a divine command theory of ethics. Clearly, worshiping God alone was more important to them than obeying the king. Were they guilty for refusing to obey the King? Not according to hierarchicalism, for one cannot be guilty of failing to do what one cannot do.	現在，沙得拉、米煞、亞伯尼歌從未讀過該思拉所著倫理學的書；讓我們想像他們選擇等級主義去解決道德困境；而且，假設等級主義的形式接近羅斯的理論，多於該思拉的理論。我們懷疑沙得拉、米煞、亞伯尼歌持守某種形式的神聖命令倫理。顯然，對他們來說，單單敬拜神比較服從國王更重要。他們拒絕服從國王是有罪嗎？按等級主義來說，他們沒有罪，因為一個人沒有做不能做的事不是罪。
For non-consequentialists who hold ethical views like those of Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego and who face a moral dilemma of the sort the three Hebrews faced, they should use the decision making procedure described in the previous paragraph. But let’s imagine a more complicated situation involving a woman who is three months pregnant. During a routine visit to her doctor, the doctor is disturbed by what she sees. She runs a battery of tests and concludes that her patient has uterine cancer. Moreover, it appears to be far more advanced than she or her patient could imagine. Chemotherapy should begin immediately if there is any hope to save her life.	對於那些持有像沙得拉、米煞、亞伯尼歌的倫理觀的非後果主義者，若他們面對像這三個希伯來人的道德困境，他們應該使用如上述的抉擇方法。但讓我們設想一個更複雜的情況，涉及一個懷孕三個月的女人。在一次例行調查中，她的醫生為所發現的感到不安，她為病人作了一連串的檢查，結論是她的病人患上子宮癌，而且比她們想像中更後期。如果真要挽救她的生命，化療應立即開始。
Now, this woman believes that it is wrong to take innocent life, but she faces a situation where two innocent lives are at stake, hers and the baby’s. If she refuses to start treatment immediately, the baby will live but she won’t. If she starts treatment, she will likely recover from the disease, but the chemotherapy will kill the baby. There is only one rule that applies in this situation, but it applies to two people, and it seems impossible to obey the rule in relation to both the mother and child. So what should she do—save her own life or that of the baby?	這名婦女認為奪去無辜的生命是錯誤的，但她面臨的情況是她和孩子兩個無辜的生命受威脅。如果她拒絕立即開始治療，孩子將生存，但她會死亡。如果她開始治療，她疾病可能治愈，但化療會殺死嬰兒。在這情況，只有一個道德律適用，但它適用於兩個人，要對母親和孩子同時遵守這道德律似乎不可能。那麼她應該怎樣做，保存自己的生命，抑或保存孩子的生命？
Initially she will probably reflect further on her moral code to see if there is some other rule that also would apply in this situation, a rule that would help to identify which person’s life she should preserve. Let’s imagine that this woman already has two other children. She, of course, has duties related to the care and nurture of those children, but if she sacrifices her own life, she won’t be able to fulfill her duties to the other children, nor will she be involved in the nurturing of the new baby. On the other hand, if she consents to an abortion and her own treatment for cancer begins and succeeds, she cannot preserve the baby’s life, but she will be able to meet her duties to her husband and two other children. Given the alternatives, it is likely she will opt for the abortion, arguing that the abortion allows her to fulfill two obligations whereas not having an abortion allows her to fulfill only one. If she is a hierarchicalist, her theory about moral dilemmas will mean that whichever life she saves, she won’t be guilty for failing to save both.	起初，她可能會進一步思考自己的道德準則，看看是否有其他道德律適用於這種情況，可以幫助確定要救哪一個人的生命。讓我們想像這個女人已經有另外兩個孩子。當然她有責任照顧和培育這些孩子；但如果她犧牲自己的生命，她將無法履行其職責，也不會參與培育新生的嬰兒。另一方面，如果她同意墮胎，她對癌症的治療可以開始，如果成功的話，她就能夠滿足她對丈夫和另外兩個孩子的責任。當她面對兩個選擇，她很可能會墮胎，並可以辯說墮胎使她履行兩項義務，不墮胎只准許她履行一項義務。如果她是一個等級主義者，無論她保存了那一個生命，她對道德困境的理論就會使她不會有罪咎感。
But let’s adjust this situation just a bit. Let’s imagine that the pregnant mother has no other children, and her husband is still alive. Though her husband will be very sad if she dies, she doesn’t believe there is a moral rule that demands her to keep her husband happy. And, though she won’t be alive to help with her husband’s needs if she saves the baby’s life, still her husband will be able to function. So we are imagining that the only rule that applies in this case is the one about not taking innocent life. The developing baby’s life is neither more nor less valuable than the expectant mother’s. What should she do, and how should she decide? In our opinion, in such a case the only option open to her is to consult the consequences of each act (saving herself or saving the baby). Depending on how she evaluates the results of each choice, she will either choose to save the baby or herself.	不過，讓我們稍為改變這情況。讓我們想像，這懷孕母親沒有其他孩子，她的丈夫還活着。如果她死了，她的丈夫雖然會很傷心，但她不相信有任何道德律要求她要使丈夫快樂。而且，如果她保存嬰兒的生命，她雖然不能生存幫助她丈夫的需求，但她的丈夫仍然可以生活。我們可以想像唯一適用於這種情況下的道德律是不能奪取無辜的生命。發育中的胎兒的生命和懷孕母親的生命有同樣價值。她該怎麼辦，她應該如何決定？我們認為，在這情況下，她的唯一的選擇是計算每一種行動的後果（或保存自己、或保存嬰兒）。根據評估每一個選擇的結果如何，她就隨之作選擇，保存自己或嬰兒。
Having read what we have just said, one might complain that following this procedure turns one into a consequentialist. While we understand the concern, we disagree. If at the outset, rather than searching for moral rules that relate to the situation, the agent immediately moves to calculate the consequences of choosing each option, then that is functioning as a consequentialist. However, in the cases just imagined the expectant mother has first identified the moral rules that apply to her situation. She has thought and thought about how she can fulfill her duty both to herself and her baby. All the relevant moral rules have been consulted, and she still doesn’t know which person to save. She has gone as far as a non-consequentialist can go in evaluating relevant rules.	根據這看法，人們可能會抱怨說，這種解決方法是後果主義的方法。雖然我們明白這種憂慮，但我們不同意這說法。如果在開始時，抉擇者沒有尋找與情況有關的道德律，而立即計算每個選擇的後果，那就是後果主義。然而，在上面的例子，懷孕的母親首先認定適用於她的情況的道德律。她多次思想如何能夠履行對自己和嬰兒的責任。當她考慮了相關的道德律後，仍然不知道要保存哪一個生命。她已經用一個非後果主義者最大的力量去評價的相關的道德律。
At such a point, what other option is there but to consult consequences of each act? If she reflects on the consequences of each act and prefers one set more than the other, that doesn’t mean that the option with the best outcomes becomes her duty—she doesn’t turn into a consequentialist! Her duty has already been defined by the rule that no one is to take innocent life. The problem is that she has two lives to preserve, and she cannot save both. What can a non-consequentialist in such a situation do other than consult consequences? But consulting consequences at this stage of the decision making process does not turn her into a consequentialist!	面對這情形，她除了計算每個行動的後果外，又有何選擇呢？如果她反省每個行動的後果，而喜歡某些後果，這並不等於帶來最好後果的選擇就變成她的責任，她不會因此變成一個後果主義者！她的責任已經由道德律定義了，就是不能奪取無辜的生命。問題是，她要保存兩個生命，而她不能同時保存。在這種情況下，非後果主義者除了計算後果外，又有什麼可作呢？但在抉擇過程中達到這階段時，計算後果不會將她變成一個後果主義者！
If she saves herself, that is morally permissible in this situation. If she saves the baby, that is also permissible, but it also involves sacrifice of her own life, which is not morally obligatory; hence it is a work of supererogation. Since such acts are not obligatory, if she sacrifices her life, she has broken no moral rule.	在這情況下，如果她保存自己，在道德上是允許的。如果她保存嬰兒，這也是允許的，但卻犧牲了她自己的生命，這在道德上沒有強制性，它是一種額外努力的行動。由於這種行動不是強制性的，如果她犧牲自己的生命，這也沒有違反道德律。
Thankfully, many moral decisions non-consequentialists face don’t generate a moral dilemma. Thankfully as well, many moral dilemmas that do arise are much easier to decide than the one involving the imagined pregnant woman. But if difficult moral dilemmas do arise, the decision making procedure outlined above seems to us the best way for a non-consequentialist to handle them.	幸運的是，許多非後果主義者面對的道德抉擇時，並沒有產生道德困境。還有幸運的，許多道德困境的解決方法比這個假想孕婦的難題更容易解決。但如果困難的道德困境確實出現，上面所描述作抉擇的程序對一個非後果主義者將是最好的方法。

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SOURCE: John S. Feinberg and Paul D. Feinberg (2010): Ethics for a brave new world, second edition (Wheaton, IL: Crossway), 55-61 (excerpt from chapter 1).