Ground Rules to Establish

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Ground Rules to Establish
a Foundation for Moral Debate

建立道德辯論基礎的重要規則

高魯辛多夫著（Scott Klusendorf），孔祥烱譯

Part 1: Can You Name My Claim?	（A）你能說出我的主張嗎？
When pro-life advocates claim that elective abortion unjustly takes the life of a defenseless human being, they are not saying they dislike abortion. They are saying it’s objectively wrong, regardless of how one feels about it.	當「維護生命」的倡導者主張：選擇性墮胎不公正地奪取一個無抵抗力的人的生命時，他們不是說他們不喜歡墮胎；他們是說，無論一個人對墮胎有何感覺，它是客觀的錯誤。
Let’s revisit the conversation between Emily and Pam in Chapter 1. Emily argued that elective abortion was wrong and could never be justified to solve a difficult life problem. Her friend Pam replied that she, too, disliked abortion and was personally opposed to it. Nevertheless, Pam insisted that each woman must decide for herself. “If you and I don’t like abortion, we don’t need to have one,” she told Emily. “But we shouldn’t force our views on others who might feel differently.”	讓我們重溫在第一章中兩個人的對話。愛美莉認為，選擇性墮胎是錯誤的，用它來解決生活困難的問題是絕不合理的。她的朋友帕姆回答說，她也不喜歡墮胎，也反對它。然而，帕姆堅持認為每個女人必須決定自己的事；她告訴愛美莉：「如果你和我不喜歡墮胎，我們不需要去墮胎。但我們不應該強迫別人隨從我們的意見，他們的意見可能不一樣。」
In case you didn’t notice, Pam subtly changed the entire nature of the exchange with a single word—like.	如果你沒有注意到，帕姆巧妙地用「喜歡」一個詞改變了整個對話的性質。
Claims About Ice Cream Versus Claims About Truth	（一）關於雪糕的主張對比關於真理的主張
There are two kinds of truth relevant to our present discussion. Objective truths are true propositions that correspond to reality. They are true whether I recognize them as such or not. These objective truths transcend human subjects. That is, I don’t create them through language or perception. I discover them through the proper use of my mental faculties. For instance, the statement “The Dodgers won the World Series in 1988” is objectively true. Notice that my accepting it as true did not make it true. It was true already, and my job was to get in line with reality.	我們現在討論的與兩種真理有關。客觀真理是真實的命題，就是它們與現實相對應。不管我承認與否，它們仍是真實的。這些客觀真理超越了人類；也就是說，我沒有通過語言或官感而創造它們；我只是透過使用思想發現它們。例如，「洛杉磯棒球隊贏得1988年世界冠軍。」這語句是客觀事實。請注意，我接受它為真實的並沒有使它成為真實；它已經是真實的，我要作的只是迎合現實。
Conversely, subjective truths are personal in nature, preferences if you will. They apply to the individual subject but may not apply to anyone else. Suppose I said, “Chocolate ice cream is better than vanilla.” You might well reply (rightly), “Ha! That’s true for you and your tastes, but I like vanilla better.” In this case, I’m really telling you what I prefer or feel, not what’s right or wrong, true or false. The problem is, many people today confuse claims about ice cream with claims about truth. When it comes to morality, they simply don’t know (or choose to ignore) the difference between subjective and objective truth claims.	相反地，主觀真理是關乎個人的，或稱為喜好。它們應用於一個主體，但可能不適用於任何其他人。假如我說：「巧克力雪糕比香草雪糕好。」你可能會答：「哈！這是你和你的口味，但我更喜歡香草雪糕。」在這情況下，我告訴你的是我所偏愛的或感覺的，但卻和對或錯、真或假無關。問題是，今天很多人將關於雪糕的主張混淆了關於真理的主張；當涉及道德問題時，他們根本不知道（或選擇忽略）主觀真理和客觀真理之間的區別。
Consider the popular bumper sticker, “Don’t like abortion? Don’t have one!” Notice what’s going on here. The pro-life advocate makes a moral claim that he believes is objectively true—namely, that elective abortion unjustly takes the life of a defenseless human being. The abortion-choice advocate responds by changing that objective truth claim into a preference he likes better, as if the pro-lifer were talking about what she likes rather than what’s true. But this misses the point entirely. Pro-life advocates don’t oppose abortion because they find it distasteful; they oppose it because it violates rational moral principles. The negative emotional response follows from the moral wrongness of the act.	讓我們考慮一個流行的標語：「不喜歡墮胎嗎？那麼你可以不去墮胎！」讓我們分析。「維護生命」的倡導者提出一個他認為是客觀真理的道德主張，就是選擇性墮胎不公正地奪取一個無抵抗力的人的生命。「維護選擇和墮胎」的倡導者的反應卻將一個客觀真理主張，改變成一個關乎喜好的主張，似乎說「維護生命」者只談及他的喜好而不是談及真理。但這是完全忽略了事實。「維護生命」者反對墮胎並不因為它是噁心的事；他們反對是因為墮胎違反了理性的道德原則。負面情緒反應只源於墮胎是道德錯誤的行動。
Francis J. Beckwith writes:	碧維夫（Francis J. Beckwith）說：
Imagine if I said, “Don’t like slavery, then don’t own one.” If I said that, you would immediately realize that I did not truly grasp why people believe that slavery is wrong. It is not wrong because I don’t like it. It’s wrong because slaves are intrinsically valuable human beings who are not by nature property. Whether I like slavery or not is not relevant to the question of whether slavery is wrong. Imagine another example, “Don’t like spousal abuse, then don’t beat your spouse.” Again, the wrongness of spousal abuse does not depend on my preferences or tastes. In fact, if someone liked spousal abuse, we would say that that he or she is evil or sick. We would not adjust our view of the matter and I [sic] say, “I guess spousal abuse is right for you, but not for me.”	試想像，如果我說：「不喜歡奴隸制嗎？那麼你可以不擁有奴隸。」如果我這樣說，你會立刻意識到，我並沒有真正領會為什麼人們認為奴隸制是錯誤的。它是錯的，並不因為我不喜歡它；它的錯誤是因為奴隸也是擁有內在價值的人，所以理應不是隸屬品。我喜歡奴隸制與否跟奴隸制是否錯誤是不相關的。試想像另一個例子，如果我說：「不喜歡虐待配偶嗎？那麼你可以不打你的配偶。」同樣，虐待配偶的錯誤並不不取決於我的喜好和口味。事實上，如果有人喜歡虐待配偶，我們會形容他或她為邪惡的或病態的；我們不會調整我們的觀點而說：「或許虐待配偶是適合你的，但不適合我。」
In short, when the abortion-choice advocate tells the pro-life advocate, “Don’t like abortion; don’t have one,” he fails to grasp what the latter is truly claiming. The pro-lifer isn’t stating his preferences; he’s stating what’s right and wrong regardless of his likes and dislikes. Most people find rape and murder personally offensive, but it doesn’t follow that there are no moral reasons for making them illegal. Of course, it’s possible that the pro-life advocate is wrong about the humanity of the unborn and the inhumanity of abortion (the pro-life advocate must still argue his case), but no one should mistake the type of claim he is making.	簡言之，當「維護選擇和墮胎」者對「維護生命」者說：「不喜歡墮胎嗎？那麼你可以不去墮胎！」他沒有明白後者的真正主張。「維護生命」者不是講及他的喜好，他是講及行動的正確和錯誤，並非他喜好與否。大多數人認為強姦和謀殺是令人噁心的，但使它們成為非法的是基於道德的原因，並非喜好的原因。當然，「維護生命」者仍然需要辯明為何胎兒是人類，而墮胎是不人道的，但任何人都不應錯誤地忽略他的主張屬於哪一類。。
“Dictatorship Of Relativism”	（二）「相對主義獨裁」
When Pam changed Emily’s moral claim into a preference (likes and dislikes), she unwittingly espoused ethical relativism, the belief that right and wrong are up to us to decide. Pope Benedict XVI (formerly Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger) writes that relativism is so pervasive in Western culture that dissent is hardly tolerated:	當帕姆將愛美莉的道德主張改變成一個喜好（就是喜歡和不喜歡），她不自覺地擁護了道德相對主義，這信念就是正確和錯誤由我們來決定。教宗本篤十六世（Benedict XVI，前紅衣主教拉辛格Ratzinger）認為相對主義已滲透了西方文化，絕不容忍反對者，他寫道：
Having a clear faith, based on the Creed of the Church, is often labeled today as a fundamentalism. Whereas, relativism, which is letting oneself be tossed and “swept along by every wind of teaching” looks like the only attitude (acceptable) to today’s standards. We are moving towards a dictatorship of relativism which does not recognize anything as for certain and which has as its highest goal one’s own ego and one’s own desires.	若你有一個基於教會信條的清晰信仰，你往往在今天被加上基要主義的標籤。反之，相對主義雖然是讓自己「被一切異教之風搖動，飄來飄去」卻被看作為在現今的標準下唯一可接受的態度。我們正走向相對主義的獨裁，就是不承認任何事物是可靠的，也以自己的自我和自己的慾望為最高的目標。
I deal more fully with relativism in a later chapter, but here’s my quick take on where this kind of thinking comes from and how to respond.	我在後面將更充分地處理相對主義，但這裏是我的對這種思想的來源，和如何應對作簡要的分析。
Ethical relativism comes in two primary forms. Cultural relativism states that right and wrong are determined by one’s own culture. That is to say, because cultures disagree on important moral issues, objective moral truths either do not exist or if they do exist we cannot know them. At best, our sense of morality is socially constructed. Hence, each culture must determine its own moral codes and refrain from judging other societies that might hold to different moral standards. Individual relativism asserts that right and wrong begin with each human being. What’s wrong for one person may be fine for another. Morality is reduced to personal preferences and tastes, meaning we shouldn’t push our morality on others or pass judgment on individual choices.	倫理相對主義有兩種主要形式。文化相對主義認為：正確和錯誤都是由自己的文化所決定。這就是說，因為不同的文化對重要的道德問題有不同的觀點，所以客觀的道德真理不存在，也可能是確實存在而為人所認識。充其量，我們的道德感覺是由社會所建立。因此，每一個文化必須確定自己的道德準則，並避免判斷其他持有不同道德標準的社會。個人相對主義認為正確和錯誤源於每一個人。一個人認為是錯的事，對另一個人可能無問題。道德被貶低為個人的喜好和口味，意思是，我們不應將自己的道德強加給別人，也不應對個人選擇作判斷。
Neither form of relativism is persuasive. First, cultures may not differ as much as we think. Sometimes the differences are factual, not moral. For example, I once heard a talk show host say that humans have intrinsic value, yet early abortion is morally permissible. He said that because he thinks the unborn is not a human entity until later in pregnancy. He’s factually mistaken on this point (see Chapter 2), but he holds to the same moral principle the pro-lifer does—namely, that humans have intrinsic value in virtue of the kind of thing they are, not some function they perform. This is not a moral difference; it’s a factual one.	兩種相對主義都沒有說服力。因為： [1] 文化差異可能不如我們想像的那麼大。有些是事實的差異，而不是道德的差異。例如，有一次我聽到一個節目主持人說，人類具有內在的價值觀，但初懷孕期墮胎在道德上是允許的。他這樣說，是因為他認為初期胎兒不是一個人，直到懷孕後期才是。在這一點上，他的事實是錯誤的，但他持有與維護生命者相同的道德原則，那就是一個人因為是人類就有內在價值，並非因為他們執行一些功能。這不是一個道德上的差異，而是事實上的差異。
Second, even if cultures do in fact differ, it does not follow that nobody is correct. As Hadley Arkes points out, the absence of consensus does not mean an absence of truth. “It is not uncommon for mathematicians to disagree over proofs and conclusions,” he writes, “yet nothing in their disagreement seems to inspire anyone to challenge the foundations of mathematics or to call into question the possibility of knowing mathematical truths.” The relativist is guilty of the is/ought fallacy: While people and cultures may in fact differ, we shouldn’t assume there are no right answers. People once disagreed on slavery and equal rights for women, but that didn’t mean moral truth was out of reach.	[2] 即使文化真的不同，這並不表示沒有人正確。哈根（Hadley Arkes）指出，缺乏共識並不表示沒有真理。他說：「數學家對證明和結論往往有不同意；然而，他們的分歧並沒有激發任何人挑戰數學的基礎，或質疑對數學真理的認識。」相對主義者犯了「是與應」之謬誤（is/ought fallacy）：雖然人們和文化事實上可能不同，我們不能假設沒有正確的答案。人們曾經對奴隸制和婦女平等有不同意見，但這並不表示不可達致道德真理。
Third, if morals are relative to culture or the individual, there is no ethical difference between Adolf Hitler and Mother Teresa; they just had different preferences. The latter liked to help people, while the former liked to kill them. Who are we to judge? But such a view is counterintuitive.	[3] 如果道德相對於文化或個人，那麼希特拉和特麗莎修女就沒有道德的區別；他們只不過有不同的偏好：後者喜歡幫助別人，而前者喜歡殺死他們而已。我們能判斷他們嗎？但這看法是違反直覺的。
Fourth, relativism, in any form, cannot say why I ought to be tolerant of other cultures. Suppose my culture decides not to tolerate minorities. Now what? Moreover, if right and wrong are relative to one’s particular society, moral reformers like Martin Luther King and Gandhi are by definition evil. After all, they challenged their own society’s moral codes.	[4] 任何形式的相對主義都不能解釋我為什麼應該容忍其他的文化。假設我的文化決定不容忍少數民族又如何？再者，如果對與錯是相對於一個人所在的社會，道德改革者如馬丁路德和甘地就在定義上成為邪惡，因為他們挑戰自己社會的道德法規。
Finally, relativism can be judgmental. For example, if the relativist thinks it’s wrong to judge, how can he say that pro-lifers are mistaken in the first place? Isn’t he judging the pro-lifer?	[5] 最後，相對主義可以是審判性的。例如，如果相對主義者認為判斷是錯誤的，那麼他怎能說維護生命者是錯的呢？他不是審判維護生命者嗎？
Do Morals Count As True Knowledge?	（三）道德可以算為真知識嗎？
Pro-life arguments are sometimes dismissed a priori because of their alleged ties to the metaphysics of religion, and more specifically, Christian theism. Throughout the media and academia, the reigning secular orthodoxy dictates that we allow for objective truth in science but never in religion or ethics. If we can’t measure something empirically through the five senses (so the argument goes), it’s simply a matter of personal taste. Science, and science alone, counts as real knowledge. Everything else—philosophy, metaphysics, morals, and religion, to name a few—cannot be measured empirically. Therefore, they’re nothing more than subjective opinions.	有時，維護生命者的論點未經驗証就被拒絕，因為他們被指控與宗教形而上學連結，也就是說，與基督教有神論連結。在傳媒和學術界中，世俗主義掛帥，只容許科學成為客觀真理，卻不接受宗教或倫理學。論點是，如果我們不能透過五官以經驗去量度的，就只被當為是個人的口味。其他一切，包括哲學、形而上學、道德和宗教等等，都不能以經驗去量度。因此，他們全都是主觀的意見。
Despite the self-refuting nature of the claim (i.e., the assertion that science is the only truth is itself a metaphysical claim, not a scientific one), examples of this secular orthodoxy abound.	儘管這論點有自我反駁性（因為斷言科學是唯一的真理，這本身就是一種形而上學式的主張，而不是科學的主張），這種以世俗主義為正統思想的例子極多。
How Did We Get Here? The Shift From Moral Realism To Moral Non-Realism	（四）我們怎麼會變成這樣？從道德實在主義轉變至道德非實在主義
Western culture has undergone a dramatic shift from moral realism (the conviction that objective morals exist even if I don’t recognize or acknowledge them) to moral non-realism (the belief that morals are merely subjective opinions). The following sketch of moral knowledge from the ancients until now, though by no means complete, highlights this shift.	西方文化已經發生了戲劇性的轉變，從道德實在主義（確信客觀道德的存在，即使我不認識或不承認它們）變成道德非實在主義（相信道德僅僅是主觀意見）。以下記述道德知識自古至今的歷史，雖然並非全面性，卻強調這一轉變。
We begin our history with the moral realism of the Old Testament, where moral truth is both real (objective) and knowable. From Moses forward, biblical texts point to objective moral truths that exist independent of my thinking that they exist. That is, my believing them to be real does not make them real. Instead, moral truths are grounded in the character of God and are accessible to all his people. (See Deuteronomy 30:11—“For this commandment that I command you today is not too hard for you, neither is it far off.”) At times these objective moral standards take on a utilitarian application, as in Deuteronomy 30:19—“Choose life, that you and your offspring may live.” However, this utilitarian application does not cheapen the objective truth standards but instead shows their practical benefits.	我們歷史的起點是舊約的道德實在主義，道德真理是真實的（客觀的），也是可知的。從摩西開始，聖經的經文指出客觀道德真理是存在的，不倚賴我的思想。也就是說，我相信它們是真的並不能使它們成為真實的；相反，道德真理植根於神的性格，為祂所有民眾所理解。（見申命記30:11：「我今日所吩咐你的誡命，不是你難行的，也不是離你遠的。」）有時這些客觀的道德標準採取一種功利主義的應用，如申命記30:19：「你要揀選生命，使你和你的後裔都得存活。」然而，這種功利主義的應用並不降低客觀真理的標準，但卻顯示道德標準的實際利益。
Even secular thinkers like Plato and Aristotle recognized these objective moral truths. For Plato, universal morals are grounded in the world of ideas (forms) but are nonetheless real. For Aristotle, objective morals are rooted in the nature of man, namely, his immaterial soul or essence. Moreover, man can know what’s right and wrong through the rational faculties of the soul. Man’s duty, then, is to cultivate virtuous habits so that he acts and behaves in a manner consistent with (and proper for) his nature as a human being. Both man’s nature and the standards he is obliged to obey exist objectively.	即使是世俗思想家如柏拉圖和亞里士多德都承認客觀的道德真理。對於柏拉圖，普遍道德植根於理念的世界（形式的世界），但仍是真實的。對於亞里士多德，客觀道德植根於人的性格，即其非物質的靈魂或本質；人可以透過靈魂的理智本能，知道什麼是正確和錯誤。人的責任是培養品德的習慣，使他的行動和行為與他作為人的本性一致；他所必須服從的人的本性和標準都客觀地存在。
Moral realism continues with the New Testament writers but with one significant addition. Not only is moral truth real and knowable, it is also transforming. That is, while ethics are deontological in their foundation, they do not end with duty for duty’s sake. Rather, through the transforming power of the Holy Spirit, God’s objective truth radically changes the Christian disciple more and more into the image of his Master. However, even the nonbeliever can know certain objective moral truths and act upon them without the aid of special revelation. The moral law, rooted in God’s general revelation, is something all men know intuitively. True, that intuitive knowledge is not sufficient to save nonbelieving men from their sins, but it doesn’t follow from this that they can’t recognize right and wrong, even if they work overtime to suppress that recognition. (See Romans 1:18-32.)	道德實在主義繼續出現於新約的作者，但有一個重要補充。道德真理不但是真實的和可知的，也是改造性的。雖然倫理學的基礎是義務論，但並非以義務為終結。相反地，藉著聖靈改造人的力量，神的客觀真理徹底地改變了基督教信徒，變成越來越接近他主人的形象。然而，即使未信者也可以知道一些客觀道德真理，並隨之行動，不一定需要特殊啟示的幫助。道德律紮根在神的普遍啟示，是所有人都憑直覺可以知道的。當然，直覺知識不足以將未信者從罪中拯救出來，但這並不就說他們不能辨別是非，雖然很多時努力去抑制這種認識（見羅馬書1:18-32）。
During the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas combined Aristotle’s ethics with Christian theology, preserving the moral realism of the biblical writers. However, there’s a slight twist. While the biblical writers grounded objective morals in the character of God, Aquinas grounds it more or less in man’s unique nature as a rational being, a substance made in God’s image with both a body and a soul. Unlike the Protestant Reformers who come later, Aquinas is confident that human reason, unaided by special revelation, can know moral truth (an idea known as natural law).	在中世紀，阿奎那（Thomas Aquinas）結合亞里士多德的倫理學與基督教神學，保留聖經著作者的道德實在主義；然而有輕微的改變。聖經的著作者將客觀道德札根於神的性格，阿奎那則大置上札根於人作為理性者的獨特性，就是具有身體和靈魂的神的形象。跟後來的宗教改革者所不同的，阿奎那認為人的理性不需要特殊啟示也可以知道道德真理（就是自然律的理念）。
Then comes the decisive empirical (modern) shift of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For empiricists like Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and David Hume (1711-1776), all true knowledge is restricted to what we can observe through the five senses. Since morals are immaterial things that cannot be observed empirically (i.e., we cannot taste, smell, feel, hear, or see them), they are not items of true knowledge. Instead, they are passions and feelings, mere preferences if you will. Human nature is also diminished. Hobbes, for example, disputes that man possesses a unique immaterial nature (soul) that bears God’s image. Instead, human beings are just heaps of physical parts. Morals are reduced to self-interest, and only a dominant ruler (a Leviathan) can keep self-interested humans from tearing each other apart.	跟著的是十七和十八世紀中決定性邁向經驗（現代化）的轉移。經驗主義者霍布斯（Thomas Hobbes, 1588–1679）和休謨（David Hume, 1711–1776）認為所有真正的知識僅限於通過五種感官的觀察。由於道德不是實物，不能通過經驗去觀察（就是不能以味覺、嗅覺、感覺、聽覺或視覺去經驗它們），它們就不是真正的知識。因此，它們只是情感的感覺，不過是喜好；結果連人類的本性也壓縮了。例如，霍布斯否認人擁有神的形象的非物質本性（靈魂）。相反，人類只是物質部分的堆砌品。道德被貶低為自我利益，只有一個有權威的統治者（利維坦Leviathan，意即海中怪獸）才能防止單為自我利益的人類彼此傷害。［譯者註：霍布斯最著名的作品就是《利維坦》。］
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) attempts to rescue objective moral truth from empiricism, but his solution is problematic. For Kant, we cannot know things as they truly are (the noumena), but only as we perceive them through our senses (the phenomena). We are trapped behind our sense perceptions. However—and here Kant takes a bizarre leap—we must act as if an objective moral lawgiver exists (i.e., God) and trust our transcendent minds (or universal ego) to get at the truth. While morals themselves may not be objectively knowable, at least our transcendent minds are universally so. Problem is, does Kant really know this, or is he trapped behind his own sense perceptions?	康德（Immanuel Kant, 1724–1804）試圖從經驗主義中挽救客觀道德真理，但他的解決方案卻是有問題的。康德認為，我們無法知道的事情的真相（即本體），我們只能通過我們的官感（即現象）去領悟它們；我們被官感所限制。在這裏，康德卻有一個奇怪的飛躍，他認為我們必須假設有一位客觀的道德立法者（即神）而行動，並信任我們的超越性思想（或稱普遍的自我）可以獲得真理。雖然而道德本身可能無法客觀地知道，至少我們超越性思想可以認知。但問題是，康德真的認知這一點嗎？還是他自己被官感所絆住呢？
The influence of Hobbes, Hume, and Kant is still felt today. If morals are not real and knowable, who are you to push your views on me or anyone else? Morality is reduced to mere preference, like opting for chocolate ice cream over vanilla.	霍布斯、休謨和康德的影響至今仍存在：如果道德不是真實的和可知的，你怎可能將你的意見強加於我或其他人呢？結果道德被貶低成為僅僅是喜好，像選擇喜歡巧克力雪糕多於香草雪糕吧了。
For the most part, Christians in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did not respond to these empiricist attacks with anything like a vigorous intellectual counterpunch. At first, they simply surrendered. The father of Protestant liberalism, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), proposed a strict dichotomy between faith and what’s really true. The historical reliability of the Christian faith, along with its doctrines, could be set aside. What mattered was individual religious experience. Thus, even if the resurrection and other doctrines were disproved scientifically, faith could survive as feeling.	大多數基督徒在十八和十九世紀沒有回應這些經驗主義的攻擊，並沒有利用任何有力的理智性反擊。最初，他們只是投降了。基督教自由主義之父士來馬赫（Friedrich Schleiermacher, 1768–1834）提出了嚴格的二分法，將信仰與真實分隔。基督教信仰的歷史可靠性以及它的教義就可被摒棄。重要的是個人的宗教經驗。因此，即使復活和其他教義被科學否定，信念仍然可以藉感覺而存活。
Later those believers who resisted liberalism grew suspicious of intellectual ideas altogether, retreating first into revivalism—where emotional, simplistic preaching produced converts with no real grasp of Christian ideas—and then into fundamentalism, where evangelicals committed to biblical truth withdrew from the universities to form their own Bible colleges and seminaries. While evangelical fidelity to theological orthodoxy was truly commendable, the retreat from the marketplace of ideas further marginalized Christians.	後來，抵抗自由主義的信徒開始對理性的思想產生懷疑，首先撤退到復興主義，以情感和簡單的講道使人歸信，對基督教思想沒有真正的明白；然後撤退至基要主義，篤信聖經真理的福音派基督徒從大學退出而建立自己的聖經學院和神學院。雖然福音派對正統神學的忠誠是真正值得讚揚的，但從思想市場的撤退加深了基督徒的邊緣化。
Finally, we arrive at the postmodern turn of the twentieth century and its leading analytical philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). The preceding modern view (Kant) said that we are trapped behind our sense perceptions and therefore can’t get at the truth. For Wittgenstein, truth can’t be known because we are trapped behind language. Sure, we can talk about truth all day long, but there is no correspondence between what we say is real and what actually is real. We must therefore construct morals and religion through our various language communities, just as we do law.	最後，在二十世紀後現代的轉變，出現了主要分析哲學家維根斯坦（Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1889–1951）。以前的現代觀點（康德）說：我們被官感所限制，因此我們無法獲得真理。維根斯坦則認為我們無法知道真理，因為我們被語言所限制。我們當然可以整天談論真理，我們所說的真實，跟實際的真實沒有對應關係。因此，我們必須在不同的語言群體中建立道德和宗教，就像我們建立法律一樣。
Postmodern thinking had a near-catastrophic impact on religion and ethics. If there is no truth in religion, why should anyone take seriously a worldview that’s just a construct of the Christian language community (or any other community)? If the postmodern view is correct, it follows that the gospel can make no real truth claims whatsoever on a Muslim or Hindu who comes from a different faith (or language) community. Privately, gospel teaching may enhance the Christian’s personal life, but we should never think of it as genuine knowledge.	後現代思想對宗教和倫理學有一個近乎災難性的影響。如果宗教沒有真理，為什麼要慎重地對待一個基督教語言群體（或任何其他群體）所構建的世界觀？如果後現代的觀點是正確的，那麼福音就不能對任何一個回教徒或印度教徒宣稱任何真實的真理，因為他們來自不同的信仰（或語言）的群體。福音在私人層面上可能提高基督徒的個人生活，但我們不應該認為它是真實的知識。
Ironically, that hasn’t stopped Christian postmodernists from making sweeping (universal) knowledge claims of their own. According to Brad Kallenberg, we are indeed trapped behind language and can’t get out to the real world. Thus, language does not represent reality; it constitutes reality. The question is, how can Kallenberg know this given his claim that no one has privileged access to what is real? Is it true that we are trapped behind language, or is that just the view of his community? If it’s just the view of his particular language community, why should I accept it? Attempts to ground the truth of Christianity in postmodernism are bound to fail. Again, why should anyone take the Christian worldview seriously if it’s just a construct of our own language?	可諷刺的是，這並沒有阻止基督教的後現代主義者作出一貫（普遍）知識的聲稱。卡林堡（Brad Kallenberg）認為我們的確是被語言所限制，而無法脫身進到現實世界。因此，語言並不能代表現實，它構成了現實。問題是，卡林堡既然主張沒有人有特許的門路知道什麼是真實的，他怎能知道這是現實呢？我們真的是被語言所限制，抑或單是他的群體認為是這樣？如果它僅僅是他那特殊的語言群體的觀點，我為什麼要接受呢？嘗試將基督教的真理建基於後現代主義是注定要失敗的。再者，如果基督教世界觀只是自己語言的一個構建，為什麼任何人要慎重地對待它呢？
Meanwhile, the postmodern turn fractured the concept of moral truth in many ways. We’re now told that the Christian language community socially constructs Christian morality while Islamic and Jewish communities socially construct their respective moral rules (and so on and so on). What’s true according to one community’s article of faith may not be true for anyone else. Hence, one community should not impose its moral views on another.	同時，轉向後現代主義在許多方面折斷了道德真理的概念。我們現在被教導說，基督教的語言群體建立了基督教道德規則，而伊斯蘭教和猶太教群體也建立了他們各自的道德規則等等。一個群體根據信仰規條認為是真的，對其他人可能不是真的。因此，一個群體不應該將自己的道德觀強加於其他人。
Ask The Why Question	（五）詢問為什麼
Next time you hear “I personally oppose abortion, but think it should remain legal,” ask this simple question: Why do you personally oppose abortion? I mean, if elective abortion does not take the life of a defenseless human being without justification, why oppose it at all?	下次你聽到「我個人反對墮胎，但認為應維持它的合法性。」你可以問這簡單的問題：為什麼你個人反對墮胎？我的意思是，如果選擇性墮胎沒有不合理地奪取一個無抵抗力的人的生命，為什麼要反對它呢？
If your critic is still confused about the kind of claim you are making, consider applying his personally opposed logic to something you both agree is objectively wrong. Robert George, like me, condemns abortion-related violence. But to show how untenable the “personally opposed” logic is when applied to moral claims, he provides a satirical example:	如果批評你的人仍然不清楚你的主張，那麼可以考慮運用他個人也反對的邏輯，應用於一些你兩人都同意在客觀上是錯誤的事。喬治羅拔（Robert George）和我（作者）一樣，都譴責與墮胎有關的暴力行為。但是，為要說明將「個人反對」的邏輯應用到道德主張上是如何不合理，他提供了一個諷刺性的例子說：
I am personally opposed to killing abortionists. However, inasmuch as my personal opposition to this practice is rooted in a sectarian (Catholic) religious belief in the sanctity of human life, I am unwilling to impose it on others who may, as a matter of conscience, take a different view. Of course, I am entirely in favor of policies aimed at removing the root causes of violence against abortionists. Indeed, I would go so far as to support mandatory one-week waiting periods, and even nonjudgmental counseling, for people who are contemplating the choice of killing an abortionist. I believe in policies that reduce the urgent need some people feel to kill abortionists while, at the same time, respecting the rights of conscience of my fellow citizens who believe that the killing of abortionists is sometimes a tragic necessity—not a good, but a lesser evil. In short, I am moderately pro-choice.	我個人反對殺死墮胎者。不過，因為我個人反對這種做法，是植根於一個教派（天主教）的宗教信仰，認為人類生命是神聖的，所以我不願意將我的觀點強加給別人，因為別人可能基於良心而有其他觀點。當然，我完全贊成消除侵害墮胎者的暴力根源的政策。我甚至支持給正在考慮殺死一名墮胎者的人為期一週的等待期，再加上非審判性的輔導。我支持減少一些人迫切覺得需要殺死墮胎者的政策，但同時我也尊重我的同國人良知的權利，他們認為殺死墮胎者是悲劇性的卻有時是必要的，這是不好的，但卻是較小的罪惡。簡言之，我是溫和的維護選擇者。
Again, I condemn all abortion-related violence. But notice that in saying so, I’m not saying I merely dislike it. I’m telling you I think it’s wrong. That’s the difference between a moral claim and a mere claim of preference. That’s the most important distinction in the entire abortion debate.	我再重覆說，我譴責所有與墮胎有關的暴力行為。但是請注意，我這樣說，並非說我單單不喜歡它。我是告訴你，我認為這是錯誤的。這就是一個道德的主張和一個僅僅關乎喜好的主張的區別。這是整個墮胎的辯論中最重要的區別。
Part 2: Is Moral Neutrality Possible?	（B）道德中立是可能的嗎？
Moral neutrality is impossible. Both sides of the abortion controversy bring prior metaphysical commitments to the debate. Why, then, is it okay for liberals to legislate their metaphysical views on the status of the unborn but not okay for pro-lifers to legislate theirs?	道德中立是不可能的。墮胎爭議的雙方都將辯論前固有的形而上學承諾帶入辯論中。那麼，為什麼自由派以形而上學的看法去立法就准許，維護生命者同樣立法就不准許呢？
Metaphysics (literally, “beyond the physical”) is not about New Age thinking or Eastern herbal remedies for the common cold, though many people mistakenly think of the term that way. Though difficult to define precisely, metaphysics generally has to do with being (ontology), or if you will, the nature of reality. Metaphysics asks questions such as: What’s ultimately real, and is that reality one or many, material or immaterial? Do living things have specific natures that define the kinds of things they are? Do human beings have minds as well as bodies? And what makes those humans valuable in the first place? As we shall see, all sides in the abortion controversy bring metaphysical assumptions to the debate, though some pretend otherwise. Epistemology is about how we know things. Questions like, are my beliefs justified? and how do we know what’s real? are epistemological in nature. Both of these philosophical disciplines play key roles in determining what’s true in disputes over abortion and embryonic stem cell research.	形而上學（字義是「超越物質」）並不是研究新時代的思維，也不是可以治療傷風病的東方草藥，儘管很多人誤以為是這樣。雖然難以有準確的定義，形而上學一般與存在（本體論）或真實的本質有關。形而上學所問的問題包括：什麼是最終的真實，真實是一個或是多個，是物質的還是非物質的？生物有沒有具體的性質去定義他們？人類除身體外也有思想嗎？有什麼東西使人類有價值呢？下面我們將看到，墮胎爭論的雙方都將形而上學的假設帶進辯論中，雖然有些人裝作沒有。認識論是關於我們如何知道事物。認識論所問的問題包括：我的信念是否合理？我們怎麼知道什麼是真實的？這兩個哲學學科對墮胎和胚胎幹細胞研究的糾紛中，如何決定什麼是真的，都發揮關鍵性的作用。
No Free Lunch: Everyone Does Metaphysics	（一）沒有免費的午餐：每個人都研究形而上學
As stated in Chapter 3, metaphysical presuppositions lurk beneath every public policy debate. The controversy over embryonic stem cell research (ESCR) is a case in point.	正如在第三章指出，每一個公共政策辯論後面，都隱伏著形而上學的前提。「胚胎幹細胞研究」的論戰是一個典型的例子。
As stated in Chapter 4, stem cells are fast-growing, unspecialized cells that can reproduce themselves and grow new organs for the body. Human embryos have an abundant supply of stem cells (so we are told) that scientists are eager to harvest in hopes of treating disease. The practice of securing these early cells is known as embryonic stem cell research. There’s only one problem: Unlike noncontroversial adult stem cell research, which in no way harms the adult donor, you must kill the embryo to secure its stem cells. (I say more about both types of stem cell research in Chapter 4.)	正如在第四章指出，幹細胞是生長快速而無定型的細胞，能自我複製，並長出新的身體器官。人類胚胎能供應大量的幹細胞（這是我們被告知的），而科學家們急於收穫幹細胞，希望用以治療疾病。收取早期細胞的做法稱為胚胎幹細胞研究。這裏只有一個問題：成人幹細胞研究是無爭論性的，因為它沒有危害成年的幹細胞贈送人，但收取胚胎幹細胞卻要殺死胚胎。（我在第四章會更多討論這兩種幹細胞研究。）
In a 2005 New York Times editorial, former U.S. Senator John Danforth writes that government restrictions on ESCR wrongly impose a particular religious view (that of the “religious right”) on a pluralistic society. “It is not evident to many of us that cells in a petri dish are equivalent to identifiable people suffering from terrible diseases ... the only explanation for legislators comparing cells in a petri dish to babies in the womb is the extension of religious doctrine into statutory law.”	美國前參議員丹福思（John Danforth）在2005年紐約時報社論中寫道：政府限制對「胚胎幹細胞研究」是錯誤地強加一個特定的宗教觀點（指宗教右派）在一個多元化的社會。「對我們許多人來說，認為培養皿內的細胞與患上可怕疾病的人作為同等，這是不明顯的。...將培養皿內的細胞與子宮內的嬰兒作比較，對立法議員來說，只有一個解釋，就是宗教教義申延到法定的律例。」
This is not at all persuasive. First, Danforth is just plain wrong that pro-life advocates opposed to ESCR provide no rational defense for their position. Sure, they do. The problem is, he takes no time to actually engage the sophisticated case that pro-life philosophers present in support of the embryo’s humanity. Even at the popular level, he can’t bring himself to answer a basic pro-life argument based on science and philosophy. As stated earlier, pro-lifers contend that from the earliest stages of development, the embryos in question are not mere clumps of cells in a petri dish but distinct, living, and whole human beings. True, they have yet to grow and mature, but they are whole human beings nonetheless. The facts of science confirm this.	但這並沒有些微說服力。因為： [1] 丹福思認為維護生命者反對「胚胎幹細胞研究」，卻沒有對自己的立場提供任何合理的辯護，他的想法是錯誤的，他們當然有。問題是，丹福思沒有花時間去考慮維護生命的哲學家支持胚胎為人類的複雜個案。即使在通俗的水平上，他也沒有以科學和哲學的論點回答維護生命者基本的辯點。如前所述，維護生命者認為胚胎從最早期開始已經不單單是培養皿內的細胞，而是一個完整、獨特和生存的人。他們不錯是要發育和成長，但他們仍然是完整的人。事實上，科學證實了這一點。
Philosophically, pro-lifers argue that there is no morally significant difference between the embryo you once were and the adult you are today. Differences of size, level of development, environment, and degree of dependency are not relevant in the way that ESCR advocates need them to be to say it was okay to kill you then but not now. Pro-lifers don’t need Scripture or church doctrine to tell them these things. They are truths that even secular libertarians can, and sometimes do, recognize. Yet nowhere in his piece does Danforth present a principled argument explaining why pro-life advocates are mistaken on these points.	從哲學上，維護生命者辯說，你以前是胚胎和今天是成人，兩者在道德上沒有顯著差異。大小、發育程度、環境和依賴程度雖有差異，但不應使「胚胎幹細胞研究」的倡導者說，以前殺了你是可以的，現在卻不能。維護生命者不需要聖經或教會的教義將這些事告訴他。這是真理，甚至世俗自由主義者也可以認識的，有時也承認的。然而丹福思在他的文章中卻沒有提出任何合原則的辯點去解釋維護生命者錯在那裏。
Second, Danforth’s own position, like the pro-lifer’s, is grounded in prior metaphysical commitments. As Francis J. Beckwith explains, the nature of the ESCR debate is such that all positions presuppose a metaphysical view of human value, and for this reason the pro-research position that Danforth defends is not entitled to win by default. At issue is not which view of ESCR has metaphysical underpinnings and which does not, but which metaphysical view of human value does a better job of accounting for human rights and human dignity, pro-life or pro-destructive research.	[2] 就像維護生命者一樣，丹福思自己的立場主要是基於形而上學的承諾。碧維夫解釋說，在「胚胎幹細胞研究」的辯論中，所有立場都以形而上學對人的價值的觀點為前提；因此，丹福思支持研究的立場不應獲得自動勝利。爭論的焦點並非哪一個立場有形而上學的基礎，哪一個沒有，而是哪一個形而上學對人的價值的觀點更良好地計算人權和人的尊嚴，是維護生命者更良好，抑或是支持毀滅性研究者的立場更良好。
The pro-life view on ESCR is that humans are intrinsically valuable in virtue of the kind of thing they are. True, they differ immensely with respect to talents, accomplishments, and degrees of development, but they are nonetheless equal because they share a common human nature. Their right to life comes to be when they come to be, either at conception or at the completion of a cloning process. Danforth’s own view is that humans have value (and hence rights) not in virtue of the kind of thing they are, members of a natural kind, but only because of an acquired property that comes to be later in the life of the human organism. Because the early embryo does not appear (to him) as a human being with rights, destructive research is permissible.	維護生命者對「胚胎幹細胞研究」的觀點是：所有人單單因為是人類就在本質上是有價值的。誠然，他們在才能、成就和發育的程度上極不同，但他們仍然是相等的，因為他們都有一個共同的人性。他們開始有生命時就有生命權，或在成孕時，或在複製過程完成的那一刻。丹福思自己的觀點是，人類具有價值（因而有權利）不是因為他們是人類、是一個自然物種的成員，而僅僅是因為他們後來在人生中獲得一些特性。對於他，早期胚胎不像是有權利的人類，所以毀滅性的研究是可允許的。
Notice that Danforth is doing the abstract work of metaphysics. That is, he is using philosophical reflection to defend a disputed view of human value in his quest to defend ESCR. In short, Danforth’s attempt to disqualify the pro-life view from public policy based on its alleged metaphysical underpinnings works equally well to disqualify his own view.	請注意，丹福思應用了抽象的形而上學。當他要保衛「胚胎幹細胞研究」的時候，他使用哲學反思去保衛一個對人的價值有爭議的觀點。簡言之，丹福思嘗試從公共政策中排除維護生命的觀點，卻基於以形而上學為支柱的理論，這理論同樣可以排除他自己的看法。
Now maybe Danforth, echoing political philosopher John Rawls, meant to convey a more sophisticated claim—namely, that society should confer a large degree of liberty by not legislating on controversial moral issues for which there is no consensus, especially if those issues involve comprehensive moral doctrines based on prior metaphysical commitments. Embryonic stem cell research, so the argument goes, is a divisive and controversial issue. Therefore, government should not restrict it.	丹福思也許是呼應政治哲學家羅爾斯（John Rawls），旨在傳達一個更為複雜的要求，就是社會應該賦予很大程度的自由；對目前有爭議而沒有達成共識的道德問題就不立法，尤其是當這些問題涉及全面性的道德規條，而且是屑及先前形而上學的承諾。這觀點繼續說，胚胎幹細胞研究是一個有分裂性而且有爭議性的問題；因此，政府不應該限制它。
But as discussed in Chapter 3, this view is self-refuting. To say government should remain neutral on metaphysical questions is itself a metaphysical claim, a comprehensive moral doctrine about how government should function. It’s also controversial: Do we have a consensus that we should not legislate on divisive matters like ESCR? Moreover, slavery and racism were controversial issues that involved prior worldview commitments. Are we to conclude that it was wrong to legislate against them? The fact that people disagree is no reason to suppose that nobody is correct.	但正如第三章討論，這一觀點是自我反駁的。說政府應該在形而上學的問題保持中立，這就是一種形而上學的主張，也就是關於政府應該如何發揮職能的一個全面道德規條。有爭議的是：我們說不應該對有分裂性的事項上（如「胚胎幹細胞研究」）立法，這說法有共識嗎？此外，奴隸制和種族主義是有爭議性的問題，也涉及先前世界觀的承諾；是否我們是結論說立法禁止它們是錯誤的呢？各人不同意並不引至沒有人是正確的。
Third, the “religious” sword in this case cuts both ways. The overwhelming majority of mainline Protestant denominations (including Danforth’s own Episcopal Church) hold to the same metaphysical view he does regarding the embryo—namely, that developing humans are not valuable in virtue of the kind of thing they are (substances with a particular nature) but only because of some accidental property acquired sometime after the early human comes to be. Many of these left-leaning groups specifically cite Scripture to make the case that embryos and fetuses are not human beings. The bottom line is, if the pro-life view opposing ESCR is suspect because of its alleged connection to the metaphysics of religion, so is the pro-destructive research one.	[3]「宗教」的論點在這種情況下是兩面性的。對胚胎的問題，絕大多數主流基督教宗派（包括丹福思自己的聖公會）持有與他相同的形而上學觀點，就是發育中的人並不因為他們是人類就有價值，而是因為初期的人獲得一些意外的性質才有價值；有許多左翼團體就特別引用聖經去辯說胚胎和胎兒不是人。最終的結論是，如果維護生命而反對「胚胎幹細胞研究」的觀點被嫌疑跟宗教形而上學有聯繫，那麼毀滅胚胎的研究亦一樣。
Fourth, the claim that “an embryo is a human subject with rights” is no more religious than claiming it’s not. Both claims involve prior metaphysical commitments. Our job is to see which claim better explains human dignity and equality. So far Danforth contents himself with calling his opponents names from a distance rather than engaging the substance of their ideas.	[4]「胚胎是擁有權利的人類」的主張和反對的主張同樣是宗教性的。兩種主張都涉及先前形而上學的承諾。我們的工作是更好的解釋人類尊嚴和人類平等的主張。到目前為止，丹福思的手段是從遠處誹謗反對者，而不是與他們辯論雙方想法的實質。
Finally, state neutrality is impossible. The law either recognizes the unborn as valuable human beings and thus protects them or it does not and permits killing them. By agreeing that human embryos are fitting subjects for destructive research, Danforth is taking a public policy position that embryos do not deserve the same protections owed to toddlers or other human beings. This is hardly a neutral position; it’s an extremely controversial one with deep metaphysical underpinnings. Why, then, is it okay for Danforth to legislate his own view on the status of human embryos but not okay for pro-lifers to legislate theirs?	[5] 最後，政府的中立是不可能的。法律需要承認未出生的生命是有價值的人類，從而保護他們，否則就是不保護他們，容讓他們被殺。當丹福思贊同利用人類胚胎作毀滅性的研究時，他就是採取公共政策的立場，贊同胚胎不應該得到兒童或其他人同樣的保護。這絕不是一個中立的立場，卻是一個極具爭議的立場，也是以形而上學為支柱的理論。那麼，為什麼丹福思可以用自己對人類胚胎的地位的觀點去立法，卻不准許維護生命者去同樣立法呢？
Everyone Takes A Position	（二）每個人都有自己的意見
Here’s another example of alleged neutrality that really isn’t. The March of Dimes (MOD) supports federal funding for embryonic stem cell research, yet declares itself neutral on the philosophical questions surrounding the abortion controversy.	下面是另一個聲稱為中立而實際不是中立的例子。優生優育基金會（March of Dimes）支持以聯邦經費作胚胎幹細胞研究，但宣稱自己在墮胎爭論的哲學問題上中立。
However, the moral permissibility of ESCR and abortion come down to the same basic question: Is the unborn a member of the human family? If so, research on human embryos should be conducted within the same guidelines we use for other children who, because of immaturity, cannot consent to treatment themselves. That is to say, the research must personally benefit the embryo and place it at no significant risk. If the embryos in question are not human, destroying them for any reason requires no further justification.	然而，「胚胎幹細胞研究」和墮胎的道德允許性實際上關乎相同的基本問題：未出生的胎兒是否為人類的成員？如果是，對人類胚胎研究應使用對其他兒童一樣的方針，兒童也不成熟，不能決定如何處理自己；這是說，研究必須對胚胎個人有利，而且沒有重大的危險。如果有關的胚胎不是人，則毀滅它們不需任何其他理由。
When the MOD officially condoned destroying human embryos for medical research, it took the position that embryos do not deserve the same protections we give to other children. For example, the organization would never fund destructive medical research on two-year-olds scheduled for execution by a totalitarian regime, even if doing so would cure millions of disease. Thus, the MOD, in supporting destructive research on human embryos, is taking a position that embryos are not the moral equivalent of other children. This is hardly a neutral position.	當優生優育基金會正式寬容毀滅人類胚胎用於醫學研究，它採取的立場是：胚胎不值得我們給予其他兒童相同的保護。例如，如果一個極權主義政權準備殺死一些兩歲的兒童，該組織也永遠不會以他們作毀滅性醫學研究，即使這樣做會治好以百萬計的疾病。因此，當優生優育基金會支持毀滅人類胚胎的研究，他們正採取一個立場，即胚胎和兒童在道德上不相等，這絕不是中立的立場。
Suppose a nineteenth-century medical school delivered this opinion on the issue of slavery: “We take no position on the morality of owning slaves. We are neutral. However, in our quest to cure many diseases, we fund many groups that conduct medical experiments on those African-American slaves scheduled for execution. Rest assured: We do not pay money for these groups to kill slaves. They must use private funds for that. We pay only for the beneficial research they conduct after the slave is killed. In fact, we think slaves deserve profound respect. However, they do not carry the same moral status as white people. Once the slaves are executed, it would be morally wrong to let all that tissue go to waste. Remember this: These slaves are going to die anyway, and we don’t pay people to kill them. We simply fund the research after the fact.”	假設一個十九世紀的醫學院對於奴隸制問題提出下列意見：「我們對擁有奴隸是否合道德不採取任何立場。我們是中立的。然而，在我們尋求治療許多疾病的同時，我們資助許多組織，他們對將被處決的美國黑奴進行醫學實驗。但你可以放心，我們不付錢給這些組織去殺死奴隸；他們必須使用自己的資金去做，我們只支付殺害奴隸後有益的研究。當然，我們認為奴隸值得深深的尊敬；然而，他們與白人沒有相同的道德地位。一旦奴隸被處決，讓他們的身體組織白白被浪費是不道德的行為。請記住這一點：這些奴隸橫豎要死，我們也不付錢去殺死他們，我們單單在事後作研究而已。」
Would anyone in America today consider this a neutral position on slavery? Clearly, the medical school would be complicit in the deaths of executed slaves. By funding the research, it would be taking a position that black slaves are the sorts of beings that can be killed and treated as property. The message would be clear: Blacks are not full-fledged members of the human community.	今日會有美國人認為這是對奴隸制有一個中立的立場嗎？明顯地，這樣做的醫學院將被視為處決奴隸的同謀者。資助有關研究，就實在是採取一個立場，即黑人奴隸可以被殺死，並可被視為財產。這訊息是明確的：黑人不是人類社會的正式成員。
Reasonable persons should commend the March of Dimes for its laudable work in improving the health of babies, preventing birth defects, and reducing infant mortality. These are good and noble actions.	合理的人應讚揚優生優育基金會值得稱讚的工作，就是提高嬰兒的健康，預防嬰兒出生的缺陷和降低嬰兒死亡率。這都是很好的和高尚的行動。
But good deeds do not atone for bad ones. By embracing destructive embryo research, the March of Dimes has violated the principle that once made it great—its basic commitment to assist the small, weak, and defenseless. It’s regrettable that this great organization would treat the most vulnerable members of the human community, the unborn, as nothing more than disposable instruments to be used for someone else’s benefit.	但好的行動不能抵贖壞的行動。通過支持毀滅胚胎的研究，優生優育基金會違反了它過往偉大的原則，就是它的基本承諾：去協助幼小、軟弱和無抵抗力者。這個偉大的組織卻這樣對待胎兒，就是人類社會中最易受傷害的成員，讓他們成為可拼棄的工具，為了別人的利益而被使用，這是令人遺憾的。
Taking Theology Seriously	（三）認真地讀神學
In review, both positions—pro-life and pro-ESCR—are attempting to answer the exact same question: What makes humans valuable in the first place? Science cannot answer that question; only metaphysics can. So why is only the pro-life position disqualified from the public square (for its alleged ties to the metaphysics of religion) while the pro-ESCR view gets a free pass?	上面指出，雙方的立場（維護生命和支持「胚胎幹細胞研究」）其實試圖回答完全相同的問題：是什麼使人類有價值？科學不能回答這問題；只有形而上學可以。那麼，為什麼只有維護生命的立場從公共廣場中被取消資格（因被指控與宗教形而上學連結），而支持胚胎幹細胞研究卻可以無條件被接納呢？
During a nationally televised speech at the 2004 Democratic Convention, Ron Reagan (son of President Ronald Reagan) said the following about those who oppose ESCR:	在2004年民主黨大會，雷根羅吾（Ron Reagan，美國總統雷根的兒子）在全國電視播放的演說中，對那些反對「胚胎幹細胞研究」的人說：［譯者註：雷根羅吾屬自由派份子，跟他屬保守派的父親完全相反。］
Now, there are those who would stand in the way of this remarkable future, who would deny the federal funding so crucial to basic research. They argue that interference with the development of even the earliest stage embryo, even one that will never be implanted in a womb and will never develop into an actual fetus, is tantamount to murder.... [M]any are well-intentioned and sincere. Their belief is just that, an article of faith, and they are entitled to it. But it does not follow that the theology of a few should be allowed to forestall the health and well-being of the many.	現在，有一些人阻止這一顯著的未來，他們想終止聯邦政府對基礎研究重要的撥款。他們辯說：干擾最早階段的胚胎（就是永不會被植入子宮中，永不會發肓成為實際胎兒的胚胎）就等於謀殺....。他們很多是善意和誠意的；他們的信念不過是一條「信仰規條」，他們有權堅信它。但這並不是說少數人的神學就可以被容許去阻止許多人的健康和幸福。
Reagan goes on to say that early embryos “are not, in and of themselves, human beings” because they “have no fingers and toes, no brain or spinal cord. They have no thoughts, no fears. They feel no pain.”	雷根羅吾接著說，早期的胚胎「本身並非人類」，因為他們「沒有手指和腳趾，沒有大腦或脊髓；他們沒有思想，沒有恐懼；他們不感覺痛苦。」
With that single statement, Reagan has injected his own “article of faith” into the debate, as Beckwith explains:	雷根羅吾就以這一句聲明，在辯論中注入了自己的「信仰規條」，就如碧維夫解釋說：
Ironically, by classifying early embryos as morally outside the circle of legal protection, Ron Reagan enters an area of theological exploration on a question of philosophical anthropology. He chooses to answer a question of scholarly interest to theologians and philosophers (“What is man?”) in order to justify a particular act (the killing of embryos). He refers to the position of his adversaries as “an article of faith,” even though he chooses to answer the same exact question (“What is man?”) his adversaries answer.	諷刺性的是，雷根羅吾將早期胚胎放置在法律保護的範圍以外，藉著一個哲理人類學的問題進入了神學性的探索。他選擇去回答一個對神學家和哲學家有興趣的學術性問題（「人是什麼？」），作用是使一特定的行動（殺害胚胎）成為合理。他形容反對者的立場為一條「信仰規條」，但他卻選擇回答跟反對者完全相同的問題（「人是什麼？」）。
As stated before, the claim that an embryo has value is indeed a claim with theological underpinnings, but it’s no more a religious claim than saying a ten-year-old has value. Can a truly secular ethic tell us why anything has a right to life? At the same time, pro-life advocates do not rely on theology alone. They do, after all, offer reasoned arguments in support of their position, arguments that can be understood by skeptics. Why won’t Reagan admit this? According to Beckwith, the problem is intellectual dishonesty:	如前所述，說一個胚胎具有價值的主張是以神學為支柱的理論，但說一個十歲的孩子有價值亦是一樣。一個真正世俗倫理能否告訴我們，任何東西擁有生命權基於什麼理由呢？同時，維護生命的倡導者不單依賴神學，他們也提供合理的論據去支持它們的立場，這些論據是懷疑者都可以理解的。雷根羅吾為什麼不承認這一點？碧維夫認為這是理性的不誠實：
In my opinion, it is only because the younger Reagan and his allies do not consider theological beliefs as belonging to a knowledge tradition that they can dismiss, a priori, theologically informed policy proposals as de facto epistemically inferior to so-called secular ones, even when secular ones answer precisely the same questions as do the so-called “article of faith.” The younger Reagan and his allies offer no reasons for the epistemological apartheid, since they know that convincing their peers that a view is or may be “religious” relieves them of their epistemic duty to rationally assess that view as a serious contender to the deliverance of so-called secular reason.	在我看來，這只是因為年輕的雷根羅吾和他的盟友不認為神學信仰屬於一個知識傳統，他們未經驗証就拒絕這傳統，認為以神學支援的政策建議，比較世俗的建議在事實上和認識上是低等的，甚至當世俗的建議回答與「信仰規條」回答同樣問題。年輕的雷根羅吾和他的盟友沒有提供任何理由解釋這種認識論分隔主義。因為他們知道他們若能說服他們的同輩，接受一個觀點是或可能是「宗教性」的，就緩解他們在認識論上的職責，不需要合理地評估這一觀點是否與世俗理由有真實競爭。
Admittedly, many secularists reject any presupposition that smells of theism. However, debates over God’s existence are no different in kind from other philosophical arguments, for example, current controversies over abortion, ESCR, and same-sex marriage. They are controversial questions about which thoughtful people often disagree. So why the double standard with religiously informed views? Edward Feser writes:	當然，許多世俗主義者拒絕任何與有神論相關的前提。然而，辯論神的存在，與其他哲學辯論沒有什麼不同，就如目前對墮胎、「胚胎幹細胞研究」和同性婚姻的爭議。他們是有爭議性的問題，有思想的人往往不同意。那麼，為什麼對宗教支援的觀點就有雙重標準呢？費沙（Edward Feser）寫道：
Do secularists demand that those in favor of legalized abortion and same-sex marriage refrain from advocating their positions in the public square simply because their arguments are nowhere near universally accepted? Of course not, nor should they. So why do they demand that religion and politics be separated not just in the constitutional sense that no one ought to be forced to belong to a particular denomination or to accept a particular creed, but also in the stronger sense that religious considerations, however well supported by rational arguments, ought to get no hearing in the public square and have no influence on public policy? Why the constant harping about the separation of church and state, but not, say, the separation of naturalistic metaphysics and the state, the separation of feminist theory and the state, or the separation of Rawlsian liberalism and the state?	世俗主義者有沒有要求贊成墮胎合法化和贊成同性婚姻的人避免在公共廣場提倡他們的看法，因為他們的辯點離被普遍接受還差很遠呢？當然沒有，也不應該這樣做。所以，為什麼他們要求宗教和政府分隔，不僅在憲法的層面（就是，沒有人應該被強迫屬於一個特定的宗派，或接受特定的信條），也在更強的層面（就是，對宗教的考慮，無論是否為合理性的辯點所支持，都不准在公共廣場發言，也不准影響公共政策）？為什麼不斷重提教會與政府分隔，但卻不提自然形而上學和政府分隔，或女權主義理論和和政府分隔，或羅爾斯自由主義和政府分隔呢？
A Final Challenge: Let’s Do Science	（四）最後一個挑戰：讓我們研究科學
Nevertheless, I’m prepared to take Senator Danforth at his word and remove religion from the starting point for the ESCR debate. Let’s use science, and science alone, to settle the question, is the embryo a human being? Robert P. George, member of the President’s Council on Bioethics, suggests the following methodology for resolving the issue with critics of the pro-life view who affirm human equality but deny it applies to embryos used for destructive research:	不過，我準備採取丹福思參議員的講法，在「胚胎幹細胞研究」辯論的出發點中除去宗教。讓我們用科學，就是單單用科學，去解決問題：胚胎是人類嗎？總統委派生物倫理委員會的委員喬治羅拔（Robert P. George）建議採取下列方法去為批評者解決「維護生命」觀點的問題（他們確認人類平等，但否認它適用於毀滅胚胎的研究）：
There are three positions that can be defended without quickly falling into logical inconsistency. The first is that human beings are in no morally relevant way different from other creatures and therefore have no special dignity. The second is that human beings have an inherent and equal dignity; each and every human being possesses it simply by virtue of his or her humanity. The third is that some, but not all, human beings have dignity; those who have it possess it by virtue of some quality or set of qualities that they happen to possess that other human beings do not possess (or do not yet possess, or no longer possess).	對人類擁有尊嚴，有三個可辯護而不會陷入邏輯矛盾的看法。第一是人類在道德上和其他生物沒有不同，因此沒有特別尊嚴。第二是人類有內在的和平等的尊嚴；每個都人擁有它，單單憑藉他是人類。第三是一些人擁有尊嚴，但不是所有人；擁有尊嚴是憑藉一些質素，只有他們擁有而其他人不擁有（或是未擁有，或是不再擁有）。
Anyone who believes that stepping on an ant is not a grave moral wrong but murdering your grandmother to prevent her spending down your inheritance is one, has already rejected the first position. Anyone who accepts the third position will, in fairly short order, find himself driven by the force of logical argumentation into the [infanticide] positions infamously defended by Peter Singer. (We can go through this exercise, if you like.)	任何人如果相信：踏死一只螞蟻是不是嚴重的道德錯誤，但為要阻止你的祖母浪費你的財產而殺害她是嚴重的道德錯誤，那麼他已經拒絕了第一個看法。任何人如果接受第三個看法，則會很快被邏輯論證的力量說服，而接受可以殺死嬰該的觀點，也就是聲名狼藉的星雅（Peter Singer）所辯護的觀點。〔譯者註：星雅認為父母可以將一歲以下的嬰該殺死而不應視為犯法。〕
Assuming one doesn’t want to embrace Singerism, that leaves the second position. Now, once one adopts that position, the key question in the debate over embryo-destructive research is “When does the life of a human being begin?” To answer this question is to decide whether or not human embryos are, in fact, human beings and, as such, possessors of inherent human dignity. Where do we go to find the answer? Not to the Catechism of the Catholic Church. If the Catechism takes a position, it must do so derivatively. That is to say, its position will be derived from another source. (I’ll identify that source in a moment.) Not to the Bible, which says nothing about human embryos. Not to the Talmud, which (like the Bible) was composed centuries before the discovery of the ovum—a time when almost nothing was known about embryogenesis. Not to the Koran. Not to our “moral intuitions.”	假設一個人不想贊同星雅的觀點，那麼只剩下第二個看法。一旦採取這一立場，爭論毀滅胚胎的研究的關鍵問題就是「人的生命在什麼時候開始？」回答這個問題就是要決定人的胚胎是否為人類，也擁有人類尊嚴。我們在哪裡去尋找答案？不能用天主教要義問答。若要用要義問答，它的立場必須藉推理方法証吸。也就是說，這立場要來自其他來源。也不能用聖經，因為它沒有說及人類胚胎。不能用猶太法典，就像聖經，它在發現的卵子前很多世紀所著，當時沒有胚胎起源的知識。不能用可蘭經。也不能用「道德直覺。」
Rather, we go to the standard texts of modern human embryology and developmental biology—for example, the texts by Keith Moore and T.V.N. Persaud; Bruce M. Carlson; Ronan O’Rahilly and Fabiola Mueller; and William J. Larsen. When we consult these works, we find little or nothing in the way of scientific mystery or dispute. The texts tell the same story and answer the key question in the same way. Anyone who wishes to know when he or she as a distinct living member of the species Homo sapiens came into existence need only open any of these books and look up the answer.	讓我們去用人類胚胎學和發育生物學的標準課本，例如，摩亞及普瑟、卡爾森、奧拉喜利及米勒、羅森等課本（Keith Moore and T.V.N. Persaud; Bruce M. Carlson; Ronan O’Rahilly and Fabiola Mueller; and William J. Larsen）。當我們徵詢這些課本時，我們發現很少或沒有任何科學性的神秘或爭議。課本講同一個故事，用同一個答案回答關鍵問題。任何人想知道人類物種存在的起點只需打開任何一本課本來找到答案。
So I have a proposal for people of goodwill who wish to affirm the inherent and equal dignity of all human beings but disagree with those of us who are opposed on moral grounds to embryo-destructive research. Let’s leave religion out of this. Let’s agree to resolve our difference of opinion strictly on the basis of the best available scientific evidence as to when the life of a new human being begins. Any takers?	所以，我有一個建議，對所有善心的人，就是確認人類擁有固有及平等的尊嚴，但不同意我們這些以道德理由反對毀滅胚胎的研究的人。讓我們不講及宗教；讓我們同意單單利用現有的最佳科學證據為基礎，解決人類生命在什麼時候開始。大家贊成嗎？［譯者註：所有上述標準課本都以生命在胚胎形成開始。］
How about it, Senator?	丹福思參議員，你認為怎麼樣？