Why I Am Not A Moral Relativist

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我為何不是一個道德相對主義者

碧維夫著（Francis J. Beckwith），孔祥烱譯

In his influential work, The Closing of the American Mind, the late philosopher Allan Bloom made the observation that “there is one thing a professor can be absolutely certain of: almost every student entering the university believes, or says he believes, that truth is relative.... The students, of course, cannot defend their opinion. It is something with which they have been indoctrinated.” Bloom was talking about both moral relativism and epistemological relativism. The latter is the view that there is no such thing as objective truth, that knowledge is relative to one’s self, culture, and/or point of view. This type of relativism will be addressed in the next chapter. In this chapter, however, I will focus on moral relativism, a view that is not limited to indoctrinated college freshmen but is dominant in North American culture.	已故的哲學家布隆（Allan Bloom）在他有影響力的著作《美國人頭腦的閉塞》中提出他的觀察：「一個教授可以絕對肯定的一件事，就是幾乎每一個初入大學的學生都相信（或者說自己相信）真理是相對的。……當然，學生們不能辯護他們的看法，但他們已被灌輸了。」布隆所指的是「道德相對主義」和「知識論相對主義」。後者就是認為沒有任何客觀真理，知識只是相對於一個人的自我、文化或觀點，這種相對主義將會在本書的下一章討論。這一章則專注於道德相對主義，這觀點不單出現在已被灌輸的大學生中，也支配整個北美洲文化。
Moral relativism is the view that when it comes to questions of morality, there are no absolutes and no objective right or wrong; moral rules are merely personal preferences and/or the result of one’s cultural, sexual, or ethnic orientation. The act that one believes there are exceptions or, to be more precise, exemptions to moral rules does not make one a moral relativist. For example, many people who believe lying is wrong nonetheless believe it is not wrong to lie in order to protect someone’s life. These people are not moral relativists, for to permit certain exemptions to a rule one must first acknowledge the general validity of the rule. The moral relativist rejects the idea that any such moral rules exist at all.	道德相對主義認為，當涉及道德問題時，沒有絕對的原則，沒有客觀的對或錯；道德準則僅僅是個人的偏愛，或是一個人的文化方向、性趨向或種族取向的結果。一個人如果單單相信道德準則有例外或豁免的情形，這並不足夠使他成為一個道德相對主義者。例如，相信說謊是錯的人，也同時相信為了保護人的生命而說謊並非錯誤，但這些人並不是道德相對主義者；他們允許準則的豁免表示，他們已首先承認準則的普遍有效性。道德相對主義者卻拒絕任何道德準則存在。
Many people see relativism as necessary for promoting tolerance, non-judgmentalism, and inclusiveness, for they think if one believes one’s moral position is correct and others’ incorrect, one is closed-minded and intolerant. They typically consider moral relativism the indispensable cornerstone of our pluralistic and modern democratic society. Unless we all embrace relativism, they fear we will likely revert to a moralistically medieval culture.	許多人認為相對主義有存在的必要，目的是提倡容忍、包容和反審判主義，因為他們認為，如果一個人相信自己的道德立場是正確的，而別人的立場是不正確的，這個人就擁有封閉的思想和不容忍。他們典型地認為，道德相對主義是現代多元化和民主社會不可缺少的基石；他們擔心，除非我們都信奉相對主義，否則我們會回復到一個中世紀的道德文化。
In this chapter, we will see why the arguments for relativism fail and why relativism itself cannot live up to its own reputation. But why, you may ask, is a critical evaluation of relativism important to the case for the Christian faith? First, Christianity teaches that there are objective moral norms that apply to all persons in all places and at all times. Relativism says that there are no such norms. If relativism is true, therefore, Christianity must be false. But if relativism is incorrect, Christianity cannot be dismissed on the grounds that it affirms objective moral norms.	在這一章中，我們將看到道德相對主義的論點如何失敗，相對主義本身亦不能符合其聲譽。你可能會問，批判性地評估相對主義對基督教信仰有重要性嗎？[1] 基督教教導客觀道德規範（準則）的存在，它們適用於所有人、所有地方和所有時間；而相對主義說沒有這樣的規範。如果相對主義是真的，則基督教一定是假的；但是，如果相對主義是不正確的，則基督教不能因它肯定客觀道德規範而被拒絕。
Second, if moral norms exist, then materialism as a worldview is false, because moral norms are nonmaterial things. If materialism is false, then other nonmaterial things such as God, angels, and souls cannot be ruled out on the grounds that they are not material. Thus, the falsity of materialism helps support the truth of Christianity. Ultimately, the claim “I am not a moral relativist” is not based on the fact that I am a Christian. Rather, I am a Christian at least in part because I am convinced that moral relativism is completely false.	[2] 如果道德規範存在，那麼唯物論世界觀就是錯誤的，因為道德規範是「非物質」。如果唯物論是假的，那麼其他非物質性的東西，如上帝、天使、靈魂也不能因其為「非物質」而被排除；因此，辯說唯物論是虛假的，有助於支持基督教是真理。其實，使我成為基督徒的其中一個理由，就是因為我被說服明白道德相對主義是完全錯誤的。
In this chapter, I will first briefly discuss how moral relativism has affected our ability to engage in moral discourse. Then I will present and critique two arguments for moral relativism. Finally, I will argue that given the existence of objective moral norms, the God of theism is the best explanation of the source of their existence.	在這一章中，我將首先簡要地討論道德相對主義如何影響了我們論述道德的能力；然後，我將批判兩個支持道德相對主義的論據；最後，我將論證：由於客觀道德規範的存在，神是道德規範的來源就是最好的解釋。
Moral Relativism And Moral Discourse	（A）道德相對主義和道德論述
Moral relativism has stunted our ability to grasp the nature of moral claims. People in our culture often confuse preference claims with moral claims or reduce the latter to the former. To understand what I mean by this, consider two statements.	道德相對主義妨礙了我們的能力，以致不能把握道德要求的本質。在我們這文化中的人，常常混淆用了基於偏愛的要求和基於道德的要求，貶低後者直至達到與前者同一水平。試考慮下面兩項聲明，就可以明白我的意思。
1. I like vanilla ice cream. 2. Killing people without justification is wrong.	[1] 我喜歡香草雪糕。 [2] 沒有正當的理由而殺人是錯誤的。
The first statement is a preference claim, since it is a description of a person’s subjective taste. It is not a normative claim. It is not a claim about what one ought or ought not to do. It is not saying, “Since I like vanilla ice cream, the government ought to coerce you to eat it as well,” or, “Everyone in the world ought to like vanilla ice cream too.” A claim of subjective preference tells us nothing about what one ought to think or do. For example, if someone were to say, “I like to torture children for fun,” this would tell us nothing about whether it is wrong or right to torture children for fun.	第一項聲明是一個基於偏愛的要求，因為它是一個人主觀口味的描述。這不是一個規範性的要求；它不是一個關乎應該或不應該做的要求，它不是說：「因為我喜歡香草雪糕，政府應該強迫你也吃。」也不是說：「世界上每個人都應該喜歡香草雪糕。」主觀性的偏愛沒有告訴我們哪些是一個人應該想或做的事；例如，如果有人說：「我喜歡折磨兒童作為娛樂。」這聲明本身沒有告訴我們折磨兒童是否是錯或對。
The second claim, however, is quite different. It has little if anything to do with what one likes or dislikes. In fact, one may prefer to kill another person without justification and still know that it is morally wrong to do so. This statement is a moral claim. It is not a descriptive claim, for it does not tell us what, why, or how things are, or how a majority of people in fact behave and think. Nor is it a preference claim, for it does not tell us what anyone’s subjective preference may be or how one prefers to behave and think. Rather, it is a claim about what persons ought to do, which may be contrary to how persons in fact behave and how they prefer to behave.	第二項聲明卻相當不同，它和偏愛（喜好）或不偏愛絕對無關。事實上，一個人可能偏愛無理由地殺人，但仍然知道在道德上是錯誤的。這項聲明就是一種道德要求；這不是一個描述性的要求，因為它沒有告訴我們有什麼、為什麼、事情如何、或者大多數人如何行動及思想；它也不是一個偏愛的要求，因為它沒有告訴我們某一個人的主觀性偏愛的內容，也沒有說一個人如何行動及思想。相反地，它是一個關於人應該如何做的要求，它甚至可能和人們的行徑或偏愛相反。
Unfortunately, the espousal of moral relativism has made it difficult for many people in our culture to distinguish between preference claims and moral claims. Rather than pondering and struggling with arguments for and against a particular moral perspective, people sometimes reduce the disagreement to a question of personal preference or subjective opinion. Take, for example, the issue of whether parents and other concerned citizens have a right to boycott products that are advertised during television programs these citizens find to be morally inappropriate, especially for children. The usual reply to these citizens is, “If you don’t like a particular program, you don’t have to watch it. You can always change the channel.” But does the person who employs this reply really understand what these citizens are saying?	不幸的是，對道德相對主義的擁護，使許多現代人難以區別偏愛要求和道德要求。他們對從道德的角度支持或反對的論點不加以思考和論證，卻常常將爭論簡化為個人的喜好或主觀的意見。例如，當電視播放有些人認為是不合道德（尤其對於兒童）的廣告，而父母們及其他關心的市民討論是否有權去抵制那些產品時，通常對這些市民的回答是：「如果你不喜歡某個節目，你可不必看，轉至另一個電視台便可以。」但是這樣回答的人是否真正了解這些市民說什麼呢？
These groups are not merely saying that they don’t prefer these programs. In fact, these citizens and their children may actually be tempted to watch these programs; that is, in terms of sheer untutored appetite, they may actually prefer these programs, though they still may know these programs are not good for them, just as one may prefer a candy bar but still know it’s not good for him or her. To put it another way, these citizens are saying something a bit more subtle and profound than their detractors are likely to recognize let alone admit: These programs convey messages and create a moral climate that will affect others, especially children, in a way that is adverse to the public good. Hence, what troubles these citizens is that you and your children will not change the channel.	這些市民不僅僅說他們不喜歡這些節目，實際上，這些市民和他們的孩子可能受到誘惑去看這些節目；意思是，依隨純粹的慾望，他們可能喜歡這些節目，但仍然知道這些對他們是不好的，就像一個人可能喜歡吃糖果，但仍然知道糖果對他不好。換言之，這些市民所說的事較表面更微妙和深刻，但反對他們的人卻不明白，也不承認。他們要說的是：這些節目傳達的信息並建立的道德風氣，是不利於公共利益的，會影響其他人，特別是兒童。因此，這些市民煩惱的是你和你的孩子不會轉換電視台。
Furthermore, it concerns these people that there is probably somewhere in America an unsupervised ten-year-old who is, on a consistent basis, watching late night HBO or listening to radio shock-jock Howard Stern. Most of these people fear that their ten-year-olds, who are not watching or listening to such programs, may have to interact socially with the unsupervised ten-year-old. Others, who may not have young children, are concerned for the declining moral health of their communities, which is sometimes manifested in an increasing level of rudeness, disrespect, incivility, crime, or verbal and physical violence.	此外，這些市民擔心，可能在美國某地方，一個無人監管的十歲小孩每晚都收看HBO電視台的深夜節目，或收聽使人震驚的斯團（Howard Stern）電台。這些人恐懼的，是自己十歲的兒女，雖然沒有收看或收聽這些節目，卻和這無人監管的十歲小孩有來往。其他人可能沒有年幼的孩子，但他們關心社區的道德水平不斷下降，出現更多粗魯、無禮、不文明、犯罪和暴力的言語或行為。
There are, in fact, many well-educated and reasonable people who believe that such a community concern is justified, especially in light of what we know about how certain forms of entertainment and media affect people, especially the young. Just as a concern for people’s lungs and physical health has resulted in criticism of and reprisals against tobacco companies, concern for people’s souls and spiritual health sometimes results in criticisms of and reprisals against different media. Thus, such concerns cannot be relegated to a question of one’s personal preference. The real question is whether any community or social action is ever permissible and would best serve the public good. Moral relativists, to be consistent, must answer no, while seems to tell us otherwise.	事實上，許多受過良好教育和講理的人相信，這樣的社會關注是有道理的，尤其是我們現在知道，娛樂和傳媒實際影響人們，特別是年輕人。正如關注人的肺部和身體健康，導致了批評和報復煙草公司；關注人的靈魂和精神健康，有時會導致批評和報復傳媒。因此，這種關注不能被貶低為個人喜好的問題。真正的問題是，可否允許用一個社會行動來改善公共利益。堅定不移的道德相對主義者必定回答不能，但普通常識卻會帶來相反的答案。
Consider another example: the debate over abortion rights. Many who defend a woman’s right to abortion (pro-choicers) sometimes tell those who oppose abortion rights (pro-lifers), “If you don’t like abortion, then don’t have one.” The intent and effect of such rhetoric is to reduce the abortion debate to a mere preference claim. That is, the objective moral rightness or wrongness of abortion (i.e., whether or not it involves killing an innocent human person) is declared, without argument, to be irrelevant. But this is clearly a mistake, for those who oppose abortion do so because they believe that the fetus (during most if not all of a woman’s pregnancy) is a human person with a right to life, and it is generally wrong, both objectively and universally, to violate a person’s right to life.	讓我們考慮另一個例子：墮胎權利的辯論。很多捍衛婦女墮胎權的人（維護選擇者）有時向反墮胎權的人（維護生命者）說：「如果你不喜歡墮胎，則你不去墮胎吧！」但這樣的講法只不過將墮胎的辯論貶低成為個人喜好的問題，也就是將一個關乎客觀道德的正誤問題（就是墮胎是否涉及殺害無辜的人）宣佈為與道德無關，而且絕不討論。這顯然是一個錯誤，因為反對墮胎的人認為一個胚胎是一個具有生命權的人（最少在懷孕期的大部份時間），侵犯一個人的生命權，在客觀上和普遍觀點上，都是錯的。
For this reason, when the pro-lifer hears the pro-choicer tell her that if she doesn’t like abortion she doesn’t have to have one, it sounds to her as if the pro-choicer is saying, “If you don’t like murder, then don’t kill any innocent persons.” Understandably, the pro-lifer, committed to objective moral norms, finds such rhetoric perplexing as well as unpersuasive. Of course, a number of sophisticated pro-choice advocates are not moral relativists and recognize the error of substituting preference claims for substantive moral debate. But it does seem that in the popular debate, pro-choicers tend to reduce the question of abortion to a question of preference, proving they have been more affected by moral relativism than have their opponents.	因此，當維護生命者聽見維護選擇者告訴她，如果她不喜歡墮胎，她不需要去墮胎的時候，就好像聽見人說：「如果你不喜歡殺人，那麼就不要殺死任何無辜的人。」當然，一個堅持有客觀道德規範的維護生命者，自然認為這樣的言辭是令人詫異的，和缺乏說服力的。當然，有些較老練的維護選擇者並非道德相對主義者，亦明白將偏愛的要求代替道德的辯論是錯誤的。但在流行的辯論中，維護選擇者似乎仍然將墮胎問題貶低成為偏愛的問題，証明他們比對手更受道德相對主義所影響。
Arguments For Moral Relativism	（B）支持道德相對主義的論據
Two arguments are often used to defend moral relativism. The first is the argument from cultural and individual differences and the second is the argument from tolerance.	道德相對主義通常有兩個支持的論據，第一是文化和個人差異的論據，第二是容忍的論據。
The Argument from Cultural and Individual Differences	（一）文化和個人差異的論據
In this argument, the relativist concludes that there are no objective moral norms because cultures and individuals disagree on moral issues. To defend this premise the relativist typically cites a number of examples, such as cross-cultural and intra-cultural differences over the morality of sexual practices, abortion, war, and capital punishment. Hadley Arkes, an opponent of moral relativism, has sardonically observed, “In one society, a widow is burned on the funeral pyre of her husband; in another, she is burned on the beach in Miami. In one society, people complain to the chef about the roast beef, in another, they send back the roast beef and eat the chef.” There are at least four problems with the argument from cultural and individual differences.	這論據就是，相對主義者認為文化和個人都在道德問題上有不同意見，因此沒有客觀的道德規範。為了維護這個前提，相對主義者通常列舉一些例子，証明跨文化和文化內部對道德有不同的看法，包括性行為、墮胎、戰爭和死刑等。哈根（Hadley Arkes）是一個道德相對主義的反對者，他諷刺地說：「在一個社會，一個寡婦在丈夫的葬禮柴堆上被焚燒；在另一個社會，她在邁阿密海灘上被焚燒。在一個社會，人們對廚師的烤牛肉抱怨；在另一個社會，人們拒絕烤牛肉而將廚師吃了。」總括來說，用文化和個人差異的論據有四個困難。
Relativism does not follow from disagreement.	（1）差異並不帶來相對主義。
The fact that people disagree about something does not mean that there is no truth. For example, if you and I were to disagree on the question of whether the earth is round, our disagreement would certainly not be proof that the earth has no shape. Likewise, the fact that a skinhead (a type of neo-Nazi) and I may disagree on the question of whether we should treat people equally is certainly not sufficient reason to conclude that equality is not an objective moral value. Even if individuals and cultures hold no values in common, it simply does not follow that nobody is ever right or wrong about the correct values. Despite the existence of moral disagreement, it is still quite possible that an individual or an entire culture, such as Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany, are simply mistaken.	人們對事情不同意並不等於沒有真理；例如，如果你和我在地球是否是圓的問題上不同意，這分歧絕對不能証明地球是沒有形狀的。同樣，我和一個新納粹主義者可能不同意是否應該平等對待人，但這分歧絕對不能証明平等不是客觀的道德價值。即使個人和文化沒有共同持有的價值觀，這並不能証明沒有人對價值觀有正確或錯誤的看法。儘管道德差異確實存在，一個人或整個文化（如希特勒和納粹德國）仍然非常有可能是錯誤的。
If the mere fact of disagreement were sufficient to conclude that objective norms do not exist, we would then have to acknowledge that there is no objectively correct position on such issues as slavery, genocide, and child molestation, for the slave owner, genocidal maniac, and pedophile clearly have an opinion that differs from the one held by those of us who condemn their actions. In the end, moral disagreement is simply a sociological observation that proves nothing about the true nature of morality.	單單有差異的事實不足以達到結論，說客觀的規範不存在。我們最多可以承認在奴隸制、種族滅絕和強姦兒童等問題上，沒有客觀而正確的立場；因為奴隸擁有者、種族滅絕的瘋子和戀童癖者明顯地與我們譴責這些行為的人有不同的意見。結果是，道德的差異僅僅是一個社會學的觀察，不能說明道德的真實本質。
Disagreement actually counts against relativism.	（2）差異實際上反駁相對主義。
Suppose, however, that the relativist, despite the logical failure of his case, sticks to his guns and maintains that disagreement over objective norms proves the correctness of relativism. The relativist has set down a principle—disagreement means there is no truth—that unravels his own case. After all, some of us believe that relativism is a mistaken view. We, in other words, disagree with the relativist over the nature of morality. We believe that objective moral norms exist whereas the relativist does not. But according to the relativist’s own principle (i.e., “disagreement means there is no truth”), he ought to abandon his own opinion that relativism is the correct position.	假設一個相對主義者雖然在邏輯分析上失敗了，但仍然堅持自己的看法，說人類對客觀規範的差異証明相對主義的正確性。相對主義者於是立下一項原則，就是差異就等於真理不存在；但這原則實際上反駁了自己的理論。人人都知道，有些人相信相對主義是一個錯誤的觀點；換句話說，我們不同意相對主義解釋道德本質的理論。我們認為客觀的道德規範存在，而相對主義者認為它不存在。但根據相對主義者的原則（就是「差異等於真理不存在」），他應該放棄自己的意見，就是不相信「相對主義是正確的」這看法。
To make matters worse for the relativist, his “disagreement” principle is a proposition for which there is no universal agreement and thus on its own grounds must be rejected. As Arkes points out, “My disagreement establishes that the proposition [i.e., disagreement means there is no truth] does not enjoy a universal assent, and by the very terms of the proposition, that should be quite sufficient to determine its own invalidity.”	對相對主義者來說，事情實際上更糟，因為他的「差異」原則是一個沒有普遍協議的命題，故此必須予以拒絕。正如哈根指出：「我的不同意使這命題（就是「差異等於真理不存在」）缺乏普遍協議，根據這命題本身的存在基礎，已能足夠確定它是無效的。」
Disagreement is overrated.	（3）差異被高估了。
Although it is true that people and cultures disagree on moral issues, it does not follow that they do not share the same values or that certain moral norms are not binding on all nations at all times and in all places. Take, for example, the Salem witch trials. During colonial days in Massachusetts, certain individuals were put to death as punishment for practicing witchcraft. We do not execute witches today, but not because our moral norms have changed. Rather, we don’t execute witches because we do not believe, as the seventeenth-century residents of Massachusetts did, that the practice of witchcraft has a fatal effect on the community.	雖然人們和文化對道德問題有差異，但這並不表示他們缺乏相同的價值觀，也不表示道德規範對所有國家、在所有時候和所有地方沒有約束力。試看塞冷城審判女巫的事例，在殖民地時期的麻薩諸塞州，一些人因施行巫術而被判死刑；今天我們再不處死巫師，因為我們的道德規範已經改變。但是，我們不處死巫師，因為我們不相信「施行巫術對社會有致命的影響」，和十七世紀麻薩諸塞州居民所相信的不一樣。
But suppose we had evidence that the practice of witchcraft affects people in the same way that secondhand cigarette smoke affects nonsmokers. We would alter the practice of our values to take into consideration this factual change. We may set up non-witch sections in restaurants and ban the casting of spells on interstate airplane flights. The upshot of all this is that the good of the community is a value we share with the seventeenth-century residents of Salem, but we simply believe they were factually wrong about the actual effect of witches on the community.	假設我們有証據証明，施行巫術能影響人，像間接吸煙能影響非吸煙者一樣；結果我們考慮到這個新發現的事實，改變我們的價值觀；我們就可能在餐館內設立非巫師區，也禁止在飛機上施行巫術。這做法其實就和十七世紀塞冷城的居民一樣，認為「群體的好處」是一種價值，只不過我們相信，他們弄錯了巫師對社會的實際效果吧。
Philosopher James Rachels presents another example of how the knowledge of certain facts may help us understand why it seems other people have different values. He points to the Eskimos’ practice of infanticide (on primarily female babies). On the surface, this practice seems to show that the Eskimos have a radically different value of human life than we do. And because one’s view of human life is so fundamental, it seems to follow from this that moral relativism is correct. Rachels does not agree. He explains that once one realizes that certain factual considerations have made the practice of infanticide a necessary evil for the Eskimos, one sees that the Eskimos’ value of human life is not all that different from ours. Writes Rachels:	哲學家雷切斯（James Rachels）提出另一個例子，說明對某些事實的知識，可以幫助我們明白為何其他人似乎有不同的價值觀。他用的例子是愛斯基摩人殺嬰孩的做法（主要是殺女嬰）。從表面上看，這種做法似乎表明，愛斯基摩人對生命的價值觀和我們極其不同。既然人的生命價值觀是極基本的價值觀，似乎道德相對主義是正確的；但雷切斯並不贊同。當我們認識到事實的本相，就明白愛斯基摩人的殺嬰行動是一種被強迫的邪惡，他們對生命的價值觀其實與我們並無太大差異。雷切斯解釋說：
But suppose we ask why the Eskimos do this. The explanation is not that they have less affection for their children or less respect for human life. An Eskimo family will always protect its babies if conditions permit. But they live in a harsh environment, where food is often in short supply....	我們可能會發問，愛斯基摩人為什麼要這樣做。解釋是他們並非對他們的孩子缺乏愛，也並非對生命的尊重較低。如果情況許可下，愛斯基摩人一定保護其嬰兒；但他們住在惡劣的環境中，食物往往供不應求。……女嬰首先被遺棄是因為：
Infant girls are readily disposed of because, first, in this society the males are the primary food providers—they are the hunters, according to the traditional division of labor—and it is obviously important to maintain a sufficient number of food gatherers.	[1] 在這個社會中，男性是食物的主要供應者，按照傳統的分工，他們是獵人；顯然地，保留足夠的食物採集者最為重要。
But there is an important second reason as well. Because the hunters suffer a high casualty rate, the adult men who die prematurely far outnumber the women who die early. Thus if male and female infants survived in equal numbers, the female adult population would greatly outnumber the male adult population. Examining the available statistics, one writer concluded that “were it not for female infanticide ... there would be approximately one-and-a-half times as many females in the average Eskimo local group as there are food-producing males.”	[2] 還有另一個重要理由，由於獵人的傷亡率很高，過早死亡的成年男子遠遠超過成年女子。因此，若男嬰和女嬰存活的人數相等，則成年女子人口將大大多過成年男子。一位作者審查現有的統計數字後，作結論說：「如果沒有殺女嬰的做法，……一個愛斯基摩群體的女性人口，約為供應糧食的男性之一倍半。」
So among the Eskimos, infanticide does not signal a fundamentally different attitude toward children. Instead, it is a recognition that drastic measures are sometimes needed to ensure the family’s survival. Even then, however, killing the baby is not the first option considered. Adoption is common; childless couples are especially happy to take a more fertile couple’s “surplus.” Killing is only the last resort.	因此，在愛斯基摩人中，殺嬰並不表示他們對孩子有截然不同的態度。相反地，為確保整個家庭的生存，他們接受有時需要採取極端的措施。即使這樣，殺死嬰兒仍不是最先的選擇，很多時出現領養；無子女的夫婦特別高興收養其他夫婦的「盈餘」，殺嬰只是最後的選擇。
I emphasize this in order to show that the raw data of the anthropologists can be misleading; it can make the differences in values between cultures appear greater than they are. The Eskimos’ values are not all that different from our values. It is only that life forces upon them choices that the rest of us do not have to make.	我要強調這一點是為了表明，人類學家最初收集的數據可能會產生誤導，它可以使文化之間不同的價值觀顯得大過實際的差異。愛斯基摩人的價值觀跟我們的價值觀並非有大差異，只不過環境強迫他們選擇了其他人不需做的選擇。
This is not to say that the Eskimos are right or that we should not try to persuade them to believe their practice is wrong. Rather, this example simply shows that so-called moral differences may not really be moral differences at all, after one carefully examines why a certain practice, such as female infanticide, is performed.	這例子並不是說，愛斯基摩人的做法是正確的，也不是說我們不應該試圖說服他們承認錯誤。這個例子只說明，當我們小心研究某些做法（如殺害女嬰），結果是表面的道德差異可能不是真實的道德差異。
Consider again the issue of abortion. The conventional wisdom is that the moral and legal debate over abortion is a dispute between two factions that hold incommensurable value systems. But the conventional wisdom is mistaken, for these factions hold many values in common.	讓我們再考慮墮胎的問題。傳統的說法是，有關墮胎的道德上和法律上的辯論，代表兩個派別的爭論；他們各持有不可共通的價值系統。但這說法是錯誤的，因為這兩個派別持有許多共同的價值觀。
First, each side believes that all human persons possess certain inalienable rights regardless of whether their governments protect these rights. That is why both sides appeal to what each believes is a fundamental right. The pro-life advocate appeals to “life” whereas the pro-choice advocate appeals to “liberty” (or “choice”). Both believe that a constitutional regime, in order to be just, must uphold fundamental rights.	[1] 雙方都相信，所有人類都擁有不可剝奪的權利，無論政府保護這些權利與否。這解釋了為何雙方都呼籲要爭取一項基本人權；維護生命的倡導者呼籲「生命」，維護選擇的倡導者呼籲「自由」（或「選擇」）。雙方都認為，一個公正的憲法制度必須堅持基本人權。
Second, each side believes that its position best exemplifies its opponent’s fundamental value. The pro-choice advocate does not deny that life is a value but argues that his position’s appeal to human liberty is a necessary ingredient by which an individual can pursue the fullest and most complete life possible. On the other hand, the pro-life advocate does not eschew liberty. She believes that all human liberty is limited by another human person’s right to life. For example, one has a right to freely pursue any goal one believes is consistent with one’s happiness, such as attending a Los Angeles Lakers basketball game. One has no right, however, to freely pursue this goal at the expense of another’s life or liberty, such as running over pedestrians with one’s car so that one can get to the game on time. The pro-life advocate argues that fetuses are persons with a full right to life. Since the act of abortion results in the death of the unborn, abortion, with few exceptions, is not morally justified.	[2] 雙方都相信，自己的立場最能體現對方的基本價值。維護選擇的倡導者並不否認生命是一種價值，但亦認為人類自由是一個必要的成份，因為一個人有自由才可以追求最豐富和最完滿的生命。另一方面，維護生命的倡導者並不避開自由；她認為，人類的自由的極限是另一個人的生命權。例如，一個人有權利自由地追求任何目標來獲得快樂，如參觀洛杉磯湖人隊的籃球比賽；但是，當一個人追求自由而使別人喪失生命或自由的時候，她就沒有這樣的權利；就如為要準時到達籃球比賽而開車撞倒行人。維護生命的倡導者認為，胎兒是一個人，有生命權，墮胎的後果是胎兒的死亡，除少數例外，墮胎在道德上是不合理的。
The pro-choice advocate does not deny that human persons have a right to life. He just believes that this right to life is not extended to fetuses since they are not human persons. The pro-life advocate does not deny that people have the liberty to make choices that they believe are in their best interests. She just believes that this liberty does not entail the right to choose abortion since such a choice conflicts with the life, liberty, and interests of another human person (the fetus).	維護選擇的倡導者並不否認人類有生命權；只不過他認為生命權沒有延伸到胎兒，因為胎兒不是人。維護生命的倡導者並不否認人有自由去選擇獲得最高的利益，只不過她認為，這種自由不包括墮胎的權利，因為這樣的選擇和另一個人（胎兒）的生命、自由和利益有衝突。
Thus, when all is said and done, the debate over abortion is not really about conflicting value systems, for we all generally agree that life and liberty are fundamental values.	因此，總括來說，墮胎的辯論並非真正是價值系統的衝突，因為大家都同意，生命和自由都是基本價值觀念。
Absurd consequences follow from moral relativism.	（4）道德相對主義引致荒謬的後果。
First, if it is true that no objective moral norms apply to all persons at all times and in all places, then the following moral judgments must be denied: Mother Teresa was morally better than Adolf Hitler; rape is always wrong; it is wrong to torture babies for fun. Yet to deny that these judgments are universally true certainly seems absurd. Every instinct within us tells us that at least some moral judgments are absolutely correct regardless of what other cultures or individuals may think.	[1] 如果真的沒有客觀的道德規範適用於所有時候和所有地方的所有人，那麼必須拒絕以下幾個道德判斷：特麗莎修女在道德上比希特拉更好、強姦永遠是錯的、折磨嬰兒為樂是錯的；但否認這些是普遍真理好像必定是荒謬的。我們每一個直覺告訴我們，不論其他文化或個人怎樣想，至少某些道德判斷是絕對正確的。
Second, if the relativist claims that morality is relative to the individual, what happens when individual moralities conflict? For example, Jeffrey Dahmer’s morality apparently permitted him to cannibalize his neighbor; his unfortunate neighbor likely did not share Dahmer’s peculiar tastes. What would the relativist suggest be done to resolve this moral conflict between the cannibal and his reluctant dinner? Since nobody’s morality is in principle superior, should we then flip a coin or simply conclude that “might makes right”? In addition, if the moral life is no more than a reflection of people’s individual tastes, preferences, and orientations, then we have no legitimate basis for telling young people that it is morally wrong to lie, steal, cheat, and kill their newborns.	[2] 如果相對主義者聲稱，道德是相對於個人的；若個人之間道德發生衝突又怎樣？例如，達默（Jeffrey Dahmer）的道德觀顯然容許自己成為食人肉者，殺死他的鄰居；但他不幸的鄰居大概不會贊同達默的獨特口味。相對主義者要怎樣解決食人肉者和他的晚餐之間的道德衝突呢？既然原則上沒有一個人的道德比其他人優越，那麼，是否我們應該拋個硬幣去決定呢？還是簡單地接受「強權即公理」呢？此外，如果道德生活只不過反映人們的個人口味、喜好和取向，那麼我們就沒有合法基礎去告訴青少年，說撒謊、偷盜、詐騙和殺死自己初生的嬰兒在道德上是錯的呢？
Third, even if the relativist were to make the more modest claim that morality is not relative to the individual but to the individual’s culture (i.e., that one is only obligated to follow the dictates of one’s society), other problems follow.	[3] 即使相對主義者讓步說，道德觀並非相對於個人，而是相對於個人所屬的文化（也即一個人只有義務遵循一個社會的法規），其他問題就隨之而來。
First, the cultural relativist’s position is self-refuting. J. P. Moreland explains what it means for a position to be self-refuting:	[a] 文化相對主義者的立場是自我反駁的。莫蘭（J.P. Moreland）﹝譯者註：現代基督教衛道家﹞解釋自我反駁的立場是什麼意思：
When a statement fails to satisfy itself (i.e., to conform to its own criteria of validity or acceptability), it is self-refuting.... Consider some examples. “I cannot say a word in English” is self-refuting when uttered in English. “I do not exist” is self-refuting, for one must exist to utter it. The claim “there are no truths” is self-refuting. If it is false, then it is false. But if it is true, then it is false as well, for in that case there would be no truths, including the statement itself.	當一項聲明不能滿足本身的標準（即不能符合自己的正確性標準或可接受性標準），它就是自我反駁。……例如，「我不能說任何一個英文字」是一項自我反駁的聲明，因為這句話用英文講出。「我不存在」也是自我反駁，因為你必定要存在才能說這句話。「真理不存在」亦是自我反駁，因為如果這聲明是假的，它就是假的；但就算這聲明是真的，那麼它仍然是假的，因為真理既然不存在，「真理不存在」這聲明就不是真理，仍然是假的。
How is cultural relativism self-refuting? The supporter of cultural relativism maintains that there are no objective and universal moral norms and for that reason everyone ought to follow the moral norms of his or her own culture. But the cultural relativist is making an absolute and universal moral claim, namely, that everyone is morally obligated to follow the moral norms of his or her own culture. If this moral norm is absolute and universal, then cultural relativism is false. But if this moral norm is neither absolute nor universal, then cultural relativism is still false, for in that case I would not have a moral obligation to follow the moral norms of my culture.	文化相對主義是如何自我反駁呢？文化相對主義的支持者認為，客觀的和普遍的道德規範不存在，因此每個人都應該隨從自己所屬的文化的道德規範。但是，這做法就等於文化相對主義者作出絕對的和普遍的道德要求，也就是每個人都有道德義務去隨從自己所屬的文化的道德規範。如果這道德規範是絕對的和普遍的，則文化相對主義是虛假的。但如果這道德規範不是絕對的或不是普遍的，則文化相對主義仍然是虛假的，因為我沒有道德義務去隨從自己所屬的文化的道德規範。
Second, since each of us belongs to a number of different “societies” or “cultures,” there is no way to determine objectively which culture’s norms should be followed when they conflict. For example, suppose a woman named Sheena is a resident of a liberal upscale neighborhood in Hollywood, California, attends a Christian church, and is a partner in a prestigious law firm. In her neighborhood, having an adulterous affair is considered “enlightened,” and those who do not pursue such unions are considered repressed prudes. At her church, however, adultery is condemned as sinful, while at her law firm adultery is neither encouraged nor discouraged. Suppose further that Sheena chooses to commit adultery in the firm’s back office with a fellow churchgoer, Donald, who resides in a conservative neighborhood in which adultery is condemned. The office, it turns out, is adjacent to the church as well as precisely halfway between Sheena’s neighborhood and Donald’s neighborhood. Which society’s morality should apply? If the cultural relativist responds that Sheena is free to choose, then we have regressed to individual relativism, which we have already determined to be absurd.	[b] 由於我們每個人都屬於不同的「社會」或「文化」，當不同文化的規範衝突時，就沒有客觀的方法來確定應遵循那一個文化的規範。例如，有一個女人名為辛娜，她在加利福尼亞州好萊塢中居住，那是一個自由派的富有住宅區。在她那個區域中，通姦被認為是「開明」的行動，不通姦者被認作是過分拘謹；但在她參加的基督教教堂中，通姦被譴責為罪惡；而在她工作的律師事務所中，通姦沒有被鼓勵也沒有被勸阻。假設辛娜選擇在律師事務所的小辦公室跟一個教友唐奴通姦，而唐奴居住在一個保守派的住宅區；在那個區域中，通姦是被譴責的；辦公室位於教堂的隔壁，亦恰好位於辛娜的住宅區和唐奴的住宅區中間。若是這樣，應當應用哪一個社會的道德呢？如果文化相對主義者回答說，辛娜可以自由選擇，結果我們就回到個人相對主義了，而我們在前面已決定個人相對主義是荒謬的。
Third, if morality is reducible to culture, there can be no real moral progress. The only way one can meaningfully say that a culture is getting better or progressing is if there are objective moral norms that exist independently of the progressing culture. There must be some superior moral principles to which the progressing society may draw closer. However, if what is morally good is merely what one’s culture says is morally good, then we can say only that cultural norms change, not that society is progressing or getting better. Yet who can reasonably deny that the abolition of slavery in the United States was an instance of genuine moral progress? Did America change for the better, or did it simply change?	[c] 如果道德可以簡化為文化，就不可能有真正的道德進步。一個文化若要越來越好，唯一的方法就是在這進步的文化外有客觀道德規範獨立存在；必須要有更高的道德準則，讓這進步的社會可以向它靠近。但是，如果道德上的好只是一個人的文化內認為是好的，則我們只可以說文化規範正在改變，但社會不會進步或越來越好。若是如此，誰可以合理地否認，美國廢除奴隸制度是一次真正的道德進步呢？美國是否在變好呢，抑或它只是在變化呢？
In addition, if cultural relativism is true, there can be no true or admirable reformers of culture. Moreland writes:	[d] 如果文化相對主義是真實的話，就不可能有真正的或令人欽佩的文化改革者。莫蘭解釋：
If [cultural] relativism is true, then it is impossible in principle to have a true moral reformer who changes a society’s code and does not merely bring out what was already implicit in that code. For moral reformers, by definition, change a society’s code by arguing that it is somehow morally inadequate. But if [cultural] relativism is true, an act is right if and only if it is in society’s code; so the reformer is by definition immoral (since he adopts a set of values outside the society’s code and attempts to change that code in keeping with these values). It is odd, to say the least, for someone to hold that every moral reformer who ever lived—Moses, Jesus, Gandhi, Martin Luther King—was immoral by definition. Any moral view which implies that is surely false.	如果[文化]相對主義是真的，那麼它在原則上就不可能有真正的道德改革者（就是一個不單單順從社會法規的人，而是要改變法規的人）。因為跟據定義，道德改革者主張社會的法規在道德上之不足，所以要改變。如果[文化]相對主義是真的，就是一個行為必須在社會法規內方能是對的，所以改革者跟據定義就是不道德的，因為他採用了社會法規外的價值觀，並嘗試用這些價值觀去改變原有的社會法規。如果一個人要將歷史上每一個道德改革者（包括摩西、耶穌、甘地、馬丁路德金）都抨斷為不道德的話，這是極可笑的。一個這樣說話的道德觀點肯定是錯誤的。
Thus, in order to remain consistent, the cultural relativist must deny that real moral progress or real moral reformers exist, for such judgments presuppose the existence of objective and absolute moral norms.	因此，為了保持一致，文化相對主義者對真正的道德進步或真正的道德改革者，必須否認他們確實存在，因為這種現象的前提就是客觀的和絕對的道德規範真實存在。
The Argument from Tolerance	（二）容忍（寬容）的論據
Many people see relativism as necessary for promoting tolerance, non-judgmentalism, and inclusiveness. If you believe your moral position is correct and others’ incorrect, you are viewed as closed-minded and intolerant, even bigoted. They usually base this premise on the well-known differences of opinion on morality between cultures and individuals. The moral relativist embraces the view that one should not judge other cultures and individuals, for to do so would be intolerant. There are at least four problems with this argument, all of which maintain that tolerance (rightly understood) and relativism are actually incompatible with each other.	為要促進容忍的態度、包容的態度和反審判主義，許多人認為相對主義是必須的。如果你認為你自己的道德立場是正確的，而別人的立場不正確，你就被視為有封閉的思想和不容忍，甚至偏執。他們這看法是基於對文化和個人之間的道德差異這一前提。道德相對主義者擁護的看法，就是任何人不應該對其他文化和個人作判斷，否則就是不容忍。但這種說法有四個問題，全部都因為容忍（當被正確理解時）和相對主義實際上是互不相容的。
Tolerance supports objective morality, not relativism.	（1）容忍的原則支持客觀的道德，而非相對主義。
Ironically, the call to tolerance by relativists presupposes the existence of at least one nonrelative, universal, and objective norm: tolerance. Bioethicist Tom Beauchamp explains:	很諷刺的是，相對主義者要求人容忍，其前提就承認至少有一個非相對的、普遍的和客觀的規範存在：容忍。生物倫理學家博尚（Tom Beauchamp）解釋說：
If we interpret normative relativism as requiring tolerance of other views, the whole theory is imperiled by inconsistency. The proposition that we ought to tolerate the views of others, or that it is right not to interfere with others, is precluded by the very strictures of the theory. Such a proposition bears all the marks of a non-relative account of moral rightness, one based on, but not reducible to, the cross-cultural findings of anthropologists.... But if this moral principle [of tolerance] is recognized as valid, it can of course be employed as an instrument for criticizing such cultural practices as the denial of human rights to minorities and such beliefs as that of racial superiority. A moral commitment to tolerance of other practices and beliefs thus leads inexorably to the abandonment of normative relativism.	如果規範相對主義規定要容忍其他看法，則整個理論就有自相矛盾的危險。如果命題是：我們應該容忍別人的意見，或者是：不干涉他人是對的；則這狹窄的理論就使這命題不可能合理。這樣的命題在特徵上就是一個非相對的道德正確性，這正確性最少有部份基於人類學家對跨文化研究的結果。……如果這個道德原則（即容忍）被認為是正確的話，當然可以用它來批評文化習俗，如剝奪少數民族的人權和種族優越感等。但是，一種容忍其他做法及信仰的道德性許諾，無可避免地導致了規範相對主義的放棄。
If everyone ought to be tolerant, then tolerance is an objective moral norm. Therefore, moral relativism is false. Also, tolerance presupposes that there is something good about being tolerant, such as being able to learn from others with whom one disagrees or to impart knowledge and wisdom to others. But that presupposes objective moral values, namely, that knowledge and wisdom are good things.	[1] 如果每個人都應該容忍，那麼容忍是一個客觀的道德規範；因此，道德相對主義就是錯誤的。此外，容忍的前提是，容忍是有益的，例如可以藉此向他人學習，包括自己所不同意的人，也可以藉此傳授知識和智慧給別人。但是，這前提又是一個客觀道德價值，認為知識和智慧都是好的。
Moreover, tolerance presupposes that someone may be correct about his or her moral perspective. That is to say, it seems that part of the motivation for advocating tolerance is to encourage people to be open to the possibility that one may be able to gain truth and insight (including moral truth and insight) from another who may possess it. If that is the case, then objective moral truths exist that one can learn.	[2] 此外，容忍的前提是：有些人的道德觀點可能是正確的。意思就是，倡導容忍的動機之一，似乎是鼓勵人們接受一個可能性，就是一個人可以從另一個人賺取真理（包括道德真理）和洞察力。如果是的話，客觀的道德真理是存在的，也是人可以學習的。
Relativism is itself a closed-minded and intolerant position.	（2）相對主義本身是一種封閉的思想和不容忍的立場。
After all, the relativist dogmatically asserts that there is no moral truth. To illustrate this, consider a dialogue (based loosely on a real-life exchange) between a high school teacher and her student Elizabeth. The teacher instructs her class, “Welcome, students. This is the first day of class, and so I want to lay down some ground rules. First, since no one has the truth about morality, you should be open-minded to the opinions of your fellow students.”	相對主義者一向教條式地斷言：沒有任何道德真理。讓我們用一段對話說明這一點（這故事有部份基於現實生活），是一個高中老師和學生伊麗莎白的對話。老師在班上說：「學生們，歡迎你們第一天上課。首先，所以我要定下一些基本規則；因為沒有人擁有道德真理，你們應該持開放態度聆聽你的同學的意見。」
The teacher recognizes the raised hand of Elizabeth, who asks, “If nobody has the truth, isn’t that a good reason for me not to listen to my fellow students? After all, if nobody has the truth, why should I waste my time listening to other people and their opinions? What’s the point? Only if somebody has the truth does it make sense to be open-minded. Don’t you agree?”	伊麗莎白舉手發問：「如果任何人都沒有真理，我豈不是有很好的理由不聆聽我的同學嗎？畢竟，如果沒有人擁有真理，我為什麼要浪費我的時間去聽別人的意見呢？有什麼作用呢？只有當有些人擁有真理時，才有理由持開放態度。難道你不同意嗎？」
“No, I don’t. Are you claiming to know the truth? Isn’t that a bit arrogant and dogmatic?”	「不，我不同意。你是否認為自己知道真理呢？這是不是有點傲慢和獨斷呢？」
“Not at all. Rather I think it’s dogmatic as well as arrogant to assert that no single person on earth knows the truth. After all, have you met every person in the world and quizzed them exhaustively? If not, how can you make such a claim? Also, I believe it is actually the opposite of arrogance to say that I will alter my opinions to fit the truth whenever and wherever I find it. And if I happen to think that I have good reason to believe I do know the truth and would like to share it with you, why wouldn’t you listen to me? Why would you automatically discredit my opinion before it is even uttered? I thought we were supposed to listen to everyone’s opinion.”	「這並不是獨斷。相反地，我認為，斷言世界上沒有一個人知道真理才是獨斷和傲慢。畢竟，你是否見過世界上每一個人，徹底地詢問了他們嗎？如果沒有，你怎麼能做出這樣的斷言呢？此外，若我說，在任何時候和任何地點，我找到真理就會改變我的意見去迎合它，這態度絕不是傲慢。如果我有充分的理由相信我知道真理，並想與你分享，那麼你為什麼不聽我說話呢？為什麼你會在我還未講之前，就自動地不信我的意見呢？我們不是要聽取每個人的意見嗎？」
“This should prove to be an interesting semester.”	「看來這學期會很有趣。」
Another student blurts out, “Ain’t that the truth,” provoking the class to laughter.	另一名學生脫口而出說：「這不就是真理嗎？」這句話引來同學的笑聲。
Relativism is judgmental, exclusivist, and partisan.	（3）相對主義是審判性的、排外的和偏袒自我的。
This may seem an odd thing to say since the relativist asserts that his viewpoint is nonjudgmental, inclusivist, and neutral when it comes to moral beliefs. But consider the following.	這好像是奇怪的說法，因為相對主義者聲稱，自己對道德信念的觀點是非審判性、包容性和中立性的，但是，讓我們考慮到以下幾點。
First, the relativist says that if you believe in objective moral truth, you are wrong. Hence, relativism is judgmental. Second, it follows that relativism excludes your beliefs from the realm of legitimate options. Thus, relativism is exclusivist. And third, because relativism is exclusive, all nonrelativists are automatically not members of the “correct thinking” party. So relativism is partisan.	[1] 相對主義者說，如果你相信有客觀的道德真理，你就錯了。因此，相對主義是審判性的。[2] 相對主義要排除你的信仰，說它不是合法的選擇，因此相對主義是排外的。[3] 既然相對主義是排外的，所有反相對主義者就自動不屬於「正確思想」的一黨，因此相對主義是偏袒自我的。
Tolerance makes sense only within the framework of a moral order, for it is within such a framework that one can morally justify tolerating some things while not tolerating others. Tolerance without a moral framework, or absolute tolerance, leads to a dogmatic relativism, and thus to an intolerance of any viewpoint that does not embrace relativism.	容忍只能在一個道德秩序的架構中有意義；因為在這樣一個架構中，人們可以容忍在道德上有道理的事，而不容忍另一些事。缺乏道德架構的容忍（也即絕對的容忍）導致了教條式的相對主義，它不容忍任何不擁護相對主義的觀點。
The “tolerance” of moral relativism either condones barbarism or is self-refuting.	（4）「容忍」道德相對主義就等於縱容野蠻行動，或是帶來自我反駁。
As I pointed out above, some moral relativists embrace tolerance because they believe that such a posture is appropriate given the diversity of moral and cultural traditions in the world today. Humanist author Xiaorong Li points out the fallacy in this reasoning:	正如我在上文指出，一些道德相對主義者擁護容忍，他們相信在今日的世界中有多樣化的道德和文化傳統，所以容忍的態度是恰當的。但人本主義作家李曉蓉（Xiaorong Li）指出這個推理的謬誤：
But the existence of moral diversity does no more to justify that we ought to respect different moral values than the existence of disease, hunger, torture, slavery do to justify that we ought to value them. Empirical claims thus are not suitable as the basis for developing moral principles such as “Never judge other cultures” or “We ought to tolerate different values.” ...	但是，道德多樣性的存在並不能引致結論，說我們應該尊重不同的道德價值觀。就正如疾病、飢餓、酷刑、奴役的存在並不能引致結論，說我們要以這些事為有價值。因此，經驗性的要求不適合作為基礎，用之來發展道德原則，例如「永不要判斷其他文化」或「我們應該容忍不同的價值觀」等等。
What if the respected or tolerated culture disrespects and advocates violence against individuals who dissent? When a girl fights to escape female genital circumcision or foot-binding or arranged marriage, when a widow does not want to be burned to death to honor her dead husband, the relativist is obligated to “respect” the cultural or traditional customs from which the individuals are trying to escape. In so doing, the relativist is not merely disrespecting the individual but effectively endorsing the moral ground for torture, rape and murder. On moral issues, ethical relativists can not possibly remain neutral—they are committed either to the individual or to the dominant force within a culture.	如果一個被人尊重和容忍的文化卻不尊重有異議的個人，並運用暴力強制他們又怎樣？當一個女孩子盡力去逃避女性生殖器割禮或纏足或安排之婚姻的時候，當一個寡婦不願意被燒死來為已死的丈夫陪葬的時候，相對主義者竟然認為有義務「尊重」文化或傳統習俗，不幫助個人去逃避；這樣的行動代表相對主義者不僅不尊重個人，甚至等於贊同酷刑、強姦和謀殺為符合道德的立場。在道德問題上，倫理相對主義者不可能保持中立，他們需要選擇——支持個人，或是支持文化內的權威。
Relativists have made explicit one central value—equal respect and tolerance of other ways of life, which they insist to be absolute and universal. Ethical relativism is thus repudiated by itself.	相對主義者已經表明他們的核心價值，就是平等地尊重和寬容其他生活方式，他們也堅持這是絕對的和普遍的。因此，道德相對主義否定了自我。
God And Morality	（C）神與道德
Given the failure of moral relativism, it must be the case that objective and universal moral norms exist. But if they exist, what is their source? Where do they come from? I will argue that the God of theism best explains the existence of universal and objective moral norms. The case I will make here is certainly not irrefutable proof of God’s existence. It is more like a prosecutor’s legal argument for a defendant’s guilt based on circumstantial evidence. In other words, given the “fingerprints” one finds on moral norms when one reflects on their nature, they are best explained as the result of the hand and mind of the God of theism.	鑒於道德相對主義的失敗，客觀的和普遍的道德規範就必定存在。但是，如果它們存在，它們的來源是什麼？他們從哪裡來？我會辯証說，普遍的和客觀的道德規範的存在，最好的解釋就是有神論的神。我的論據肯定不是一個証明神的存在無可辯駁的証據；它就像一個檢察官的法律論証，利用間接的証據証明被告者的罪行；換句話說，就像一個人在道德規範上找到「指紋」後，經過對其本質反省後，發現最好的解釋就是有神論的神以手和思想所造成。
Although one may reject this conclusion (i.e., one may conclude that “reasonable doubt” exists), it is difficult to conceive of a better explanation for the evidence taken as a whole. In the words of philosopher Paul Copan, “Objective moral values are quite at home in a theistic universe. Given God’s existence, moral realism is natural. But given an atheistic universe ... , objective morality—along with its assumptions of human dignity, rights, and moral responsibility—is unnatural and surprising and ‘queer.’”	儘管有人會拒絕這一結論（也即認為說「合理的懷疑」仍然存在），但要根據整體的証據而找出一個更好的解釋，是很難想象的。哲學家歌潘（Paul Copan）說：「客觀的道德價值在一個有神論的宇宙中就是合理的。由於神的存在，道德現實主義是自然的；若是在一個無神論的宇宙中，……客觀道德以及其假設（就是人的尊嚴、尊重人權、道德責任等）就是不自然的、令人驚訝的和古怪的。」
The Nature of Morality	（一）道德的本質
Given the existence of moral norms, there are some observations we can make about them. First, they are known, for if they were not known, then we would have to be moral skeptics. The above critique of moral relativism, however, shows that moral skepticism is not an option.	既然道德規範存在，我們可以對它們有幾點觀察。[1] 道德規範是已知的，因為如果不是已知的，那麼我們必定對道德持懷疑態度。上述對道德相對主義的批判，顯示道德懷疑主義不合理。
Second, moral norms are not physical. They have no physical properties such as extension, weight, height, and they do not consist of chemicals, particles, or other parts that can be measured by scientific instruments. We do not discover them by using our sense organs; rather, we encounter them through introspection and reflection. Thus, if moral rules exist and they are not physical, then materialism as a worldview is false.	[2] 道德規範不是物質性的。它們沒有物質的特徵，如長度、重量、高度等；它們也不是由化學元素或微粒組成，所以不可以用科學儀器測量。我們沒有用我們的感官發現它們，我們遇到它們是透過內省和反思。因此，道德準則存在，而且它們不是物質，所以唯物主義的世界觀是假的。
Third, moral norms are a form of communication, an activity in which one mind through statements conveys meaning to another mind. Moral norms are found in imperatives (e.g., “One ought to keep one’s promises”), commands (e.g., “Keep your promises”), and descriptions (e.g., “Keeping promises is good”).	[3] 道德規範是一種通訊的方式，它們是一種活動，是一個思想者通過一些聲明將意義傳達到另一個思想者。道德規範是一些指示（例如，「一個人應該持守自己的諾言」）、命令（例如，「要持守自己的諾言」）和描述（例如，「持守諾言是好的」）。
Fourth, there is an incumbency to moral norms. As Gregory Koukl puts it, moral norms “have a force we can actually feel prior to any behavior. This is called the incumbency, the ‘oughtness’ of morality.... It appeals to our will, compelling us to act in a certain way, though we may disregard its force and choose not to obey.?”	[4] 道德規範是有責任性的。正如古高（Gregory Koukl）所說，道德規範「有一種力量，是我們行動之前可以實際感受到的，這被稱為責任性，就是道德的『應然性』。……它向我們的意志呼籲，迫使我們採取某種行動，不過我們也可以漠視它的力量而選擇不服從。」
Fifth, when we break a significant and clear moral rule, it is usually accompanied by feelings of painful guilt and sometimes shame, for we are cognizant of our moral failure and realize we deserve to be punished. Only sociopaths succeed in overcoming their conscience completely.	[5] 當我們違反一項重大而明確的道德準則，通常會帶來痛苦的內疚感，有時會有羞恥感，因為我們認識到我們的道德失敗，明白我們應該受到懲罰。只有極端反社會者才能完全埋沒自己的良心。
The Source of Morality	（二）道德的來源
Moral norms, therefore, are known nonmaterial realities that are a form of communication for which we have a sense of incumbency and about which we feel painful guilt when we violate them. I believe there are only three possible sources of these moral norms: (1) They are an illusion; (2) they exist but are accidents, a product of chance; or (3) they are the product of an intelligence.	道德規範是一種可知的卻是非物質的現實，它們是一種通訊的方式，我們對它們有一種義不容辭的責任感；當我們違反它們時，就會感到內疚。我相信道德規範只有三種可能的來源：[1] 它們是幻覺；[2] 它們的存在是一個意外，是機遇性的產物；[3] 它們是一個智慧者所造成的。
Morality is an illusion.	（1）道德是一個幻覺。
This, of course, is the position of the relativist. As we have seen in this chapter, however, this position fails. Morality, therefore, is real; it is not an illusion.	這當然是相對主義的立場。然而，正如在本章中看到，這理論是失敗的。因此，道德是真實的，不是一個幻覺。
Moral norms are accidents, products of chance.	（2）道德規範是意外，是機遇性的產物。
If moral norms are products of chance, then they are the result of unguided evolution. But this does not seem adequate, for if moral norms have no mind behind them, then there is no justification to obey them.	如果道德規範是機遇性的產物，它們就是非導引進化過程的結果。但這解釋似乎並不充分，因為如果道德規範的背後沒有一個思想者，就沒有理由去服從它們。
Consider this illustration: If while playing Scrabble the letters randomly spell, “Go to Baltimore,” should I obey the command, buy a plane ticket, make hotel reservations, and/or take up temporary residence in Baltimore? Of course not, for “the command” is a chance-created phrase and is thus really no command at all. As Koukl points out, “Commands are communications between two minds. Chance might conceivably create the appearance of a moral rule, but there can be no command if no one is speaking.” A command created by accident “can be safely ignored.”	試考慮這個例子：如果在玩拼字遊戲中偶然拼出「到巴爾狄摩城」，則我是否要聽從命令，買機票，預訂旅館，並短時間居住在巴爾狄摩城呢？當然不會，因為這「命令」只不過是一個機遇，其實不是命令。正如古高指出，「命令是兩個思想者的通訊，機遇性有可能創造出一個道德準則的外貌，但如果沒有人說話，它不是一個命令。」機遇創造出來的命令「可以安全地被漠視。」
Suppose, however, that an evolutionist replies that morality exists because it is necessary for survival. According to this view, moral rules against adultery, murder, stealing, and so on are the result of the forces of natural selection “choosing” those genes that perpetuate traits that are more conducive to the preservation of the human species. In the words of Robert Wright:	假設一個進化論者的答覆是，道德的存在是因為它是生存所必要的。根據這觀點，通姦、謀殺，偷盜等反道德準則就是自然選擇的過程，「選擇」了那些擁有某些特徵的遺傳基因，以利於人類物種的保存。賴特（Robert Wright）解釋說：
If within a species there is variation among individuals in their hereditary traits, and some traits are more conducive to survival and reproduction than others, then those traits will (obviously) become more widespread within the population. The result (obviously) is that the species’ aggregate pool of hereditary traits changes.	如果在一個物種中間，個體的遺傳特徵有差異，有些特徵比其他特徵更有利於生存和繁殖，則這些特徵[明顯地]會在整體中更廣泛，結果[明顯地] 就改變物種的遺傳性特徵的總池。
Behavioral patterns that help sustain these species-preserving traits are part of what we call “morality.” There are several problems with this viewpoint.	於是，能幫助維持物種保存的行為型式就被稱為「道德」。但這個觀點有幾個問題。
First, since helping the weak, the genetically marred, and the needy are not evolutionarily helpful (i.e., they do not advance the “survival of the fittest”), why is it that we have a sense of duty and incumbency to help those less fortunate than ourselves? Suppose the evolutionist answers that we would not have this sense of duty and incumbency unless it were helpful to human evolution. That is, it must be helpful even if we do not know exactly how.	[1] 我們扶助軟弱者、殘廢者和貧困者的行動，其實對進化過程沒有幫助（因為他們不會協助「適者生存」），那麼為什麼我們有責任感和意識去幫助那些比自己不幸的人呢？假設進化論者回應說，除非這行動有利於人類的進化，否則我們不會有這樣的責任感和意識；這就等於說，即使我們不清楚知道如何，但一定是有幫助的。
There are at least two problems with this answer. (1) The question we are asking is whether evolution can explain all our moral senses. It is circular reasoning to presuppose that whatever moral senses we have must be the result of evolution. (2) Because it is clear that not every human being has a moral sense that he or she has a duty and incumbency to help those less fortunate, on what grounds could the evolutionist say that these human beings are mistaken in their moral viewpoint? After all, people who lack this moral sense have existed all over the globe for generations, and if they too are the products of evolution, perhaps having such people in our population is necessary for the preservation of the species. If that is the case, then “moral sense” is personally relative and is not universally binding. But this is pure relativism, and as we have seen, it fails as a moral theory.	這個答案至少有兩個困難。[a] 我們的問題是：進化過程是否可以完全解釋我們的道德意識？若猜想說，道德意識必定是進化的結果，這是循環論證。[b] 很顯然，不是每個人都有同一個道德觀念，有些人沒有責任感和意識去幫助那些較不幸的人，那麼進化論者根據什麼理由說，這些人的道德觀弄錯了呢？畢竟，缺乏這種道德意識的人已生存在地球很多代了，既然他們也是進化過程的產品，也許有這樣的人在人類中間是物種保護所必須的。如果是的話，那麼「道德意識」就是相對於個人的，而沒有普遍約束力。但是，正如上面看到，這種純粹的相對主義是一個失敗的道德理論。
On the other hand, suppose the evolutionist bites the bullet and maintains that those who lack the moral sense to see that they have an obligation to those weaker than themselves are morally wrong regardless of what moral sense they may feel. Then there is a morality above evolution by which we can make moral judgments about the moral senses of different segments of our population that resulted from unguided evolution. Thus, evolution lacks explanatory power in accounting for morality.	另一方面，假若進化論者堅持說，那些缺乏道德意識而看不到他們有義務去幫助比自己軟弱的人，是道德上錯誤，有錯誤的道德意識。這樣就是說，在進化過程之上有一個更高的道德觀，可以用來判斷整體不同部分的道德意識，雖然所有道德意識都同樣從非導引進化過程而來。若如此，進化過程實際上缺乏解釋力去解釋道德。
Second, evolution is concerned only with the sorts of behavior that are conducive to the preservation of the species. But morality is more than just behavior, for it includes, among other things, motive and intent. In fact, a moral judgment is incomplete without taking these into consideration, for one can be immoral without any behavior, simply on the basis of motive and intent. For example, I can intend to carry out a murder and by my sloth or incompetence fail to do so. My bad intentions alone are clearly immoral. One can also be immoral simply on the basis of motive and intent even if the behavior has “good” results. For example, if I intend to trip someone in order to harm them, but it results in the person not being hit by a car and thus saving his or her life, the results are good even though what I did was clearly immoral.	[2] 進化過程只關心有利於保存物種的行為，但道德比行為更廣闊，它還包括動機和意圖等等。事實上，若不考慮到這些，道德判斷就不完整，因為一個人沒有任何行為也可以是不道德的，單單有動機和意圖已可能是不道德。例如，我可能打算謀殺人，但因為我的懶惰或無能而不成功；可是，單單我不良的意圖已顯然是不道德的。再者，即使一個行為有「良好」的結果，單單因為動機和意圖已經是不道德的。例如，若我打算用絆跌去傷害一個人，但因他跌倒而沒有被汽車撞倒，結果是救了他的性命；雖然結果是好的，但我的行為卻明顯地是不道德的。
“Bad” results may be part of a morally good act simply on the basis of motive and intent. For example, if a surgeon operates on a terminal patient with the intent to remove a cancer, but during the operation the patient dies of cardiac arrest, the surgeon has not acted immorally. Since evolution, at best, can only describe what behaviors are conducive to the preservation of the species and does not address the role of motive and intent in evaluating those behaviors, evolution is an inadequate explanation for the existence of moral norms.	相反地，一個基於良好道德的行為（單單基於動機和意圖）可能帶來「壞」的結果。例如，若一個外科醫生為一個將死的病人施手術，意圖將癌細胞割除，但在手術中，病人因心臟驟停而死亡，則該外科醫生沒有不道德的行為。由於進化過程充其量只可以描述有利於保存物種的行為，它不能處理動機和意圖對行為的評價，所以進化過程不能完滿地解釋道德規範的存在。
Third, the evolutionary explanation of morality is merely descriptive. That is to say, it merely tells us what behaviors in the past may have been conducive to the survival of the species and why I may have on occasion moral feelings to act consistently with those behaviors. But evolution cannot tell me whether I ought to act on those feelings in the present and in the future. Granted, I am grateful that people in the past behaved in ways that made my existence possible.	[3] 以進化過程解釋道德只是描述性的；意思是，它只告訴我們，過去的行為可能有利於物種的保存，同時解釋我為什麼間中會有道德感情，去採取行動與這些行為保持一致。但是進化過程不能告訴我，我應否隨著這些感情在現在和未來去行動。當然，我很感謝過去的人有行動，使我可以存在。
But why should I emulate only those behaviors that many people today say are “good”? After all, some people in the past raped, stole, and murdered. And I know of many people today who have feelings to rape, steal, and murder. Perhaps these behaviors are just as important for my existence and the preservation of the species as the “good” behaviors. Unless there is a morality above the morality of evolution, it is difficult to see how one can distinguish between morally good and bad actions if both types may have been conducive to the preservation of the species.	可是，我為什麼因為很多人說是「好」的就去模仿這些行為呢？畢竟，在過去有一些人犯強姦、偷竊和謀殺，而且我知道今天仍有很多人想去強姦、偷竊和謀殺；也許這些行為也是重要的，而且會被形容為「好」的，因為它們可能引致人類的保存和我的存在。除非在進化的道德以上有一個更高的道德，否則就有困難；假如好和壞兩類行為都有利於人類的保存，就很難看到如何區別行為在道德上是好或是壞。
Moral rules are the product of intelligence.	（3）道德準則是智慧者的產物。
Since moral norms are neither illusory nor the product of chance, only one option remains: They have their source in an intelligent being. As C. S. Lewis explained in Mere Christianity, the existence of moral law implies a moral lawgiver. But what sort of intelligence is this being, this lawgiver?	由於道德規範既不是虛幻的，也不是偶然的產物，餘下的只有一種可能性：它們的來源是一位智慧主體。魯益師（C. S. Lewis）在《如此基督教》中解釋說，道德律的存在指向一位道德的立法者。但這立法者又擁有什麼樣的智慧呢？
It must be the sort of being who could be the ground of morality. It could not be a contingent intelligence, one whose existence and moral authority is dependent upon something else outside itself, for in order to be the ground of morality, a being must not receive its existence and moral authority from another, for that other being, if it is not contingent, would then be the ground of morality. Moreover, the source of morality must be the sort of being who has the moral authority to enforce universal moral norms. Therefore, the source of morality must be a self-existent, perfectly good being whose realm of authority is the entire universe. It seems fitting to call such a being “God.”	它必須是道德的發源者，它不可能是一個偶然的智慧主體，它的存在和道德權威不可能依賴本身以外的東西；要成為道德的發源者，它的存在和道德權威不可能來自其他主體；若它是偶然性的，則它的來源才是道德的發源者。再者，這道德的發源者必須擁有道德權威去強制推行普遍的道德規範。因此，這道德的發源者必須是一個自存的、完全良善的主體，而它權力的境界就是整個宇宙。這個主體當然切合地被稱為「神」。
Conclusion	（D）結論
Moral relativism is a philosophical failure. The two main arguments for moral relativism—the argument from disagreement and the argument from tolerance—are seriously flawed in numerous ways. Given the failure of moral relativism, we must conclude that objective moral norms do exist. Since they exist, morality cannot be an illusion, and if it is not an illusion, it is either a product of unguided evolution (i.e., chance) or a self-existent mind. We have seen that the second option clearly makes more sense. Thus, the objective moral norms that exist are best explained by a being we call God.	道德相對主義是一種哲學上的失敗。道德相對主義的兩個支持論據——差異的論據和容忍的論據——都在多方面存在嚴重的缺陷。鑒於道德相對主義的失敗，我們必然會下的結論：客觀的道德規範是存在的。由於他們存在，道德不可能是一種幻想；如果它不是一種幻想，它就是一種非導引進化過程（即機會）的產物，或者是自我存在思想主體的產物。我們已經看到，第二個解釋顯然比較合理；因此，對客觀道德規範的存在最好的解釋就是神。

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SOURCE: Francis J. Beckwith (2001): “Why I am not a moral relativist,” in Why I am a Christian: leading thinkers explain why they believe, ed. Norman L. Geisler and Paul K. Hoffman (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker), 15-29 (chapter 1).

Moral Relativism And Moral Discourse. 4

（A）道德相對主義和道德論述... 4

Arguments For Moral Relativism.. 8

（B）支持道德相對主義的論據... 8

The Argument from Cultural and Individual Differences. 8

（一）文化和個人差異的論據... 8

（1）差異並不帶來相對主義。... 9

（2）差異實際上反駁相對主義。... 10

（3）差異被高估了。... 11

（4）道德相對主義引致荒謬的後果。... 15

The Argument from Tolerance. 19

（二）容忍（寬容）的論據... 19