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A Survey of Ethical Systems
倫理系統概覽
芬博約翰及芬博保羅著（John
S. Feinberg and Paul D. Feinberg），孔祥烱譯
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In this section we survey the basic kinds of
theories available. Ethicists often like to group individual theories into
broad categories. This can help understanding, but it can also be very
frustrating. Frustration arises because authors categorize theories
differently. Confusion begins to lift, however, once one recognizes that each
category scheme is structured to respond to some critical question in ethics.
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在本節中，我們會介紹一些基本理論。倫理學家往往喜歡將個別理論歸入廣泛的類別；這可以幫助理解，但也可以是非常令人沮喪；沮喪的原因是倫理學家用很多不同的分類。不過，當我們認識到，每個分類方法都為求對一些關鍵的倫理問題作回應，混亂就能被解除。 |
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To
illustrate this point, Edward Long (A
Survey of Christian Ethics), William Frankena (Ethics), and
Norman Geisler (Ethics: Alternatives and Issues) each discuss and
classify a variety of theories. Each scheme differs, and that can be
confusing. However, each scheme responds to a specific ethical question. Long’s
category scheme emphasizes answers to the question “What is the source
of ethical norms?” Frankena’s organization addresses more the issue of what
makes good actions good and evil actions evil. Geisler’s schema centers on
how many ethical norms there are and how they relate. All three questions are
very important, but they are not identical. |
為了說明這一點，龍格（Edward Long著《基督教倫理學綜覽》）、法蘭堅拿（William Frankena著《倫理學》）和該思拉（Norman Geisler著《倫理學：選擇與問題》）三位討論各種理論，並加以分類。每個分類方法都不同，可能產生混亂；然而，每個分類方法都對一個特定的倫理問題作反應。龍格強調他的分類為要回答「道德規範的來源是什麼？」法蘭堅拿的分類為要回答「什麼決定良好的行動是良好，而邪惡的行動是邪惡？」該思拉的分類集中於有多少倫理規範，以及它們的相互關係。三個都是非常重要卻不相同的問題。 |
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Our
desire is to discuss theories from the perspectives of the three questions
mentioned. However, we must first note several other distinctions that form
the bases for classifying ethical theories. The distinctions are between
naturalistic and non-naturalistic theories and between cognitivist and
non-cognitivist theories. Both distinctions relate to questions about meaning
and justification of ethical terms and judgments. |
我們希望從這三個問題的角度去討論各種理論。但是，我們必須首先注意倫理理論分類基礎的其他幾個區別；就是自然主義與非自然主義的區別，和認知主義與非認知主義的區別。兩種區別所關注的問題是倫理詞語和倫理判斷的意義和合理性。 |
Naturalism and Non-naturalism
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（A）自然主義與非自然主義
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Naturalistic
ethical theories claim that ethical terms can be defined in terms of
non-ethical ones and that ethical claims can be translated into factual ones.
Thus, naturalistic theories hold that ethical sentences assert some fact
(e.g., empirical or metaphysical) and that the terms in them can be defined
in non-ethical terms. For example, one theory may define “good” as “being
conducive to harmonious happiness,” while another understands “good” as
referring to whatever God commands. |
[1] 自然倫理理論認為倫理詞語可以用非倫理詞語來定義，而倫理要求可以轉化成為實際要求。因此，自然主義認為倫理句子確定某些事實（例如，經驗的或形而上學的），而句子中的詞語可以用非倫理詞語來定義。例如，一個理論可能以「好」的定義為「引致和諧的歡樂」，而另一個理論可能以「好」為神的任何命令。 |
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Thus,
“murder is evil” may simply be a veiled assertion (for a divine command
theory) that “God commands us not to commit murder” or (on a different
definition of “good”) that “murder is not conducive to harmonious happiness.”
The claim about happiness is open to verification or falsification through empirical
means, whereas the assertion about God’s commands is open to justification
through what might be called metaphysical reasoning. As to justifying ethical
claims, according to naturalistic theories, one should be able to justify
them the same way one justifies any other statement of fact (by empirical
investigation or by a priori reasoning). |
因此，「謀殺是邪惡的」可能只是一個隱匿的斷言，就是「神命令我們不可謀殺」（神聖命令的理論）或是「謀殺不會引致和諧的歡樂」（「好」有不同的定義）。對歡樂的聲稱可以用實際方法去證實或偽造，而對神命令的斷言可以用形而上學的推理去辯明。至於對倫理聲稱，根據自然主義的理論，人們應該能夠用其他辯証的方式，去辯明倫理聲稱（通過實證調查或先驗的推理）。 |
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Non-naturalists
think ethical terms such as “good” and “ought” are not definable in
non-ethical terms. In fact, they hold that some of these terms are
indefinable or simple and unanalyzable, just as yellowness or pleasantness
are. G. E. Moore thought this about “good”; Henry Sidgwick thought it about
“ought.” In addition, for non-naturalists, ethical and value judgments are
true or false, but they are not justified as such by empirical observation or
metaphysical reasoning. Typically, non-naturalists say that basic judgments
are self-evident and can be known only by intuition. Non-naturalists, then,
are often intuitionists. |
[2] 非自然主義者認為倫理詞語如「好」與「應該」，是無法用非倫理詞語去定義的。事實上，他們認為有些詞語是無法定義、過份簡單和無法分析的，就像黃色或愉快這等詞語；摩爾（G. E. Moore）認為「好」就是這類詞語，西治威（Henry Sidgwick）認為「應該」也是。此外，對於非自然主義者，倫理和價值的判斷可以是真的或假的，但他們不能透過經驗觀察或形而上學的推理去決定是否合理。非自然主義者通常說，基本的判斷是不言自明的，可以憑直覺知道；因此，非自然主義者往往是直覺主義者。 |
Cognitivism and Non-cognitivism
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（B）認知主義與非認知主義
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The
distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism in ethics concerns the
meaning of ethical terms and judgments, but beyond that it emphasizes the
difference between theories that claim moral judgments are matters of
knowledge and those that say they are not. Cognitivists think ethical
judgments state facts that may be verified or falsified. Hence, ethical
judgments are items of knowledge. Since cognitivists believe this about
purported facts that are natural or non-natural, both ethical naturalism and
ethical non-naturalism are cognitivist theories. |
認知主義和非認知主義之間的區別就是對倫理詞語和倫理判斷的意義有不同。兩者的另一個區別就是一種認為道德判斷是知識，而另一種認為不是。[1] 認知主義者認為道德判斷陳述事實，而它可以被証實或拒絕；因此，道德判斷是知識。由於認知主義者相信這情形出現於自然或非自然的領域，故此倫理自然主義和倫理非自然主義都是認知主義的理論。 |
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For
non-cognitivists, ethical statements do not assert any kind of fact. They are
meaningful, but not as raising items of knowledge. According to non-cognitivists,
ethical judgments may be used in one of several ways. Emotivists hold
that moral utterances merely vent an emotion or express an attitude. Thus, to
say murder is wrong is to express a negative attitude toward it (“I don’t
like murder”), but in so doing one is not asserting anything about whether
murder really is or is not good or bad. Prescriptivists think ethical
judgments do more than express emotions, but they do not regard them as statements
of fact. Instead, they interpret them as expressing a command. |
[2] 非認知主義者認為，道德聲明並不說及任何事實；它們是有意義的，但並未達到知識的水平。根據非認知主義者，道德判斷可作不同用途。情感主義者認為道德陳述只不過是表達一種情緒或態度；因此，說殺人是錯的是表達對它有消極的態度（「我不喜歡殺人」），但這樣表達並沒有說明謀殺是否真的是好還是壞。指令主義者認為道德判斷不算是表達情緒，但他們並沒有把它們當作為事實的陳述；相反地，他們解釋道德判斷為命令的表達。 |
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Thus,
“murder is wrong” means something like “you must not commit murder.” Of
course, this says nothing about justifying this prescription as proper.
Prescriptivism doesn’t even suggest whether commands are justifiable. It
simply holds that moral utterances should be understood as merely giving a
command. Finally, for non-cognitivists ethical claims may be used conatively.
To do so “makes the primary use of a moral assertion that of expressing
the intention of the utterer to act in a particular sort of way specified in
the assertion.” |
因此，「謀殺是錯誤的」的意思是「你必不可謀殺」。當然，這也沒有說明這指令是否合理；指令主義者甚至沒有說明應否有指令；它只不過認為道德陳述應被理解為命令。最後，非認知主義者認為道德宣稱可用於實踐上；「道德主張的主要用途就是用來表達說話者意圖隨著主張去行動。」 |
Source of Ethical Norms
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（C）倫理規範的來源
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As already noted, ethical category schemes normally address some
question in ethics. An initial schema focuses on the source of ethical norms.
Both Christian and secular ethics address this issue in one of three ways: (1)
reason, (2) prescription, and (3) relationship. |
正如前述，道德系統分類通常是解決一些倫理問題。第一個模式的焦點是倫理規範的來源。基督教和世俗倫理學對這問題有三種解決方法：（1）原因，（2）指令，（3）關係。 |
Reason-Based
Systems
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（一）理性為基礎的系統
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Here the
basic idea is that ethical norms are generated from and discernible by
reason. For some theories, reason is also thought to justify the theory. Some
Christian systems in this category also hold that revelation plays a role,
but even if revelation provides some norms, reason alone could have generated
those norms. In secular ethics one of the most famous reason-based systems is
that of Immanuel Kant. Kant derived his categorical imperative (“act only
according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should
become a universal law”) from reason alone. Though it is a prescription, it
is not a demand that someone makes just because he has power to command
others to obey. Rather, by reason Kant thought all should conclude it
necessary to act in accord with this imperative. |
一個基本想法是，倫理規範從理性產生，也可由理性分辨；有一些理論甚至認為理性使理論合理。在這一類系統中，一些基督教系統認為啟示有它的角色，但是，即使啟示提供了一些規範，只有理性可以產生規範。在世俗倫理學中，一個最有名的理性系統是康德的系統。康德的絕對命令（categorical imperative，就是「行動要根據一個原理，就是同時決志使行動可以成為一個普遍規律」）以理性為唯一的原因。雖然這是一個指令，這要求並不因為他有指揮別人服從的權力；相反，康德認為所有人透過理性都應該結論說，跟從這命令是必要的。 |
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Undoubtedly,
the most significant Christian reason-based system is natural law ethics.
Thomas Aquinas is the prime example of a Christian thinker who held this
system. Stemming from him, natural law ethics has been especially associated
with the Roman Catholic tradition. Though there are different forms of the
theory, certain items typify natural law ethics generally. According to
natural law theories, the end (the goal toward which it strives) of each
thing in the natural order is built into the thing itself. Thus, by observing
an object in nature, one can discern easily its intended purpose in the
natural order. This end immediately indicates how the thing should act. |
毫無疑問，基督教（天主教）中以理性為基礎的最重要的系統是自然律倫理學（natural law ethics）。阿奎那（Aquinas）是基督教思想家中提倡這個系統最主要的人物；隨著他，自然律倫理學成為羅馬天主教的傳統。這理論雖然有不同的型式，但有一些典型的特徵。根據自然律倫理學，自然秩序中的每一事物的終局（它所指向的目標）都蘊藏在該事物中。因此，通過對自然事物的觀察，就可以很容易辨別事物在自然規律中預定的目的；這目的立即可以指示出如何採取行動。 |
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In
addition, built into the structure of things is a set of laws governing conduct.
Those laws will be closely related to each object’s intended end or goal.
Natural law theories also hold that such laws of conduct are universally
known by reason apart from special revelation. Moreover, since human nature
and the natural order do not change, whatever ethical norms are derivable
from nature do not change from time to time or place to place. |
此外，這個結構內建立了一組支配行為的規律。這些規律和事物所預期的目的或目標密切相連。自然律理論也認為這些行為的規律是在特殊啟示以外普遍以理智可知的。此外，由於人的本性和自然秩序不改變，從自然引申出來的倫理規範不會因時間或地域而改變。 |
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Finally,
natural law theories typically claim that what reason discovers by reflecting
on the natural order is consistent with what man intuitively knows through
his conscience. As one writer claims, essential to the notion of natural
moral law are the “features of universality, unwrittenness and intuitively
perceived or rationally discoverable moral knowledge of the divine will apart
from special historical Biblical revelation.” Proponents of natural law
ethics use various Scriptures to support their views, but the central
passages are Rom 1:18-32 and 2:14-16. Natural law ethicists think biblical
revelation of moral norms is important, but they hold that even without that
revelation everyone can know by reason alone the basic principles of right
and wrong. Consequently, one need not be a Christian or even a theist to know
the moral law. |
最後，自然律理論通常主張由理智反省自然秩序所獲得的，這和人通過他的良知直覺所知道的是一致的。正如一位作者宣稱，自然道德律觀點着重「普及性的特點、由不成文直覺領悟或藉理性（就是在特殊的聖經啟示外）發現對神的意志的道德知識。」自然律倫理學的支持者引用很多經文支持自己的看法，但主要的章節是羅馬書1:18-32和2:14-16。自然律倫理學者認為聖經所啟示的道德規範是重要的，但他們也認為，即使沒有這啟示，每個人都可以單單藉理性而知道是非的基本原則。因此，一個人不需要是基督徒也可以知道道德律。 |
Prescription-Based
Systems
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（二）指令為基礎的系統
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For these
theories, ethical norms originate from an authority figure who mandates them.
This does not mean theories based on reason have no prescriptions, nor that
theories based on prescription are irrational. The point is that commands in
reason-based systems are determined by reason alone, whereas prescriptions in
prescriptive theories come from an authority figure. That person may or may not choose rules on the basis of what seems rational, but that
is not the key for prescriptive theories. The key is that someone or some
group decides what is to be law and sets that forth. |
這些理論主張倫理規範源於一個發出指令的權威。這並不是說基於理性的理論沒有指令，也不是說基於指令的理論不合乎理性。重點是基於理性的系統單單由理性確定，而基於指令的理論從一個權威者而來。這個人物可以基於理性去選擇規則，也可以不基於理性，但這不是指令的理論的關鍵。關鍵是某個人物或某個群體決定並提出什麼是法律。 |
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Prescriptive
theories often appeal to God as the prescriber, but not all theories do. For
example, Brandt and Firth’s ideal observer theory holds that calling an act
right just means that any ideal observer would approve the act (and most
likely prescribe it as well). But what defines an ideal observer? Brandt and
Firth fill in the background conditions that make an observer an ideal one.
Firth emphasizes procedures normally considered rational for decision making.
For example, one usually assumes that someone informed about the facts of a
particular moral issue (for example, abortion) is better prepared to make a
moral decision than someone not so informed. |
指令性的理論通常以神為指令者，但並非所有理論都是如此。例如，勃蘭和弗夫（Brandt and Firth）的理想旁觀者理論認為，有一個理想旁觀者批准（也極可能指令）一個行動，該行動就被稱為是正確的。但如何定義一個理想的旁觀者呢？勃蘭和弗夫為一個旁觀者成為理想者加上背景條件。弗夫強調通常被認為是合理的抉擇程序。例如，一個人通常會假設，已經獲得有關某一個道德問題（例如墮胎）的資料的人，比沒有資料的人更能作出道德抉擇。 |
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Hence, someone
who qualifies as an ideal observer should be fully informed about all
relevant facts for moral decision making. Likewise, in moral decision making,
qualities such as impartiality are important; an ideal observer should have
those qualities, too. By using this procedure, one can specify what would
make an observer ideal. Then, one merely asks what moral norms that person
would likely prescribe if he had the right to choose ethical rules. Those
rules become prescriptive for all. |
因此，一個擁有資格作理想旁觀者的人，必定擁有對道德抉擇的所有相關資料。同樣，在道德抉擇中，公正是重要的，一個理想旁觀者必須有這品質。通過使用這個程序，一個人就可以指定什麼人才是理想旁觀者。如果這人有選擇道德律的權力，只需問他會指令什麼道德規範，那些道德律便成為所有人的指令。 |
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Undoubtedly,
the most influential prescriptive theories claim God as prescriber. Such
theories are often labeled divine command theories, and there are varieties
of them. The key, of course, is that God’s will determines the norms. The
basis of his choice, however, is understood differently depending on the
theory. Divine command theories can be roughly divided on this matter in
terms of the question raised pointedly in Plato’s Euthyphro. That
dialogue discusses whether an act is right because God wills it, or
whether God wills it because he knows it is right. |
毫無疑問，最有影響力的指令性理論以神為指令者。這些不同的理論被統稱為神聖命令理論。當然，關鍵是神決定規範。不過，不同的理論對神選擇的基礎有不同的看法。神聖命令理論大致可以柏拉圖所著的《猶非夫》（Euthyphro）中的對話劃分為兩大類，對話討論一個行動的正確性可以有兩個來源，是源於神對行動有決志，或是源於神知道行動是正確的，所以對它有決志。 |
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Divine
command theories vary in their answer to Plato’s question, but during the Middle
Ages divine command theorists typically chose the former option. A prime
example of such a theory from medieval times is William of Ockham’s.
According to Ockham, whatever God wills must be done simply because he says
so. If God had wanted, he could have ordered men to obey the opposite of the Ten
Commandments. Even now he can rescind those laws and will their opposite. |
對柏拉圖的問題，神聖命令理論有不同的答案，在中世紀的神聖命令理論家通常選擇前者，這種理論最好的例子是中世紀的岳金（William of Ockham）。根據岳金，不管神決志什麼，人也必須照樣行，單單因為祂這麼說。如果神想作的話，祂可以下令人類遵守十誡的反面行動。即使現在，祂仍然可以撤銷那些律法，而以反面行動為命令。 |
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In
contemporary ethics there are proponents of the divine command theory. Some
give the impression that God chooses his commands completely arbitrarily;
others hold that God’s choices are not purely arbitrary, though they do not
always explain God’s rationale for his choices. |
當代倫理學也有支持神聖命令理論者。有些給人的印象是神完全任意選擇祂的命令；有些則認為，神的選擇並非純粹是任意的，但他們有時卻沒有解釋神作選擇的理由。 |
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In
addition, some ethicists hold a modified divine command theory of some sort.
Robert M. Adams is a well-known proponent of such a view. He follows divine
command theories in that he claims that ethical prescriptions say something
about God’s will and commands. On the other hand, Adams says every statement
of ethical right and wrong presupposes that “certain conditions for the
applicability of the believer’s concepts of ethical right and wrong are
satisfied.” Among those conditions is that God is love. Thus, Adams’s theory
amounts to the following: “x is ethically wrong” means “x is contrary to the
commands of a loving God.” For Adams this implies that while it is
logically possible for God to command cruelty for its own sake, it is
unthinkable that he would do so. |
此外，一些倫理學家持守修改形式的神聖命令理論。亞當斯（Robert M. Adams）就是一個著名的支持者。他跟隨神聖命令理論而主張倫理指令反映神的意志和命令。另一方面，亞當斯認為對道德是非的每個聲明都有一個前提，就是「滿足了當事人對正誤道德觀念是否適用的一些條件。」這些條件之一就是神是愛。因此，亞當斯的理論可以變成：「X是道德錯誤」這句的意思是「X是違反一位慈愛的神的命令。」含意就是，在邏輯上，神有可能用自己的意思指令殘忍，但祂這樣做是無法想像的。 |
Relation-Based
Systems
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（三）關係為基礎的系統
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Here the
key idea is that actions are shaped either (1) by the sense of excitement or
gratitude one feels as a result of a relationship with some person or group,
or (2) by how some crucial principle relates to each new situation. In
relation-based systems the emphasis may be responding to a person and/or
because of one’s relation to that person (e.g., God or Christ), or the focus
may be responding to a situation (e.g., what is the loving thing to do in
this situations), or both (e.g., what would Jesus do in this situation?). |
這些系統的關鍵思想認為塑造行動的動力是（1）一個人因着個人或群體的關係而有的興奮和感激的感覺，或（2）一些關鍵性原則出現在新的情況下。以關係為基礎的系統的重點是對一個人的回應，或是由於與那個人（例如，神或基督）建立關係的結果，其焦點或者是對一個情況的回應（例如，在此情況下，什麼是愛的行動），或者兩方面都包括（例如，耶穌在此情況下會怎樣做？）。 |
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This
broad category of systems includes such diverse approaches as those set forth
in Thomas a Kempis’s The Imitation of Christ, Karl Barth’s notion that
one must simply obey whatever God commands when God encounters him, and Joseph
Fletcher’s situation ethics, which instructs us to calculate the most loving
thing to do in any situation and to consider it one’s duty. Each of these
systems has a constant rule (do what Christ would do—a Kempis; do what God
tells you to do—Barth; do whatever you calculate as the most loving thing to
do—Fletcher). Nonetheless, the specific action following from this rule
varies from situation to situation. |
這廣泛的分類包括用不同處理方法的系統，例如金碧士（Thomas a Kempis）所著的《效法基督》、巴特（Karl Barth）的概念，認為當一個人遇見神時，必須簡單地服從神任何命令、和弗萊查（Joseph Fletcher）的處境倫理，就是教導我們在任何情況下計算最有愛心的行動，把它看為一個人的責任。這裏每一個系統都有一條固定的規則，金碧士的規則是做基督會做的，巴特的規則是做神告訴你去做的，弗萊查的規則是做你計算中最有愛心的行動。然而，跟隨這規則的具體行動卻因不同的情況而改變。 |
Criteria for Good and Bad Actions
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（D）好與壞行動的標準
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A second category scheme for ethics
addresses what makes good acts good and bad acts bad. Traditionally, there
have been two main answers to this question and respectively two broad
categories of theories. Those categories are teleological (consequentialist)
theories and deontological (non-consequentialist) theories. In more recent
years, various ethicists have argued for theories that mix deontological and
teleological concerns. |
第二個倫理模式的焦點是，什麼使好行動成為好，而壞行動成為壞。傳統上有兩個主要的答案，分別組成兩大類理論。就是目的論（後果主義）和義務論（非後果主義）。近年來，不同倫理學者提出混合兩者的理論。 |
Teleological
Theories
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（一）目的論理論
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According to these theories, what is
morally good or bad, right or wrong, obligatory or forbidden is determined by
the non-moral value produced when the act is done. If the deed generates more
non-moral good than evil, the act is considered morally good.
Consequences (results), then, determine which acts are good and which evil.
For a teleologist, what is good in the non-moral sense may vary. Many
teleologists have been hedonists, identifying good with pleasure and evil
with pain. Others have identified good with power, knowledge,
self-realization, or other non-moral goods. Despite this variation, whatever
non-moral good is the key for a given theory, those acts are morally good
that produce the greatest amount of that non-moral good, and those
actions are morally evil that remove or reduce such non-moral good.
Teleological theories are generally of two sorts. The first kind focuses on
producing the greatest good for oneself (ethical egoism). The second type
emphasizes producing the greatest good for the greatest number (ethical
universalism). |
根據這些理論，當行動完成時，在道德上的好或壞、對或錯、應作的或被禁止的，都由行動產生的非道德價值所確定。如果行動產生的非道德好處比壞處多，該行動就被認作是道德上的好行動。因此，後果（結果）確定行動的善惡。對於一個目的論者，非道德的善可能不同。許多目的論者是享樂主義者，認定歡樂就是善、痛苦就是惡。其他人將善和權力、知識、自我實現、或其他非道德事物等同。雖然有不同的理論，但關鍵都是非道德的善，道德上好的行動就是可以產生最大量非道德的善者，道德上壞的行動就是消除或減少這種非道德的善者。目的論理論普遍有兩種。第一種側重於為自己產生最大的善（倫理利己主義），第二種側重於為最多人產生最大的善（倫理普及主義）。 |
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The most commonly held teleological
theories are utilitarian. Utilitarian theories are of two kinds: (1) act
utilitarian theories and (2) rule utilitarian theories. For act
utilitarianism, an act is morally right and obligatory if it would produce
the most utility (the best consequences) under prevailing conditions. Since
this means one must calculate the effects of his action in each situation, no
general rules such as “telling the truth produces the greatest general good”
should be stated. Rule utilitarianism, on the other hand, claims that an act
is right if it would be more beneficial to have a code of moral rules
permitting that act than one which excluded it. Thus, rule utilitarianism
looks for the rules that as a whole produce the greatest utility, and it
prescribes them. With a rule utilitarian theory, like situations are handled
in like ways, whereas with act utilitarianism, like situations are not
necessarily treated in the same way. |
最常見的目的論理論是功利主義。功利主義理論有兩類：（1）行動功利主義，（2）規則功利主義。行動功利主義認為如果根據目前的狀況，產生最大的效用（最好的後果）的行動就是道德正確和必須行的。由於這說法的意思是在每一種情況都必須計算行動的後果，因此一般性的規則，如「說真話產生最大的普遍益處」是不成立的。另一方面，規則功利主義認為一個行動被一套道德法律允許就比一個被法律排斥的行動更好，這就成為正確的行動。因此，規則功利主義找尋在整體上產生最大效用的規則，然後指令它們。根據規則功利主義的理論，同樣的情況將以同樣的方式處理。但行動功利主義則對同樣的情況可能有不同的處理。 |
Deontological
Theories
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（二）義務論理論
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Deontologists deny that the moral goodness
of an act is determined by the non-moral consequences it produces. Other
considerations make an act morally right or wrong, obligatory or forbidden.
For example, an act is considered right because it keeps a promise, it is
just, or God commands it. The key for deontological theories is that an act
is right because it is one’s duty to do it, and it is one’s duty for some
reason other than the consequences stemming from the act. Deontologists do
not ignore consequences altogether. They only claim that consequences are not
the basis for deciding the moral rightness or wrongness of an action.
Examples of deontological theories include prescriptivist theories like
divine command theories and reason-based systems like Kant’s. |
義務論者否認一個行動在道德上的善由所產生的非道德後果而確定。其他因素會使一個行動成為正確或錯誤、應作的或被禁止的。例如，一個行動若回應一個承諾，若它是正義的，若它是神命令的，這就使行動成為正確的。道義論理論的關鍵是，一個行動基於它是一個人的責任就成為正確，它成為責任並非因為行動所產生的後果。義務論者不是完全忽視後果，他們只是宣稱，行動的正誤並不基於後果。義務論的理論包括指令主義理論（像神聖命令理論）和以理性為基礎的系統（如康德的理論）。 |
Mixed
Theories
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（三）混合理論
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Some ethicists favor a theory that mixes
deontological and teleological concerns. They believe that determining right
and wrong must involve consulting rules. However, they are concerned that
consulting rules alone might obligate one to do acts that are possibly
arbitrarily chosen and may even have detrimental results for human
well-being. For example, on a very strict divine command theory, what makes
an act right or wrong is God’s command. Nothing about the act itself commends
it for prescription or prohibition. Theories like this give the impression
that God may arbitrarily choose which norms we must obey. Likewise, depending
on what God prescribes, the results could be harmful if those rules are
obeyed. |
一些倫理學家支持混合義務論和目的論的理論。他們認為，判斷是非必須參考道德律。但是，他們擔心單單參考規則可能強制人作出任意選擇的行動，甚至可能對人類有害。例如，在一個嚴格的神聖命令理論中，決定行動的正誤是神的命令。行動本身沒有表明它是被指令的或被禁止的。這樣的理論給人的印象是，神可以任意選擇一些我們必須遵守的規範。視乎神指令的是什麼，遵守這些規則可能有害。 |
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Think again of Ockham’s claim that God
could demand that we obey the opposite of the Ten Commandments. That would
mean that murder, stealing, lying, etc., are morally good and our moral
obligation, but obviously, the consequences of such acts could be ruinous for
the victims. Concerns like these have led many ethicists to argue that the
moral worth of an act must be determined by its ends and consequences at
least as much as by deontological considerations. |
再想想岳金的主張，即神可以要求我們服從十誡的反面行動。這就是說謀殺、偷竊、說謊等等都變成道德的善，也是我們的道德義務。但是，這些行為的後果顯然傷害受害者。這種擔憂導致許多倫理學家辯說，行動的道德價值取決於其目的和後果，至少與義務論的理由同樣重要。 |
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William Frankena offers an example of a
mixed theory that he calls a mixed deontological theory. He says there are
two basic principles of moral obligation: benevolence and justice. From the
former stems principles such as the principle of utility, the principle of
not injuring anyone, and the principle of not interfering with another’s liberty.
From justice follows principles such as equality before the law. Now, his
theory is deontological in that it tells us to decide on right and wrong by
consulting rules normally associated with morality. It is teleological in
that “it goes on to say that the best way to tell what rules we should live
by is to see which rules best fulfill the joint requirements of utility and
justice.” |
法蘭堅拿提供了一個混合理論，他稱為混合義務論。他認為道德義務有兩個基本原則：仁愛和正義。仁愛引致其他原則，包括實用的原則、不傷害人的原則、不干預別人自由的原則。正義引致的原則是在法律面前人人平等。法蘭堅拿的理論是義務論的，因為它告訴我們要參考通常與道德有關的規則去決定正確和錯誤。它也是目的論的，因為「它接着說，要知道哪些是最好的規則，最好的方法是看看哪些規則滿足效用和正義兩方面的要求。」 |
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DOWNLOAD (MS-Word document)
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SOURCE:
John S. Feinberg and Paul D. Feinberg (2010): Ethics for a brave new world, second edition (Wheaton, IL:
Crossway), 24-35 (excerpt from chapter 1). |
Cognitivism
and Non-cognitivism
Criteria
for Good and Bad Actions